Suchergebnisse

Afrikanische Staaten und die Afrikanische Union kommen als eigenständige politische Akteure in der Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie für Deutschland kaum vor. Dabei zeigt der Putsch in Niger mit seinen direkten Auswirkungen auf den Abzug der Bundeswehr aus Mali exemplarisch, dass politische Entwicklungen auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent weitreichende Folgen für die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik haben. Die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie ist geprägt vom Geist der Zeitenwende. Sie trägt der Tatsache nur unzureichend Rechnung, dass der russische Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine für afrikanische Länder, die seit Jahrzehnten Erfahrungen mit gewaltsamen Konflikten auf dem Kontinent machen, keinen so umfassenden Einschnitt darstellt wie für Europa. Obwohl das Strategiedokument von der Prämisse einer multipolaren Weltordnung ausgeht, liegt das Hauptaugenmerk auf westlichen Partnern wie EU und NATO. Die namentlich nicht erwähnten BRICS-Staaten oder die G20 spielen dagegen eine untergeordnete Rolle. Anders als in den Sicherheitsstrategien Frankreichs, Großbritanniens und der USA wird der afrikanische Kontinent in der bundesdeutschen Sicherheitsstrategie stiefmütterlich behandelt und lediglich zweimal erwähnt. Dennoch bietet das Konzept der integrierten Sicherheit - mit dem damit verbundenen Fokus auf eine bessere Verzahnung von militärischer Konfliktbearbeitung, Diplomatie und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit - wichtige Impulse für die zukünftige Zusammenarbeit mit Afrika.

The swift rise of military juntas in the Sahel, their alignment with Russia, and their adept use of anti-colonial and anti-French rhetoric have left many in Europe grappling for answers. Was Europe's engagement in the Sahel in vain? How should Europe position itself vis-à-vis the new military regimes?

The withdrawal of European engagement in the Sahel has fuelled narratives of sovereignty and anti-colonial emancipation. However, the populist rhetoric of the military juntas masks a more complex reality: they govern fragile states, with the social order in flux. Their power is tenuous, hinging on fleeting public support and the acquiescence of elites.

The military juntas continue to enjoy significant public support. Their support is driven by a combination of populism, militarism, conflict aversion, and sheer desperation. However, beyond the hard-to-fulfil promise of regaining control over the security situation, the military juntas have little to offer to society. If public dissatisfaction grows, they have to choose between ramping up repression or eventually relinquishing power.

While African societies have not lost their preference for democracy, public opinion has become more divided. Unconditional support for democracy is nowhere near the supermajority it was a few years ago, but it is still dominant in all Sahel countries except for Mali.

The Organization of African Unity, recognised for its promotion of solidarity and sovereignty across Africa, just turned 60. Today, the African Union continues the OAU's spirit and mission. Sixty years of pan-African cooperation have been defined by tremendous challenges and underappreciated achievements - but, above all, they have demonstrated a continued appreciation for multilateralism.
Colonial legacies meant that nascent African states with often arbitrarily drawn borders and limited territorial control had the difficult task of achieving full decolonisation, ensuring inter-state peace, and integrating into the international system. Despite being dealt a bad hand, the early OAU played a crucial role in the strides made by the African community towards achieving these ends.
Over time, the need for African solutions and African agency in dealing with new developments and challenges has become undeniable. Efforts to make the OAU fit for purpose ultimately led to the establishment of the more authoritative and sophisticated AU at the turn of the new millennium. This concluded a remarkable institutional transformation and ushered in a new era of cooperation.
Today's AU is a natural ally for promoting norms and goals shared by the European Union and others, including democracy and good governance, human rights, economic development, peace and security, and environmental protection. With its inclusive membership and history of representation, a strong AU can play an important role in achieving progress and serve as Africa's voice on the world stage.
The African-European partnership is crucial for dealing with many issues of mutual concern, but should not be taken for granted. For the partnership to be sustainable and effective in the long run, it is important for policymakers in Europe to recognise their own hand in the challenges Africa faces, and to respect African agency, support African-led solutions, and to accept cooperation as equals.

