In the last quarter of the twentieth century, both Argentina and Brazil decentralized their governments. Both countries also started this process with similar institutions of intergovernmental relations and in the context of military regimes. However, whereas the military in Argentina took an administrative decentralization measure first (ie., the transfer of primary level education from the central government to the provinces), the Brazilian military began the process of decentralization with a political measure (the reinstallation of the direct popular election of governors). The article shows that different types of militarism, in particular the different ways in which the military occupied the state apparatus and controlled the political system, explain the occurrence of opposite initial steps in the decentralization process. Such different beginnings led ultimately to varying degrees of autonomy for governors and mayors. Thus, by the end of the century, Brazilian governors and mayors had gained significantly more autonomy than their counterparts in Argentina. Adapted from the source document.
Both advocates and critics of decentralization assume that decentralization invariably increases the power of subnational governments. However, a closer examination of the consequences of decentralization across countries reveals that the magnitude of such change can range from substantial to insignificant. In this article, I propose asequential theory of decentralizationthat has three main characteristics: (1) it defines decentralization as aprocess, (2) it takes into account theterritorial interestsof bargaining actors, and (3) it incorporatespolicy feedback effects. I argue that the sequencing of different types of decentralization (fiscal, administrative, and political) is a key determinant of the evolution of intergovernmental balance of power. I measure this evolution in the four largest Latin American countries and apply the theory to the two extreme cases (Colombia and Argentina). I show that, contrary to commonly held opinion, decentralization does not necessarily increase the power of governors and mayors.
Latin American development : perspectives and debates / Maristella Svampa -- Fiscal policy, income redistribution, and poverty reduction in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay : an overview / Nora Lustig and Claudiney Pereira -- Social investment in Latin America / Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens -- Debt, democracy, and post-neoliberalism : thirty years of regional integration in Latin America / A]Isabella Alcaiz -- Mercosur and regional migration : a human rights approach / Marcela Cerrutti -- Venezuela between two states / George Ciccariello-Maher -- From partial to full conflict theory : A neo-Weberian portrait of post-neoliberal Venezuela / David Smilde -- Populism or democracy? : reexamining the role of "the people" in twenty-first century Latin American politics / Paulina Ochoa Espejo -- Constitutional changes and judicial power in Latin America / Roberto Gargarella -- Agents of neoliberalism? : high courts, legal preferences, and rights in Latin America / Sandra Botero -- Experimenting with participation and deliberation in Latin America : is democracy turning pragmatic? / Thamy Pogrebinschi -- The Gattopardo Era : innovation and representation in Mexico in post- neoliberal times / Gisela Zaremberg, Ernesto Isunza Vera, and Adrian Gurza Lavalle -- Anti-imperial, but not decolonial? : Vasconcelos on race and Latin American identity / Juliet Hooker -- Decolonization and plurinationality / Oscar Vega Camacho -- Postwar El Salvador : entangled aftermaths / Irina Carlota (Lotti) Silber