Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- The Argument -- The Contribution -- Plan of the Book -- References -- Chapter 2 The Regulatory Power of Corporations -- Governance, Regulation, Power and Authority -- The Governance Perspective -- Corporate Strategies in the Regulatory Process -- Beyond Efficiency: Adopting a Power Approach -- Legitimate Power: Authority -- Conceptualising Regulatory Power -- Experts -- Innovators -- Operators -- Selection of Industry Sectors -- References -- Chapter 3 Protecting Consumers and the Environment in Europe -- Corporate Versus Diffused Interests -- Corporate Interests in EU Politics -- The Rising Power of Diffused Interests -- Responsiveness of Policymakers -- The Industry Sectors at EU-Level -- Corporate Regulatory Strategies -- Voluntary Agreements -- Beyond Legislation -- The Use of Litigation -- Areas of EU Regulation -- References -- Chapter 4 The Expert: Striving for a Circular Economy -- European Paper and Plastics Industries -- Paper Industry -- Plastics Industry -- Consumer Protection and Environmental Groups -- Regulating Paper and Plastics -- Expert or Gatekeeper? -- The Paper Industry: We Are the Recycling Experts! -- The Regulatory Power of the Paper Industry -- The Plastics Industry: We Go Green! -- The Regulatory Power of the Plastics Industry -- References -- Chapter 5 The Innovator: Boosting Resource Efficiency -- European Home Appliance and ICT Industries -- The Home Appliance Industry -- The ICT Industry -- Consumer Protection and Environmental Groups -- Regulating Home Appliances and Consumer Electronics -- Innovator or Top Dog? -- The Home Appliance Industry: Binding Regulation! -- Compliance Through Litigation? the Example of "Hoovergate" -- The Regulatory Power of the Home Appliance Industry.

AbstractBuilding on the existing literature on business power that has evolved against the background of a liberal economic world order, this article develops a novel analytical framework to capture business strategies in an altered, geoeconomic context. It addresses the research question whether and how business power has been affected by the more recent turn of European policy‐makers to adopt geoeconomic measures in response to external geopoliticising pressures. The relevance of these categories for analysis is illustrated by discussing recent cases of business lobbying on the EU's geoeconomic agenda, as well as business responses to the sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. These illustrative examples show that whilst most business actors have adapted their strategies, there are also cases where business actors adhere to and defend the status quo. The article prepares the ground for further research on the understudied consequences of the geoeconomic turn for business power.

AbstractJoint Institutional Frameworks governing the EU's relations with third countries often fail to address important issues of sectoral governance. Non‐EU countries benefit from access to EU sectoral bodies, but this is limited, and alternative avenues of co‐operation are therefore needed. This article contributes to existing research on EU bilateral relations, which has thus far not paid sufficient attention to the external face of sectoral governance. The qualitative case comparison studies the well‐established, yet increasingly politicized bilateral co‐operation with Switzerland in order to draw insights for UK–EU relations, and contrasts two strategically important areas of market integration, namely electricity and financial markets. The findings show that politicization and (external) disintegration have repercussions for allegedly 'technical' areas of co‐operation where formalized requirements for EU sectoral bodies, public and private, become more stringent and less permissive to accommodate informal modes of co‐operation that in the past facilitated external participation.

Joint Institutional Frameworks in bilateral relations are circumscribed in policy scope, can lack adequate instruments for dynamic adaptation and provide limited access to decision-making processes internal to the contracting parties. Informal governance, the involvement of private actors as well as rules such as equivalence provide avenues to remedy these limits in bilateral relations in sectoral governance. Through bilateral agreements, the scope of territoriallybound political authority is expanded. The formalised and institutionalised frameworks and bodies established are, however, frequently accompanied by mechanisms of informal cooperation and special rules either to cover policy fields where no contractual relation exists, to provide for flexible solutions where needed, or to involve both public and private actors that otherwise do not have access to formal decision-making bodies. This SAFE working paper conceptualises formal and informal modes of cooperation and varying actor constellations. It discusses their relevance for the case of bilateral relations between the European Union (EU) andSwitzerland in sectoral governance. More specifically, it draws lessons from EU-Swiss sectoral governance of financial and electricity markets for the future relations of the EU with the United Kingdom (UK). The findings suggest that there are distinct governance arrangements across sectors, while the patterns of sectoral governance are expected to look very much alike in the United Kingdom and Switzerland in the years to come. The general takeaway is that Brexit will have repercussions for the EU's external relations with other third countries, putting ever more emphasis on formal and rule-based approaches, while leaving a need for sector-specific cross border co-operation.

