Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Quartino -- Indice generale -- Premessa -- Parte I - Comportamenti e diritti -- Capitolo I - Economia e diritto: ordito e trama del tessuto sociale -- Capitolo II - Diritti e doveri di cittadinanza nella storia occidentale -- Capitolo III - La capacità d'intendere e di volere nell'interpretazione economica -- Parte II - Diritti di proprietà e obbligazioni giuridiche -- Capitolo IV - "Sono beni le cose che possono formare oggetto di diritti" -- Capitolo V - I diritti di proprietà: da conflitti inevitabili a esiti efficienti -- Capitolo VI - Le obbligazionitra interazione volontaria e involontaria -- Parte III - Le organizzazioni private e pubbliche -- Capitolo VII - Vantaggi e costi delle organizzazioni -- Capitolo VIII - I problemi della committenza politica: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? -- Bibliografia essenziale.

The role of private interests in shaping public policies is pervasive both in democratic and non-democratic settings, and the basic task of any political system is that of regulating the market for political influence and sifting out the demands to be satisfied. The paper assumes that collecting and processing information - the hidden information issue materialising the vertical dimension of politics - and selecting interests, the hidden action issue materialising its horizontal dimension, are always dealt with in terms of an ideological syntax (shared goals) and of an institutional architecture (who controls the selection, and how). In analysing those components and their evolution, the paper discusses a number of biases of political screening and considers the main features of the democratic processes in that light. With the fall of information costs, ideology loses its relevance, while the growing competition of interests reduces the space for political collusion. In such a setting, pressure groups can influence policy making only by providing information. A more balanced weighting of opposed interests will eventually emphasise the quasi-judgmental nature of politics.

SUMMARYIn the SCHUMPETER‐DOWNS economic approach to politics, rational citizens vote to select a government that will supply policies to meet their preferences. There is no place in that logic for the variegated coalitions which are called political parties; voting itself is indeed irrational following JOHN STUART MILL'S view of the relationship between citizens and politicians, we suggest that voting and other political activities are the 'price' paid in an exchange relationship in which the quid pro quo is the promise of politicians to represent the opinions of citizens in parliamentary debates in what MILL called the Congress of Opinions. In that view, political parties are organizations that serve to guarantee that the implicit or quasi‐contracts between citizens and representatives are abided by and fulfilled.ZUSAMMENFASSUNGIn der demokratischen Wirtschaftstheorie von SCHUMPETER und DOWNS wird ange‐nommen, dass der bewusste, rational handelnde Staatsbürger eine Regierung wählt, die seine politischen Interessen unterstützt. In dieser Logik gibt es keinen Platz für die verschiedenen Koalitionen, die als politische Parteien bekannt sind. Der individuelle Akt des Wählens selbst wird als irrational bezeichnet. In diesem Artikel beziehen wir uns auf die Ansicht JOHN STUART MILLS, der das Verhäitnis zwischen Staatsbürgern und politischen Vertretern analysiert, und behaupten, dass der Gebrauch des Stimm‐rechts und alle politischen Tätigkeiten der "Preis" für das Versprechen des Politikers, die Interessen des Staatsbürgers im Parlament (JOHN STUART MILL nennt dasselbe "Kongress der politischen Meinungen") zu vertreten sei. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt gesehen, kann man sagen, dass politische Parteien Organisationen sind, die dazu dienen, die Erfüllung dieses impliziten Vertrages oder quasi‐Vertrages zwischen Staatsbürgern und ihren politischen Stellvertretern zu garantieren.RÉSUMÉLa théorie économique de la démocratic énoncée par SCHUMPETER et DOWNS suppose que les citoyens votent pour désigner un gouvernement qui formulera, à son tour, des choix politiques conformes à leurs préférences. Non seulement une telle façon de concevoir ne laisse aucune place à ces différentes coalitions bigarrées nommées partis politiques, mais le fait même de voter est considéré comme irrationnel. Dans cet article, prenant pretexte de ce que nous suggére JOHN STUART MILL sur les rapports entre citoyens et politiciens, nous interprétons l'expression du suffrage et les autres actes politiques individuels comme le "prix" que les citoyens patent en échange de la promesse que les hommes politiques leur font de les représenter au cours des débats parlementaires qui se déroulent dans ce que MILL définit les "Congrés des Opinions". Les partis politiques constituent, par conséquent, des organisations qui servent à garantir et à contrôler que ce contrat implicite ou que ce quasi‐contrat entre les citoyens et leurs représentants politiques soit rempli et respecté.

Uses the modern theory of rational choice to explore the 'foundations' of democracy. The authors consider diverse problems of modern democratic politics such as the importance of civic virtue, negative advertising, the interaction of democracy and markets, and the role of constitutions and of civil society in sustaining democracy

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Contributors -- Introduction -- PART 1: IN DEMOCRATIC CONTEXTS -- 1 Acquiescence to Opacity -- 2 Citizens' Knowledge, Politicians' Duplicity -- 3 Transparency and Efficiency -- PART 2: IN INTERNATIONAL SETTINGS -- 4 The Artist as a Secret Agent: Liberalism Against Populism -- 5 Jihad vs. McWorld: A Rational Choice Approach -- PART 3: CORRUPTION -- 6 Invisible Feet and Grabbing Hands: The Political Economy of Corruption and Welfare -- 7 Information, Corruption, and Measures for the Promotion of Manufactured Exports -- PART 4: GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOUR -- 8 Cases For and Against Transparency/Obfuscation in Intergovernmental Relations -- 9 Transparency in the Budget Process of a Bureaucratic Organisation: A Principal-Agent Model of Budgeting -- 10 Redistribution, Decentralization and Constitutional Rules -- Index