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This book provides insights into current issues in corporate governance by examining twelve cases from the 2010s and 2020s where corporate governance was seen to be an issue. The cases are designed to introduce the reader to real life episodes with corporate governance implications, shedding light on why corporate scandals continue to occuer, to what extent these are a corporate governance failure, and in which ways corporate governance and the behaviour of those involved in ensuring good governance and an ethical culture in their business - may be improved in the future. This book will be of interest to businesspeople, students of business, and lawyers and motivate discussion on the reasons why corporate governance failed, or was seen to be inadequate. Professor Jean Jinghan Chen joined the University of Macau in 2018 as a Chair Professor in Accounting and Finance and the Dean of Faculty of Business Administration. Prior to joining the University of Macau, Professor Jean Chen worked in the UK Higher Education Sector for almost 30 years. She was a Chair Professor of Accounting and Finance in the University of Southampton, at the University of Surrey and at Xian Jiaotong-Liverpool University.

Since economic reforms started in 1978, urbanisation in China has been taking place at a faster rate than ever before. This recent urban development is characterised by overcrowded agglomerations, fast­growing small-medium cities, imbalance in regional development, widening rural-urban disparities, urban housing shortage, heavy traffic congestion and serious damage to the environment. This research examines the characteristics of China's urbanisation and the patterns of its development. Although the patterns can be explained by cumulative causation, the trickle-down effect should not be ignored because the effectiveness of trickle-down also depends on the geographical distance. More research is necessary to test which theory can better explain the patterns of China's recent urbanisation development. This article also studies the environmental impact of China's rapid urbanisation development. It is argued that future growth need not be purchased at the expense of higher levels of pollution. But China is a developing and growing country with many competing claims on public and private resources. Reconciling these claims and prioritising environmental policies requires careful analysis of the economic costs and benefits of urbanisation. At present, the Chinese government's agenda on urbanisation, environment and development in the 21st century is but a visionary concept, which lacks a comprehensive policy framework and realistic implementation measurements. Actions for the next twenty-five years rest on three pillars: harnessing market forces, creating incentives for investment in cleaner urban environment, and developing effective regulation and a legal framework.

"There is potential for institutional investors to improve their role in corporate governance. In order to increase their influence institutional investors need to be prepared to pursue an escalation strategy. However, such an approach also needs a strong long-term commitment and investment perspective as well as an attitude that considers the long-term interests of the company. Institutional investors have a high level of expertise that can contribute to the widely discussed improvement of the competence and independence of boards. Important prerequisites of institutional investors who wish to play a role in corporate governance are no conflict of interest and sufficient sector expertise. The managerial implications are that the investor relations function is well established. Communication is the most appropriate measure. However, other typical and presumably more powerful measures like use of voting rights, engagement in the AGM, regular contact with the members of the supervisory board, taking a seat on the supervisory board, owning a meaningful company stake and collaboration with other shareholders play a minor role."

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Map of China -- The Editors -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Urban Land Management in China: Completing the Policy Agenda -- 3 Development of Urban Land Policies in China -- 4 China's Land Reform and the Establishment of a Property Market: Problems and Prospects -- 5 Pricing of Land in China's Reforms -- 6 The Impact of China's Economic Reforms upon the Construction Industry -- 7 Foreign Investment in the Construction Industry -- 8 Social Cost Benefit Analysis of China's Construction Investment -- 9 Pioneer Urban Housing Reform in China -- 10 Sustainable Development: A Sino-British Comparison -- References.

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueThis study examines the direct effect of family ownership on innovation in emerging markets by using data from Indian family‐controlled publicly listed firms as its sample. In particular, we study (1) the direct effects of family ownership on innovation and (2) the influences of business group affiliation on these family firms.Research Findings/InsightsUsing an unbalanced panel of 395 Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) listed Indian firms during the years 2001 and 2008, we found that the impact of family ownership on innovation productivity is positive (after controlling for possible endogeneity). We further emphasized the business group affiliation of family firms and distinguished between the innovation activities of group‐affiliated and stand‐alone family firms. We found that affiliating with top 50 business groups increases the innovation activities of these family firms.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsTheoretically, we complement agency theory by incorporating both the institutional perspective and the external resourcing perspective to provide a more robust framework for examining the impact of family ownership on innovation in emerging markets. Methodologically, we adopted a more rigorous econometrics method by providing a panel analysis that used a system GMM estimator and addressed the endogeneity issue thoroughly, which represented a significant improvement over the shortcomings of the methodologies found in the existing literature.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur findings suggest that the Indian government should provide support for affiliating family firms with business groups while improving policies on information disclosures; it should also establish a proper corporate governance mechanism for private and public family business. The findings further suggest that a corporate governance code should encourage family firms to have an independent professional CEO.