Joint Institutional Frameworks in bilateral relations are circumscribed in policy scope, can lack adequate instruments for dynamic adaptation and provide limited access to decision-making processes internal to the contracting parties. Informal governance, the involvement of private actors as well as rules such as equivalence provide avenues to remedy these limits in bilateral relations in sectoral governance. Through bilateral agreements, the scope of territorially bound political authority is expanded. The formalised and institutionalised frameworks and bodies established are, however, frequently accompanied by mechanisms of informal cooperation and special rules either to cover policy fields where no contractual relation exists, to provide for flexible solutions where needed, or to involve both public and private actors that otherwise do not have access to formal decision-making bodies. This SAFE working paper conceptualises formal and informal modes of cooperation and varying actor constellations. It discusses their relevance for the case of bilateral relations between the European Union (EU) and Switzerland in sectoral governance. More specifically, it draws lessons from EU-Swiss sectoral governance of financial and electricity markets for the future relations of the EU with the United Kingdom (UK). The findings suggest that there are distinct governance arrangements across sectors, while the patterns of sectoral governance are expected to look very much alike in the United Kingdom and Switzerland in the years to come. The general takeaway is that Brexit will have repercussions for the EU's external relations with other third countries, putting ever more emphasis on formal and rule-based approaches, while leaving a need for sector-specific cross border co-operation.

Dieser Beitrag widmet sich der Frage, wie Wirtschaftsakteure den Zyklus der Rechtsetzung auf europäischer Ebene zu beeinflussen suchen. Untersucht wird insbesondere, warum europäische Wirtschaftsverbände in drei Sektoren (Kunststoffindustrie, Haushaltsgerätehersteller, Elektronikbranche) Selbstregulierung und Prozessführung in unterschiedlicher Weise nutzen. Konzeptuell schlägt die vergleichende Fallstudie eine Brücke zur Governanceforschung sowie der Literatur zur Internationalen Politischen Ökonomie (IPÖ). So ergänzt die Perspektive auf sowohl konflikthafte wie auch kooperative Strukturen die Diskussion um den sogenannten Schatten der Hierarchie in der Governanceforschung. Mit Bezug auf die in der IPÖ etablierten Kategorien zur Analyse wirtschaftlicher Macht weist der Befund darauf hin, dass der Blick auf instrumentelle Macht, also die direkte Einflussnahme auf Gesetzgebung, zwingend ergänzt werden muss um eine systematische Erfassung struktureller Macht. Diesbezüglich zeigt die Untersuchung, dass Wirtschaftsverbände gerade außerhalb der legislativen Arena vielfältige regulative Strategien mobilisieren, die darauf abzielen, Regelsetzung mitzugestalten, zu substituieren, zu verhindern, zu blockieren oder rückgängig zu machen.

This working paper suggests to analyse agencification as a double process of institutional and policy centralisation. To that end, it develops a categorisation of agencies that incorporates these two dimensions. More specifically, it is argued that mixed outcomes where the levels of institutional and policy centralisation diverge can be expected to be the rule rather than the exception, in line with the hybrid nature of EU agencies as inbetweeners. Moreover, the fiduciary setting hits important legal constraints given the limits to delegation in the EU context. Against this backdrop a process whereby institutional centralisation develops incrementally and remains limited, yet is accompanied by a process of substantial policy centralisation, appears as the most promising path for EU agencification. A fiduciary setting, where a strong agency enjoys a high degree of independence and operates in a centralised policy space, by contrast, should be the exception. The comparative study of the process of agencification in the energy and banking sector is insightful in the light of these expectations. The incremental nature of institutional change in energy exemplifies the usual path of agencification, which is conducive to a weak agency operating in a relatively centralised policy space. Agencification in banking, by contrast, has led to a rather unusual outcome where the strong agency model combines with a fragmented policy context.

This working paper suggests to analyse agencification as a double process of institutional and policy centralisation. To that end, it develops a categorisation of agencies that incorporates these two dimensions. More specifically, it is argued that mixed outcomes where the levels of institutional and policy centralisation diverge can be expected to be the rule rather than the exception, in line with the hybrid nature of EU agencies as inbetweeners. Moreover, the fiduciary setting hits important legal constraints given the limits to delegation in the EU context. Against this backdrop a process whereby institutional centralisation develops incrementally and remains limited, yet is accompanied by a process of substantial policy centralisation, appears as the most promising path for EU agencification. A fiduciary setting, where a strong agency enjoys a high degree of independence and operates in a centralised policy space, by contrast, should be the exception. The comparative study of the process of agencification in the energy and banking sector is insightful in the light of these expectations. The incremental nature of institutional change in energy exemplifies the usual path of agencification, which is conducive to a weak agency operating in a relatively centralised policy space. Agencification in banking, by contrast, has led to a rather unusual outcome where the strong agency model combines with a fragmented policy context.