Suchergebnisse

Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Abbreviations -- List of Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction: Promoting Regional Integration and Transforming Conflicts? -- Definitions -- Regional Integration -- Regional Conflict -- Conflict Transformation -- The State of the Art -- The Analytical Framework -- A Two-step Model -- Three Logics of Impact -- Case Selection -- The Structure of the Book -- References -- Chapter 2: Adapting to Regional Challenges? The Brussels Perspective on the Promotion of Regional Integration and Conflict Transformation -- Introduction -- The Promotion of RI Towards the Four Regions: A Comparative Assessment -- The Record as Seen from Brussels -- Accounting for and Adapting to the Failure of RI Promotion: An EU Perspective -- The EU as an Adaptive Normative Power -- Adjusting Incentives and Social Learning to Transform Conflicts -- Reconsidering the EU as a Model of Regional Conflict Transformation -- Conclusion -- References -- Part I: Regional Integration and Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa -- Introduction: Middle East and North Africa -- Reference -- Chapter 3: Israel-Palestine: The Mediterranean Paradox -- Introduction -- Assessing Regional Integration Initiatives -- Overview of Regional Integration in the Region -- EU Support for Regional Integration in the Mediterranean -- Assessing the EU's Pathways of Influence on Regional Integration and Conflict Transformation in Israel-Palestine -- Compulsion -- Social Learning -- Model Setting -- Assessing the Pathways' Impact -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 4: Western Sahara: A 'Head-in-the-Sand' Approach to Maghrebi Integration -- Introduction to the Conflict -- An Overview of Regional Integration in the Maghreb -- EU Presence and Policies in the Maghreb

This paper contributes to the debate about the normative assessment of securitisation in light of Covid-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It develops the distinction of progressive and regressive securitisation. In doing so, it emphasises the processual, contextual and ambiguous nature of securitisation. I suggest that progressive securitisation is closely linked to the solidarisation, whereas regressive securitisation implies the pluralisation of international society. The two cases of Covid-19 and Russia illustrate that international order has increasingly been characterised by regressive securitisation and a pluralisation of international society, despite possible alternatives, such as a transnational response to the spread of Covid-19. They have thus contributed to the further demise of the post–Cold War liberal order, which despite its problems, has involved a re-orientation of security away from state territory and national identity as the core referent objects. I end with a plea to take the ethics of security more seriously again, and in particular to scrutinise the ways in which our own behaviour reinforces regressive securitisation.

La guerre de la Russie contre l'Ukraine pose un défi à l'ordre international et remet en cause à la fois institutions et pratiques. Il convient de s'y pencher à nouveau pour réfléchir à une future architecture de sécurité pour l'Europe, même s'il est aujourd'hui impossible de savoir quel sera l'état du rapport de force.

This article discusses the relevance of discourse in the analysis of EU foreign policy. Instead of using discourse as a structure, the discursive struggles in meaning production are emphasised. The article argues that the literature trying to make a contribution to the explanation of EU foreign policy has so far overemphasised the positive function of discourses in influencing policies in their substance. In contrast, the article focuses on the delimiting function of discourses in providing the boundaries of the kinds of policies which can be legitimately pursued. From this point of view, important discursive struggles take place exactly about these limits, and it is only through the setting of these limits that identities and norms are provided with clearer meanings. The article illustrates this framework by focusing on the debate about normative power Europe. It argues that an important aspect of this debate which has been missing from the literature so far is that it is indeed engaging in a struggle over what is acceptable as a policy of a normative power and is what not, and that it is therefore engaged in setting the limits of legitimate EU foreign policy. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright NISA.]