Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Compliance, Coordination, and Censorship: Switzerland's Response to Palestinian and Brazilian Terrorism -- -- Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism: The 1969 Kloten Airport Attack and the 1970 Skyjack Sunday1 -- Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism: The Abduction of Ambassador Bucher (1970–71) -- Conclusions of Part 1: A Comparison of Crisis Management -- At the Forefront through the Backdoor: Switzerland's Counterterrorism Diplomacy -- -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the icao: "An Elegant Way of Doing Nothing" -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the un: A Fastidiously Balanced Position -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE: Experts "Making" Foreign Policy -- Conclusions of Part 2: Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking in Multilateral Fora -- In Defiance of Neutrality: Switzerland's Secret Counterterrorism Cooperation -- -- A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance: Intelligence-Sharing within the Club de Berne (1971–1972) -- Conclusions of Part 3: A Glimpse into the Club de Berne in the 1980s -- Conclusions.

Switzerland suffered four major terrorist attacks in 1969 and 1970, which forced the Swiss government to address the issue of international terrorism for the first time. Subsequently, "neutral" Switzerland worked closely with Western Cold War powers to develop international counterterrorism measures and forged a European-Israeli counterterrorist alignment to counter Palestinian terrorism in Europe.0Using recently declassified archival records, this book is the first study to examine how the Swiss government positioned the country within the international struggle against terrorism. The book brings to light the creation of the Club de Berne, a secret European network of intelligence agencies connected to Israel and the United States. It offers new insights about the history of Swiss, Western European, and Israeli security cooperation

Abstract
What happens among intelligence communities when two countries face a diplomatic crisis? This article looks at the interactions between the West German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and Israel's Mossad in a multilateral liaison called the Club de Berne after the Munich Olympics attack in September 1972. The article shows that these covert links were a means to overcome the crisis and served different functions for each side. For the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which had been severely criticized after giving in to terrorist pressure, the BfV tried to prove to Israel its value as a security asset. For Israel, the Club de Berne allowed Mossad to send a covert message that aimed to pressure the FRG into a no-negotiation line. For both, the agencies could build on preexisting relations based on trust in the Club de Berne, which helped with the normalization process after the crisis. Although diplomatic and domestic policies after the Munich attack are well known, the intelligence dimension has thus far not been explored. The article offers a new way of thinking about covert diplomacy in theory and practice.

R ésumé . – En 1969, le gouvernement suisse est confronté au terrorisme international lors une attaque perpétrée à l'aéroport de Zurich Kloten par des membres du Front populaire pour la libération de la Palestine (FPLP). En septembre 1970, le PFLP frappe à nouveau en organisant plusieurs détournement d'avions simultanés à travers le monde. Cette attaque terroriste à grande échelle aboutit à la capture de trois cent dix passagers et a comme conséquence de concerner et d`impliquer de nombreux pays. Plus tard, cet évènement sera connu sous le nom de Skyjack Sunday . Cet article étudie les réponses des dirigeants suisses aux deux attentats, les implications concernant la neutralité helvétique et le développement d'une stratégie antiterroriste. Plus précisément, l`article trace la décision helvétique de se positionner clairement du côté de l'Occident dans la Guerre froide globale et, en ce faisant, d`abandonner les considérations liées à la neutralité.

This paper develops a novel theoretical framework for the conduct of postmortems after major foreign policy surprises for the European Union and its member states. It proposes a taxonomy of surprise which elucidates how officials or organisations experience both sudden and slower-burning threats. It argues that foreign policy surprises in European settings require a closer look at who was surprised, in what way, and when. The paper outlines six vital performance criteria and three key attenuating factors, allowing us to better ground judgements about foreign policy performance as well as to advance realistic recommendations on how to improve.

This book provides the first assessment of the performance of three leading European polities in providing estimative intelligence during an era of surprise. It develops a new framework for conducting postmortems guided by a normative model of anticipatory foreign policy. The comparative analysis focuses on how the UK, the EU and Germany handled three cases of major surprises: the Arab uprisings, the rise to power of the Islamic State (ISIS), and the Russian annexation of Crimea. It considers not just government intelligence assessments, but also diplomatic reporting and expert open sources and how these assessments were received by organisational leaders. The book tests and develops new theories about the causes of strategic surprises, going beyond a common focus on intelligence versus policy failures to identify challenges and factors that cut across both communities. With the help of former senior officials, the book identifies lessons yet to be learnt by European polities to better anticipate and prepare for future surprises.