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Record-high levels of international migration both toward and across Europe have recently given rise to a new body of research on the social protection of immigrants. A recurring argument in this literature maintains that migrants are generally more likely to gain access to social benefits in generous welfare states. The article offers a critical review of this hypothesis with a focus on unemployment benefit provision. The tides of European welfare politics have produced a set of systems in the past which are today highly stratified on the basis of employment. This mechanism generates a considerable benefit gap in reference to migration, especially for those who arrived to their country of residency only recently. Empirical analyses with micro-level data for 14 Western European countries provide supporting evidence for this argument. The findings indicate a negative relationship between generosity and social protection which has not been accounted for in previous research.

Unemployment insurance systems are designed to provide income security for those who drop out of work temporarily. This form of social protection is particularly relevant for foreign-born workers who are, on average, more likely to become unemployed during layoffs. The article explores how the social protection of immigrants differs in cases where payments are tied to voluntary rather than mandatory contributions. This is done by focusing on a recent welfare reform in Sweden which led to both a sharp increase in costs and a decline in benefit generosity overnight. It is argued that migrants lost their social protection at a disproportionate rate over the course of the reform. Both their status on the labour market and position as newcomers to the norms and rules of society are expected to impede on their decision to obtain or prolong insurance membership, leading to a decline in eligibility to income security. Difference-in-difference estimates with administrative data from all unemployment insurance funds show that the share of benefit recipients with earnings-related payments decreased at a higher rate among the foreign-born as expected, especially if they had arrived in the country only recently.

Record-high levels of international migration both toward and across Europe have recently given rise to a new body of research on the social protection of immigrants. A recurring argument in this literature maintains that migrants are generally more likely to gain access to social benefits in generous welfare states. The article offers a critical review of this hypothesis with a focus on unemployment benefit provision. The tides of European welfare politics have produced a set of systems in the past which are today highly stratified on the basis of employment. This mechanism generates a considerable benefit gap in reference to migration, especially for those who arrived to their country of residency only recently. Empirical analyses with micro-level data for 14 Western European countries provide supporting evidence for this argument. The findings indicate a negative relationship between generosity and social protection which has not been accounted for in previous research.

Whether and under what conditions foreigners should be granted access to welfare benefits has been debated for as long as public welfare systems have existed. In contrast, research on the actual social protection of immigrants is still comparatively scarce in the welfare state literature. The dissertation contributes to an emerging body of research which addresses this 'migrant gap'. It does so by introducing a new analytical lens. Rather than studying how immigrants gain access to formal social rights upon entry, it investigates how actual social benefits are distributed in relation to migrant-specific characteristics such as country of birth and length of residency. This perspective helps uncover how general welfare conditionalities – such as work-, membership and conduct-testing – affect the distribution of social protection in relation to cross-border migration without targeting the formal rights of immigrants specifically. In its examination of the relationship between welfare conditionality, migration and social protection, this thesis focuses on the provision of unemployment benefits in Western Europe welfare states in particular. Three independent empirical studies are conducted, using statistical analyses with administrative data. Their findings indicate that general work-related welfare conditionalities produce large gaps in benefit receipt between immigrants and native-born residents, particularly in countries that have so far been portrayed as comparatively inclusive in the welfare state literature. For disciplinary measures such as benefit sanctions, in contrast, immigrants are found to be less negatively affected. As a whole then, the dissertation demonstrates that the social protection of immigrants turns out to be much more complex as soon as we study the actual distribution of benefits inside and across countries with established welfare systems.

Abstract
Educated individuals are believed to be more tolerant towards ethnic minorities—a finding widely inferred from standard survey items. We propose a new approach that helps mitigate the risk of socially desirability bias (SDB), using a multifactorial survey experiment with name-based vignette dimensions. The experiment is strategically inserted into a question about a social dilemma not related to ethnicity. By embedding our experiment into an established survey—the Swedish part of the European Values Survey—we show that individuals with a high level of education are more tolerant towards ethnic minorities, even under a lower risk of SDB. The study strengthens findings in prior research and supports the hypothesis that education can further ethnic tolerance.

AbstractSanctions are payment cuts that case managers implement in order to discipline welfare recipients. Previous research suggests that immigrants face a particularly high risk to receive such reductions, primarily due to the prevalence of stereotyping in street‐level bureaucracy. The study contributes to this literature with help of a triangulation between in‐depth interviews, survey data and administrative records for the case of the German social assistance system. Our findings indicate that immigrants tend to be sanctioned at a lower rate than other benefit recipients in this context, especially if they arrived at the country only recently on grounds of international protection. This finding can be explained by the importance of reciprocity and control in the country's 'Bismarckian' welfare state. Our qualitative data shows that case managers exert a considerable level of agency over the implementation process. This discretion is, on the one hand, used to discipline benefit recipients who are perceived as having contributed little to the welfare system as a whole through taxes and social insurance contributions. Those who are considered to have limited control over their labour market position, on the other hand, are given a certain degree of leeway. We therefore conclude, against the background of the current street‐level bureaucracy literature, that immigration can also act as a deservingness cue in means‐tested social assistance, given that the benefit system is embedded into a welfare regime in which labour market participation, work‐testing and social insurance contributions are the dominating principles of eligibility.

Abstract
Welfare benefit recipients who are subject to benefit sanctions live below the subsistence level for a fixed period of time. Individuals with low education bear an increased risk of being sanctioned. Quantitative analyses of linked administrative and survey data indicate that this increased risk cannot be attributed to a lower motivation to work or a lower willingness to make concessions regarding job offers. Our analyses of qualitative interviews and individual case files reveal complex processes: Low cultural capital when dealing with administrative matters, a habitual distance vis-à-vis job center employees as well as previous negative attributions in case files can advance the sanctioning of low-skilled welfare recipients. In this way, sanctions contribute to the (re)production of social inequality.