Africa reportedly exhibits lower overall levels of electoral integrity compared to other world regions. Remedying this situation has occasioned an explosion in the adoption of election technology. In 2023, Nigeria joined the wave of election digitalisation by holding its most technologically advanced polls since the inception of the Fourth Republic. But evidence from the elections contradicts the much-touted credibility guarantees that such technology comes with.
Previous elections in Nigeria have witnessed a consistent decline in voter participation. Turnout in the just-ended 2023 presidential elections was a paltry 29 per cent, down from 69 per cent in 2003 and 53 per cent in 2011.
Popular distrust in the electoral process generally, and in the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) particularly, has seen voter apathy in recent elections reach record levels.
To salvage this situation, Nigeria has adopted digital technology to, among other things, enhance transparency and integrity in the electoral process and boost popular confidence in the INEC. Digital technology is expected to guarantee a credible electoral roll and bring some robustness to voter-accreditation processes, while simultaneously enabling public access to results in real time.
However, the technology deployed in the 2023 elections proved to be insufficient in resolving these credibility deficits. Aside from the multiple technical challenges that bedevilled the technology in the course of these elections, voter turnout was the lowest in the history of the Fourth Republic and popular trust in the electoral process and the INEC does not seem salvageable in the short term.
Ensuring that digital technologies guarantee credible elections in sub-Saharan Africa requires governments, democracy promoters, civil society groups, and international organisations prioritise election cybersecurity, build up local technical capacities, and focus on Election Management Bodies becoming more transparent, especially regarding the use of such technology.

Military coups, leaders abolishing constitutional term limits, and violent conflicts undermining democratic governance have made headlines in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. However, longitudinal data from key democracy indices and survey data from Afrobarometer reveal that the state of democracy in Africa is better than expected in certain regards. Democracy indices show a strong increase for sub-Saharan Africa since 1990. While only relatively few countries qualify as "democratic" and many more remain in the grey zone between democracy and autocracy, recent "backsliding" trends have not offset past gains. Although frequently dissatisfied with their leaders and with how democracy works, two-thirds of Africans support democracy while even bigger majorities reject authoritarian alternatives. Africans' support for it already makes an independent case for democracy. In addition, democracy also means freedom from oppression as well as the right to choose one's rulers. Democratic systems can manage conflicts peacefully and are arguably better for socio-economic development. Major threats to democracy include adverse socio-economic conditions, intergroup conflicts, a politicised military, and authoritarian-minded civilian leaders. External factors such as support for dictators, the influx of authoritarian ideologies and narratives, as well as increased external rivalries over "zones of influence" pose a special threat.

Nachdem Frankreich und Verbündete das Ende des Antiterroreinsatzes Opération Barkhane in Mali verkündet haben, mehren sich in Deutschland Stimmen, die ebenfalls einen Rückzug befürworten. Die Diskussion ist dabei oft auf Mali bzw. den Sahel verengt. Nach dem russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine sollte das sicherheitspolitische Engagement jedoch im Kontext zweier afrikanischer bzw. globaler Trends betrachtet werden:
Erstens: Seit einigen Jahren hat eine dschihadistische Welle das subsaharische Afrika erfasst. Diese hat sich auf inzwischen fast ein Drittel aller Länder der Region ausgeweitet und droht auf weitere Staaten überzugreifen. Der Dschihadismus kann an strukturelle Schwächen und langfristige Trends andocken und hat weitreichende Folgen für Stabilität, Demokratie und Entwicklung in der Region.
Zweitens: Die dschihadistische Welle ist auch Folge des Einflusses aus der MENA-Region (Middle East and North Africa). Generell gewinnen immer mehr nicht-westliche Akteure in Afrika an Einfluss. Dies sind vor allem autoritäre Staaten wie China, Russland, die Golfstaaten und die Türkei. Der Einfluss des Westens schwindet, wie sich zuletzt am Abstimmungsverhalten in der UN-Generalversammlung zum russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine zeigte. Die geostrategischen Rivalitäten können besonderen Schaden für Stabilität, Demokratie und Entwicklung in der Region entfalten.
Auch wenn es für einen Abzug des ausländischen Militärs aus Mali gute Gründe gibt, wäre ein sicherheitspolitischer Rückzug aus der Region angesichts beider Trends kontraproduktiv. Für Mali und seine Nachbarstaaten bedeutete ein Rückzug wahrscheinlich eine Ausbreitung des Dschihadismus. Dazu käme ein weiterer Bedeutungszuwachs aggressiver und autoritärer Staaten wie China und Russland.
Die Entscheidung über eine weitere militärische Präsenz in Mali betrifft das afrikapolitische Engagement des Westens insgesamt. Eine Neujustierung sollte Zielkonflikte zwischen Werten und harten Interessen berücksichtigen und Mittel überprüfen. Erstrebenswert ist ein verstärkter transatlantischer Schulterschluss, der auch einer sicherheitspolitischen Komponente bedarf. Die Herausforderung besteht darin, eine wertegeleitete Afrikapolitik zu betreiben, die eigene Interessen wahrnimmt und afrikanische Interessen berücksichtigt.