Intro -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Alibaba Group-The Evolution of Transnational Governance -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.1.1 About Alibaba Group -- 2.1.1.1 Alibaba's Business Scope -- 2.1.1.2 Alibaba Group's Public Listing -- 2.1.2 Alibaba Group Development Strategy and Structural Evolution -- 2.1.3 Overview of Corporate Governance at Alibaba Group's Parent Company -- 2.2 Transnational Governance Evolution -- 2.2.1 Changes in Shareholding Structure -- 2.2.1.1 1999-2005: Initiation Period, VC/PE Entry -- 2.2.1.2 2005-2010: Venture Capital/Private (VC/PE) Equity Exit, Yahoo Buys in -- 2.2.1.3 2010-Present: Reopening the Door to PE Financing, Public Share Issue -- 2.2.2 Board of Directors -- 2.3 Analysis of Transnational Governance Evolution -- 2.3.1 Changes in Shareholder Composition -- 2.3.1.1 1999-2005: Start-up VC/PE Entry Period, Shareholder Structure and Impact -- 2.3.1.2 2005-2010: VC/PE Exit, Yahoo Shares Result in Shareholder Structural Change -- 2.3.1.3 2010-Present: Reopening the Door to PE Financing, Public Share Offering -- 2.3.2 Changes in the Composition of the Board of Directors -- 2.3.3 Evolution of Control -- 2.3.3.1 1999-2004: Jack Ma and Other Founders Are the First Shareholder, Equity Control -- 2.3.3.2 2005-2010: Same Shareholding, Based on the Same Proportion of the Voting Rights of Founders, Such as Jack Ma, as Well as Yahoo -- 2.3.3.3 2010-Present: Partnership System, Outside the Equity Logic -- 2.4 Impact of Transnational Governance Evolution -- 2.4.1 Shareholders, Board of Directors, Senior Management Team Building and Business Development -- 2.4.2 Parent and Subsidiary Governance Model Choices -- 2.5 Discussions and Conclusions -- 2.5.1 Alibaba's Transnational Governance Facing up to Risk.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Boxes -- List of Abbreviations -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Urban Growth -- 3 The Spatial Structure of Urban Areas -- 4 Housing -- 5 The Location and Globalization of Urban Economic Activity -- 6 Urban Development and Renewal -- 7 Property Development -- 8 Property Investment -- 9 Urban Planning, Land Policy and the Market -- 10 Welfare Economics, the Environment and Urban Congestion -- 11 Conclusions -- Index.

ABSTRACTManuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: We investigate the effect of insider control from the managerial power perspective and the global pay benchmarks from the behavioral approach on Chinese executive compensation.Research Findings: Based on a balanced panel sample of 502 Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2006, we find that both CEO duality and CEO ownership exert significant influence on Chinese executive compensation contracting and they contribute to the high level of executive compensation. We support the managerial power hypothesis by arguing that CEO duality and CEO shareholding tend to entrench insider managers further to collude with government officials and extract a firm's assets. Shareholdings appear to actively restrain managers from serving their self‐interests as to their pay levels, including on the board independence and the supervisory board levels. However, private institutional shareholdings perform actively in restraining managerial influence on the executive pay setting. There is an upward increase in the executive pay levels due to the global pay benchmark effects introduced by foreign investment. The compensation committees' decisions on executive pay levels are largely influenced by the global peer group's pay levels, rather than linking to firm performance as predicted by the optimal contracting model.Theoretical Implications: We extend the optimal contracting model by incorporating the managerial power hypothesis to demonstrate how insider control affects the Chinese executive pay setting. We also add a behavioral approach to reflect how the global pay benchmarks affect the Chinese executive compensation setting via the negotiation between a firm's compensation committee and its managers.Practitioner/Policy Implications: The Chinese government should consider exerting rigorous restrictions on executive shareholding and management buy‐out as an incentive for managers. In addition, the Chinese Code of Corporate Governance should explicitly restrict CEO duality. The government should be aware of the potential influence of behavioral bias in human decisions departing from rational economical criteria, and set policies to balance the benefits of introduction of foreign investment against the costs of resultant excessive executive compensation, and the benefits of setting a compensation committee as a corporate governance control device against the costs of the compensation committees working with the executives together to increase the executive pay level.

Prior evidence suggests that board independence may enhance financial performance, but this relationship has been tested almost exclusively for Anglo-American countries. To explore the boundary conditions of this prominent governance mechanism, we examine the impact of the formal and information institutions of 18 national business systems on the board independence-financial performance relationship. Our results show that while the direct effect of independence is weak, national-level institutions significantly moderate the independence-performance relationship. Our findings suggest that the efficacy of board structures is likely to be contingent on the specific national context, but the type of legal system is insignificant.