Suchergebnisse

The existence of noticeable 'unified' parties is central to the theory and practice of democracy in general, and to parliamentary democracy in particular. However, legislative studies scholars have good reason to cease treating parties as monolithic, unitary actors, for they evidently are not. The first step in this direction is to ask why one of the distinguishing features of modern political parties is their legislative unity. Do parties enter parliament as unified actors, or are they moulded into this model by the legislature? The answer depends on whether one is looking at cohesion or at d

Examines the presidentialization of politics in Israel where the Knesset (parliament) adopted a 1992 constitutional change that "presidentialized" the prime minister; however, negative consequences led to its abolishment less than five years later. Both structural-institutional provisions & the personalities of prime ministers contributed to the gradual strengthening of the prime minister's office at the expense of the parliament, parties, & ministers. A look at the causes & consequences of the move from de facto to constitutional presidentialization notes that the prime minister's increased power led to a decrease in his own party's parliamentary strength which in turn adversely affected his ability to govern. It is contended that the presidentialization of the electoral process & executive or party power are not causally linked. Israel's experience with the presidentialization of politics is compared to that of other democracies to conclude that other countries should be discouraged from grafting a presidentialized prime minister onto a proportional parliamentary infrastructure. 2 Tables, 3 Figures, 27 References. J. Lindroth

Although it is common in the literature to distinguish between cohesion & discipline, these terms are rarely demarcated properly & prominent legislative scholars use them interchangeably. The delineation presented in this article attempts not only to distinguish between these two concepts but to divorce them, using two different approaches to party unity. The first is sociological, which emphasises norms & roles. The second is institutional, & it stresses strategic incentives & constraints. Herein lies the distinction between cohesion (agreement, or shared preferences) & discipline (the enforcement of obedience). This article argues that parties are more than shared preferences. Parties matter, even once preferences have been taken into account. If this is the case, then it is important to distinguish between how preferences can hold parties together, how parties can hold themselves together when preferences are not enough, & how to delineate between these two separate determinants of party unity. 2 Figures. Adapted from the source document.