There is a long-standing idea that societies with too many men, particularly young and single men - the so-called "bare branches" - have a tendency for vice, risk-taking and violence, ultimately threatening social order and stability.
Marriage is an important marker for adulthood across the globe. Yet, participation in the marriage market - looking for a spouse and forming a union - in sub-Saharan Africa is constrained, and the marriage market is an important institution shaping and maintaining inequality in income and opportunities.
Traditional marriage practices, such as that of polygyny, where one man is married to more than one woman at the same time, are still prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa and lead to a situation where some men, particularly the young, struggle to find a wife and start a family.
Having more men than women in the marriage market gives rise to competition amongst men, spurring frustration and anger among those that struggle to find a bride. The imbalance between men and women in the marriage market has been associated with increasing rebel attacks and intergroup conflict in the region. Hence, there is a palpable need to pay more attention to the marriage market, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries, many of which are already struggling with political and societal instability.
A more complete characterisation of the marriage market and its actors is necessary to better understand the underlying forces that cause young and unmarried men to gravitate towards violence.
Governments must begin to recognise the importance of the marriage market as an institution perpetrating injustices and economic grievances. At the same time, targeted strategies need to be developed that recognise and address perceived inequalities and thus pre-empt promises by extremist groups, who exploit the relative dearth of brides as a recruitment strategy. Targeted information campaigns and appeals are only short-term solutions. Direct interventions in the marriage market might encounter pushback. New ways of thinking based on deeper research may be required.

Over the past two decades, Africa has become increasingly connected as more and more Africans gained access to the internet and mobile phones. Building on this enhanced connectivity, a new wave of African startups has emerged, tackling some of the continent's biggest challenges with "homemade" digital technologies. There are growing signs that these new technologies could provide a leapfrogging opportunity for Africa. Africa has seen massive improvements in internet access and mobile phone adoption, due to investments in the continent's digital infrastructure, particularly mobile broadband networks. At the same time, there are significant connectivity gaps between Africa and the rest of the world as well as between and within African countries. These may widen as Africa's digital infrastructure faces capacity pressures from a rapidly expanding internet user base. Tech giants, primarily from the United States, have recognised a business opportunity in Africa's existing connectivity gaps and have begun investing heavily in subsea data cables, data centres, and technology hubs. It is critical that these investments bridge Africa's connectivity gaps - a growing body of evidence shows the wide-ranging positive socio-economic impacts of improved internet and mobile phone access. Africa's enhanced connectivity has led to the emergence of a new wave of growth-oriented technology startups, building innovative and "homemade" digital technologies for widespread use. Digital platforms in particular are increasingly disrupting Africa's major, mostly informal service, retail, and agricultural sectors. Anecdotal reports suggest that digital technologies from African startups can be transformative for individuals, businesses, and farms, but there is very little systematic empirical evidence on their local impacts. Such evidence is urgently needed to harness their full potential for inclusive economic development in Africa. As Africa's digitalisation accelerates, African governments must develop policies that simultaneously harness the benefits of new technologies and ensure that lagging countries and segments of society do not fall further behind. Policies should incentivise private investment in Africa's digital infrastructure and encourage entrepreneurship and innovation, while preventing unregulated new technologies from harming consumers. In addition, digital skills need to be strengthened to prepare African countries for the coming digital century.

