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Article(electronic)#22017
Political Hypotheses and Mathematical Conclusions
In: Future of Economic Design, (Laslier, Moulin, Sanver, and Zwicker, eds.),Springer-Verlag, Forthcoming
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Open Access#32015
The Myth of the Condorcet Winner
There is consensus among legal scholars that, when choosing among multiple alternatives, the Condorcet winner, should it exist, is the preferred option. In this essay I will refute that claim, both normatively and positively. In addition, I will suggest that a different approach, based in behavioral economics, might be a more productive way to model the choices that legislatures make among multiple alternatives.
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Article(print)#52012
Majority judgment: measuring, ranking, and electing
In: Public choice, Volume 151, Issue 3-4, p. 807-810
ISSN: 0048-5829
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Article(electronic)#62012
The Myth of the Condorcet Winner
In: 22 Supreme Court Economic Review 207 (2015).
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Article(electronic)#72012
The institutional dimension of election design
In: Public choice, Volume 153, Issue 3-4, p. 287-293
ISSN: 1573-7101
The traditional approach to election design focuses solely on the best method to aggregate the preferences of the voters. But elections are run by institutions, and the interests of the institution may not be reflected in the preferences of the voter. In this comment I discuss how institutional considerations come into play in election design in three areas: political representation, corporate voting, and judging in competitions. As an illustration of this institutional approach I appraise the method by which the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences selects the nominees and winners of the Oscars. Adapted from the source document.
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Article(print)#82012
The institutional dimension of election design
In: Public choice, Volume 153, Issue 3, p. 287-293
ISSN: 0048-5829
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Article(electronic)#9July 15, 2011
Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki: Majority judgment: measuring, ranking, and electing: Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010. xv + 414 pages. USD 40.00 (cloth)
In: Public choice, Volume 151, Issue 3-4, p. 807-810
ISSN: 1573-7101
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Article(electronic)#10April 9, 2011
The institutional dimension of election design
In: Public choice, Volume 153, Issue 3-4, p. 287-293
ISSN: 1573-7101
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Article(print)#112011
Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki: Majority judgment: measuring, ranking, and electing
In: Public choice, Volume 151, Issue 3, p. 807-811
ISSN: 0048-5829
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Article(electronic)#122011
Book Review: Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki: Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing
In: Public Choice, Volume 151, Issue 3
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Article(electronic)#132010
The Institutional Dimension of Election Design
In: Public Choice, April 2011
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Article(electronic)#142009
And the Oscar Goes to...' The Academy Awards and the Institutional Dimension of Election Design
In: Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-23
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Article(electronic)#15March 2004
Voting power and at-large representation
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 47, Issue 2, p. 219-232
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