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Scholars and statesmen have debated the influence of international commerce on war and peace for thousands of years. Over the centuries, analysts have generally treated the questions ""Does international commerce influence security?"" and ""Do trade flows influence security?"" as synonymous. In Producing Security, Stephen Brooks maintains that such an overarching focus on the security implications of trade once made sense but no longer does. Trade is no longer the primary means of organizing international economic transactions; rather, where and how multinational corporations (

A major theoretical shortcoming in international relations (IR) is the lack of any semblance of a common understanding regarding the role of grand theory. This article argues that explicit theoretical work of this sort is useful, but that a search for a single overarching grand theory to guide inquiry is misguided and that the primary business of IR is to form and evaluate middle-range theories.

AbstractPolitical scientists and economists have long been interested in the role of special interests in the policymaking process. In the past few years, a series of important new books have argued forcefully that the lobbying activities of economic actors have an important influence on the prospects for war and peace. All of these analyses claim that whether economic actors enhance or decrease the likelihood of conflict ultimately depends on the domestic political balance between economic actors who have a strong vested interest in pushing for peace versus those that do not. I advance two contrary arguments. At least among the advanced states, I posit there are no longer any economic actors who will be favorable toward war and who will lobby the government with this preference. All of the identified mechanisms that previously contributed to such lobbying in these states have been swept away with the end of colonialism and the rise of economic globalization. In particular, I show that the current structure of the global economy now makes it feasible for foreign direct investment to serve as an effective substitute for conquest in a way that was not possible in previous eras. My second argument concerns those economic actors in advanced states with a preference for peace. I posit that it has become unnecessary for them to directly lobby the government to avoid war on economic grounds because economic globalization—the accumulation of decisions by economic actors throughout the globe—now has sufficiently clear economic incentives for leaders.

Kirshner, Jonathan: The changing calculus of conflict? - In: Security Studies (London). - 16 (October-December 2007) 4. - S. 583-597 + Gholz, Eugene: Globalization, systems integration, and the future of great power war. - In: Security Studies (London). - 16 (October-December 2007) 4. - S. 615-636 + Caverley, Jonathan D.: United States hegemony and the new economics of defense. - In: Security Studies (London). - 16 (October-December 2007) 4. - S. 598-614

This article examines the conditions under which conquest is likely to reap significant economic rewards. Scholars have largely focused on how the level of popular resistance within the vanquished country influences the benefits of conquest. What needs to be scrutinized in greater depth is how post-World War II economic transformations within the most advanced countries affect the benefits of conquest. This article focuses on examining one particular economic change that has been neglected for the most part in the security and peace literature: the globalization of production. The article delineates four recent changes in the structure of global production and outlines how each of these economic transformations alters the benefits of conquest. The collective impact of the arguments strongly indicates that the benefits of conquest have declined significantly in recent years within the most economically advanced countries.

Entgegen den üblichen Hinweisen von Theoretikern internationaler Beziehungen auf die Gemeinsamkeiten realistischer Theorieansätze arbeitet der Autor die Unterschiede dieser Positionenhinsichtlich staatlichen Verhaltens heraus: 1. Werden Staaten in ihrer außenpolitischen Strategie eher von einem worst-case-Denken bezüglich der Möglichkeit eines Konflikts bestimmt? 2. Wie gewichten Staaten ihre kurz- undlangfristigen Ziele gegeneinander? 3. Wie gewichten Staaten militärische Sicherheit und wirtschaftliche Macht gegeneinander? Brooks demonstriert diese unterschiedlichen Einschätzungen anhand der deutschen und japanischen Außenpolitik, der nuklearen Proliferation in der Ukraine und der regionalen Wirtschaftskooperation zwischen Entwicklungsländern. (SWP-Gtv)

International relations scholars have tended to focus on realism's common features rather than exploring potential differences. Realists do share certain assumptions and are often treated as a group, but such a broad grouping obscures systematic divisions within realist theory. Recently, some analysts have argued that it is necessary to differentiate within realism. This article builds on this line of argument. The potential, and need, to divide realism on the basis of divergent assumptions has so far been overlooked. In this article I argue that realism can be split into two competing branches by revealing latent divisions regarding a series of assumptions about state behavior. The first branch is Kenneth Waltz's well-known neorealist theory; a second branch, termed here "postclassical realism," has yet to be delineated as a major alternative but corresponds with a number of realist analyses that cohere with one another and are incompatible with Waltzian neorealism.

This paper examines (1) the transformations in the international economy that led to the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Free Trade Agreement and (2) the factors working in favor and against the agreement's implementation. The underlying motivation for AFTA is examined in terms of being a reaction to the rise of the European Community and the North American Free Trade Agreement, which led to fears of reduced foreign investment, trade diversion, diminished bargaining power in negotiations, and lower international competitiveness. The implementation of AFTA is discussed as being constrained by a lumber of factors, including regional security tensions, product exclusions, long lead time, uneven levels of development, insufficient coordination of external policy, as well as lack of treatment of NTBs, subsidies and government procurement practices. ; Chief of Naval Operations ; http://archive.org/details/aseanfreetradeag00broo ; OP-60 ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.