Suchergebnisse

The Iraqi civil war is the result of both the legacy of the former regime, & of American preconceptions. Saddam Hussein's regime was characterized by systematic deconstruction of the nation, which pushed Iraqis to retreat into the private sphere. This explains the weak capacity for political mobilization exiled political protagonists proved to have; when they returned to Iraq, they sought to monopolize resources rather than implement any political project. This general state of anomie enabled the Americans to impose their interpretation of Iraqi society, which they viewed as being divided into three ethno-religious units. Thus, the violence that was initially directed against Coalition troops quickly evolved toward conflicts between religious groups, though this must not lead us to overlook the equally significant phenomenon of the privatization of violence. The fact that the Americans have been unable to manage the transition has also undermined the credibility of democracy, eventually leading to a depoliticization of politics. Adapted from the source document.

Considering a Non-Conventional Iraqi Opponent, by David BARAN
The debate on Iraqi war capabilities, initiated month's ago by the American threats against Iraq, totally ignores the non-military, non-tangible assets of Saddam Hussein in a war that might not have much to do with conventional warfare and classic theory. This article will hopefully contribute to the debate in three ways. First of all, it develops a historical outline of the Iraqi military and security apparatus, so as to define precisely its various organs and illus-trate the expériences and concepts that determined its current doctrine. Secondly, it will concentrate on the adaptability displayed by the Iraqi regime in the face of the specifie American threats during the nineties. This adaptability is seen as a prolongation of the impressive plasticity demonstrated by the regime throughout the aforementioned historical process. Last of all, this article implies an atypical but non-the-less plausible war scenario, based precisely on a better attention paid, paradoxically, to Saddam Hussein's non-military resources.

The War in Iraq, the Strategy of the Weak in the Face of the American Superpower, by David BARAN
The recent conflict in Iraq has produced an uncertain vision of the real unfolding of events and of the Iraqi adversary. The Iraqi resistance was the object of a political and media campaign of disinformation aimed at projecting the image of a rapid war of liberation. The resistance did in reality develop a subtle strategy, constructed around the victimisation of the regime, the conciliation of the population and the organisation of an armed resistance, but which ultimately revealed itself to be inadequate. The extent of the disym-metry between Iraqi and American forces provoked a strong sense of helplessness within the Iraqi population which reinforced its apathy and the incoherence of its reactions: pockets of civilian resistance facecf the American offensive while an ultimate wave of defiance towards the regime provoked its betrayal by the military. Iraq did not believe in victory, while not believing in a "liberation" by saviours either, official déclarations having relentlessly assimilated the conflict to a war for Iraqi oil and against Islam. It is nevertheless on the forces of occupation that tne country is now banking in order to fulfill the hopes of the Iraqi people.

Syria and Iraq's accelerating fragmentation has prompted feverish speculation about the erasure of the modern Middle East's Western-imposed borders. Such notions are not altogether divorced from reality: Syria and Iraq today are scarcely recognizable as nation-states, and their once rigid border has become increasingly porous while falling entirely from governmental control. Yet this erosion must not be mistaken for dissolution. The post-Ottoman border continues to serve an array of material and symbolic functions, and as such will remain of paramount relevance, as a resilient object of contention, for the foreseeable future. By grappling with this paradoxical state of mutation and durability—and by tracing its roots back into the late twentieth century—we can draw broader insights into the seismic changes roiling the Middle East, where brittle, centralizing power structures are increasingly giving way to a more grassroots and fluid political landscape with which Western actors have yet to come to terms. ; Funded by the European Research Council (ERC) within the 7th Framework Programme, the BORDERLANDS project is hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, and directed by Professor Raffaella A. Del Sarto.