Democracies and authoritarian regimes have different approaches to international law, grounded in their different forms of government. As the balance of power between democracies and non-democracies shifts, it will have consequences for international legal order. Human rights may face severe challenges in years ahead, but citizens of democratic countries may still benefit from international legal cooperation in other areas. Ranging across several continents, this volume surveys the state of democracy-enhancing international law, and provides ideas for a way forward in the face of rising authoritarianism.
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Roberto Gargarella has always placed distribution of access to political and economic power at the center of the analysis. This article focuses on his argument that participation might be able to improve material inequality. It argues that inequality can be confronted directly or indirectly, and that sometimes, participation is not the best mechanism for addressing inequality. The article draws on case studies from Japan and the Philippines to illustrate its argument. ; Roberto Gargarella siempre ha colocado la distribución del acceso al poder político y económico en el centro del análisis. Este artículo se centra en su argumento de que la participación podría mejorar la desigualdad material. Sostiene que la desigualdad puede ser enfrentada directa o indirectamente y que, a veces, la participación no es el mejor mecanismo para abordar la desigualdad. El artículo utiliza estudios de caso sobre Japón y Filipinas para ilustrar su argumento.
Abstract Our era is one of democratic backsliding. International courts and institutions have provided some bulwark against this trend, but we are now witnessing leaders seeking to use international law to extend their power. Courts in several countries have relied on international human rights norms to facilitate term limit extensions by leaders seeking to retain power beyond what is constitutionally allowed. This Article documents these cases and calls for a more robust and substantive international law of democracy-protection.
AbstractInternational law, though formally neutral among regime types, has mainly been a product of liberal democracies since World War II. In light of recent challenges to the liberal international order, this Article asks, what would international law look like in an increasingly authoritarian world? As compared with democratic countries, authoritarians emphasize looser cooperation, negotiated settlements, and rules that reinforce regime survival. This raises the possibility of authoritarian international law, designed to extend authoritarian rule across time and space.
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 134, Heft 4, S. 722-723
Comparative constitutional law in Latin America : an introduction / Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg -- Constitution making and constitutionalism in Latin America : the role of procedural rules / Gabriel L. Negretto -- Constitution making and constituent power / Joel Colâon-Râios -- A critical mapping of transitional justice in Latin America / Lucas Lixinski -- Constitutional revolution in the Andes? / Zachary Elkins -- The New "Bolivarian" Constitutions : a textual analysis / Mark Tushnet -- Looking beyond the constitution : the social and ecological function of property / Helena Alviar Garcia -- Equality / Roberto Gargarella -- Modes of disestablishment in Latin America / Julieta Lemaitre -- Judicial role and the limits of constitutional convergence in Latin America / David Landau -- Ambitious constitutions : prominent courts / Oscar Vilhena Vieira -- Between power and submissiveness : constitutional adjudication in Latin America / Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri -- The institutional limits of inter-American constitutionalism / Alexandra Huneeus -- The constitutional protection of economic and social rights in Latin America / Carlos Bernal -- The "economic constitutions" of Latin America : between free markets and socioeconomic rights / Javier Couso
This article responds to a set of well-known challenges to empirical research on formal institutions in comparative politics. We focus on the case of written constitutions and discuss the scholarly utility of studying such documents in the face of four analytic and theoretical challenges. Each of these challenges, in turn, implies a set of empirical questions, for which we invoke original data to sketch a broad-brushed set of answers. The data analysis and accompanying discussion suggest a set of guidelines for how written constitutions should be deployed in comparative research designs on topics that involve political institutions.
AbstractFor many, the growing judicialization of international relations is the next step in the process toward the complete legalization of international politics. We draw on the literature in comparative judicial politics to examine the limits of the phenomenon. The domestic literature on judicialization portrays the process as something of a one-way ratchet. In an increasingly juridified world, judges have been asked to take on greater roles in global governance, and they seem to be doing so with aplomb. This in turn incentivizes individuals and interest groups to frame their policy claims in legal terms, providing ever-more fuel for judicial governance. Yet many courts and other legal institutions, both domestic and international, have had their jurisdiction constrained, with some areas of law removed from judicial purview. Might the dynamics of constraint and backlash lead to the dejuridification of an area that has been judicialized? We conceptualize the possibility of what we call dejudicialization, situate it in the context of the literature on backlash, and delimit its potential scope and implications. While dejudicialization is empirically rare, we argue that its very possibility suggests that judicialization should not be considered a teleological process.
Introduction : The First-Period Problem of Constitutional Implementation / Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq -- Looking "Backward" or "Forward" to American Constitutional Development : -- Reflections on Constitutional "Endurance" and "Adaptation" in the "First Republic" / Sanford Levinson -- Marking Constitutional Transitions : The Law and Politics of Constitutional -- Implementation in South Africa / Rosalind Dixon and Theunis Roux -- India's First Period : Constitutional Doctrine and Constitutional Stability / -- Madhav Khosla -- Two Steps "Forward", One Step "Back"? : Transformation and Correction in the Implementation of Ecuador's 2008 Constitution / Eric Alston -- The Long Road Ahead : The First Period of a Gender-Responsive Constitution in Zimbabwe / Claudia Flores -- Constitutional Reform and Women's Political Participation : Electoral Gender -- Quotas in Post-Arab Spring Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan / Susan H. Williams -- Explaining the Institutional Role of the Colombian Constitutional Court / -- Diego González -- Implementing a New Constitution in a Competitive Authoritarian Context : The Case of Kenya / James Thuo Gathii -- Transformational Authoritarian Constitutions : The Case of Chile / -- Tom Ginsburg -- Authoritarian Straitjacket or Vehicle for Democratic Transition? : The Risky -- Struggle to Change Myanmar's Constitution / Melissa Crouch -- The Ethiopian Constitution and Ethnic Federalism / Daniel Abebe