In 2022, Kenyan electoral authorities took the radical decision to digitally publish handwritten result forms from over 46,000 polling stations, allowing any Kenyan with an Internet connection to tabulate results. Unlike Brazil and the United States, they avoided electronic voting machines but opted for paper ballots alongside digital transparency. This combination may have contributed to the notably peaceful election seen.
Kenya is a digital leader in Africa and a pioneer of digital technology in finance. But previous elections have suffered from a lack of trust in the electoral process, leading to violent unrest and the nullification of results by the Supreme Court of Kenya.
In 2022, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission of Kenya (IEBC) leveraged widespread digital connectivity for voting processes, including the release of raw local tallies soon after voting closed. Access to such results led to initial confusion during tallying by media outlets but the results survived a challenge by the losing party in the Supreme Court.
A consortium of civil society organisations, led by startup Ushahidi, simultaneously collected and responded to crowdsourced data and queries from partners and the public, tagging misinformation and violent threats plus escalating inflammatory material for action by authorities. There was minimal violence before and after the election.
Despite post-result infighting between IEBC commissioners, the Supreme Court challenge, and the extremely expensive nature of the process, the use of digital transparency provides a viable model for other digitally connected democracies in Africa.
Electoral integrity is essential for a functioning democracy. Paper voting can be combined with digital technology to facilitate voter identification, transmission of results, and real-time publication thereof. Crowdsourced on-the-ground reports can also foster accountability and combat misinformation. Such electoral technology in Africa is in its infancy and should be supported with technical skills and funding to improve its speed, security, reliability, and functionality.

Within just one year, the world witnessed the collapse of elected governments in Mali, Afghanistan, and Guinea. While the power grabs by military juntas in Mali and Guinea and by the Taliban in Afghanistan caused fear among the respective populations, many citizens were also willing to acquiesce to the overtaking forces, because the deposed civilian governments were perceived as failing and corrupt. These developments highlight important lessons about government legitimacy in fragile states.
There is more to government legitimacy than elections. The holding of elections alone often does not suffice to render a government legitimate in the eyes of citizens. Questionable or botched elections can do more harm than good to government legitimacy.
In weak and fragile states, governments cannot rely on citizens' acceptance of state institutions to legitimate their authority. They must find alternative ways to continually legitimate their rule in the eyes of citizens.
Insights from Burkina Faso suggest that government legitimacy can be improved by addressing problems of state-society relations. Even in communities that have very strained relations with the state, most citizens actually desire greater state presence and would be willing to give state institutions and security forces the benefit of the doubt - if they were perceived to be doing more to protect people's safety and livelihoods.
If the conditions are right, local governments can play a crucial role in mitigating the central state's deficient capacity and legitimacy. In some areas, local governments are the most powerful and legitimate political actors in citizens' lives.
In dealing with governments that are deficient in legitimacy, international actors should be guided by a careful analysis of state-society relations. Calls for rapid elections are no panacea, and elected governments should not automatically be considered legitimate representatives of society. Instead, international actors should focus on identifying and supporting societal changes that are prerequisites for more legitimate governance.

South Africa finds itself in a severe internal crisis that has serious implications for its neighbours. As the regional hegemon is turning inwards, it has largely been unable to engage in regional crises in a constructive and meaningful way. As a result, we see a worrying downward trend in Southern Africa, traditionally a haven of stability in Africa.
The COVID-19 pandemic has amplified South Africa's social and economic woes. Unemployment has reached an all-time high; more than half of the youth cannot find a job and live in poverty. This has bred public discontent and protest.
The governing African National Congress (ANC) is ravaged by internal power struggles between "traditionalists" and the "reformers" around current president Cyril Ramaphosa. While official investigations have exposed deeply ingrained corruption in state-owned companies, the ANC suffered a serious blow in the November 2021 local elections.
Being preoccupied with its domestic challenges, the government has largely remained inactive in responding to gross human rights violations in neighbouring Zimbabwe and eSwatini. Additionally, authoritarian Rwanda, not South Africa, has led the regional response to jihadist violence, deploying elite troops to quell the Islamist insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado region.
The European Union and Germany both have a strong interest in further supporting South Africa and thereby also the broader Southern Africa region: South Africa is one of the world's few democratic regional powers: it can be a core partner in fighting the global climate crisis, and its progressive constitution closely aligns with the new German government's focus on promoting human rights and women's empowerment. Finally, with more than 600 German companies present in South Africa, German business interests would profit from fostering stability in the country and the Southern African region.

Der neue US-Präsident verspricht nach den Trump-Jahren einen grundlegenden Wandel der amerikanischen Außenpolitik: "America is back". Der Start von Joe Bidens Präsidentschaft im Januar 2021 ist deshalb auch in Afrika mit großen Erwartungen verbunden. In vier zentralen Themenbereichen wird sich entscheiden, ob die neue US-Administration diese Erwartungen wirklich erfüllt.
Sicherheitspolitische Schwerpunkte, vor allem der Kampf gegen den sich ausbreitenden islamistischen Terror, prägen die US-Afrikapolitik. Einige der autoritärsten Staaten im subsaharischen Afrika gehören dabei zu den engsten Partnern. Präsident Biden verspricht der internationalen Förderung der Demokratie dagegen zukünftig einen zentralen Stellenwert einzuräumen.
Wenn der Kampf gegen den Klimawandel tatsächlich ein Markenzeichen der Biden-Regierung werden soll, kann das nicht ohne Afrika gehen. Bislang fördern die USA allerdings noch zahlreiche Großprojekte dort, die auf fossile Energieträger setzen.
Die US-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Afrika konzentriert sich auf die Bekämpfung von Krankheiten wie HIV/AIDS. Angesichts von COVID-19 würde ein stärkerer Fokus auf die Stärkung von Gesundheitssystemen, Impfprogramme und die Überwindung der Corona-Pandemie ein Gegengewicht zu Chinas "Impf-Diplomatie" aufbauen.
Der "African Growth and Opportunity Act" (AGOA) unterstützt afrikanische Exporte in die USA. Der Effekt ist jedoch begrenzt geblieben und der amerikanisch-afrikanische Handel weit hinter dem mit China zurückgefallen.
Der große Wandel in der US-Afrikapolitik ist unter Präsident Biden nicht zu erwarten. Jedoch ergeben sich neue Möglichkeiten der Zusammenarbeit im Gesundheitsbereich und der Überwindung der Corona-Pandemie, bei der Klimapolitik und der Förderung der Demokratie. Angesichts des amerikanischen Fokus' auf die geostrategische Konkurrenz mit China sollten die Erwartungen allerdings realistisch bleiben.

The 20 October 2021 marks the first anniversary of the shooting of unarmed protesters by the Nigerian military. The movement pushing to abolish the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) has proved how social media can make the voices of the weak heard. However, recent developments surrounding social media regulations in the aftermath of the shooting show that the right to freedom of expression is at risk of regression.
The EndSARS protest has proven itself to be a milestone people-led movement. It is the first time Nigerians from different classes, ethnic groups, and religions have united behind a cause. It went beyond making demands for the mere disbanding of the SARS squad to insisting on the release of protesters, justice for victims, prosecution of poor police conduct, evaluation and retraining of officers, and an increase in police salary - all organised via social media.
What came in the aftermath of the movement served as a driver for the renewed calls for bills to regulate social media. The political elite issued a communiqué that called for the strict monitoring and censorship of social media usage.
Recent developments are not unique. A careful analysis of social media regulations shows that the government has remained ambivalent towards freedom of expression - promoting that right while at the same time limiting it.
Nigeria has witnessed some progress since it transitioned from military to civilian rule in 1999. Nevertheless, it risks regression if draconian bills are introduced that curtail freedom of expression and assembly. The Nigerian government must be willing to review and revise its cyber bills to eliminate ambiguity. It must also include all relevant stakeholders, such as youth, women, and human as well as digital rights experts, in its drafting of cyber bills.

The new US president has promised a fundamental change in American foreign policy after the Trump years: "America is back." The start of Joe Biden's presidency in January 2021 is therefore also associated with considerable expectations in sub-Saharan Africa. Four key issues will determine whether the new US administration will really deliver on these expectations. Security policy priorities, especially the fight against spreading Islamist terror, shape US Africa policy. Some of the world region's most authoritarian states are among the US's closest partners in sub-Saharan Africa in this regard. President Biden has promised to make the international promotion of democracy a central priority in the future. If the fight against climate change is really to become a hallmark of the Biden administration, this cannot happen without Africa being onboard. So far, however, the US has continued to support numerous large-scale projects in Africa that rely on fossil fuels. US development cooperation with Africa focuses on fighting diseases such as HIV/AIDS. In light of COVID-19, greater focus on strengthening health systems, vaccination programmes, and overcoming the pandemic would help counterbalance China's "vaccine diplomacy." The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) supports African exports to the US. However, the effect has been limited and US-African trade has fallen far behind that between Africa and China. A fundamental shift in US Africa policy is not to be expected under President Biden. However, there are new opportunities for cooperation in health and overcoming the current COVID-19 pandemic, in climate policy, and in promoting democracy. Given the US focus on geostrategic competition with China, however, expectations should remain realistic.