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"Assuming no prior knowledge, this widely-used and critically-acclaimed text provides a clear introduction to, and uniquely fair-minded assessment of, Rational Choice approaches. The substantially revised, updated and extended new edition includes more substantial coverage of game theory, collective action, 'revisionist' public choice, and the use of rational choice in International Relations"--

This radical examination of Tony Blair's Labour party provides an analysis of how the party has constructed its position at the centre-ground of British politics. Challenging conventional analysis, it demonstrates how the Labour Party has had to construct the centre rather than simply occupy it.

Arguing about rational choice theory remains a popular pastime. Following the publication of Green and Shapiro's Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, a backlash against the use of rational choice theory within political science gained momentum. This article shows how, since 1994, sceptics have refined and extended the critique of rational choice and how practitioners have defended their approach, and a more general argument has emerged. In the 1990s, attitudes towards rational choice theory constituted a fundamental fault-line within the discipline, but changes to the way in which rational choice is practised and defended, together with some broader changes in the social sciences, have created more areas of common ground and taken some of the urgency out of this debate. Adapted from the source document.

Arguing about rational choice theory remains a popular pastime. Following the publication of Green and Shapiro'sPathologies of Rational Choice Theory,a backlash against the use of rational choice theory within political science gained momentum. This article shows how, since 1994, sceptics have refined and extended the critique of rational choice and how practitioners have defended their approach, and a more general argument has emerged. In the 1990s, attitudes towards rational choice theory constituted a fundamental fault-line within the discipline, but changes to the way in which rational choice is practised and defended, together with some broader changes in the social sciences, have created more areas of common ground and taken some of the urgency out of this debate.

The banking crisis and the recession it induced provide a salient backdrop to domestic and international politics.

2

The

International Monetary Fund (IMF 2010)

estimates that total banking losses between 2008 and 2010 exceeded US$2.3 trillion. This article uses grid‐group theory to review the existing literature on the causes of the banking crisis and, in doing so, distinguishes between hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian and fatalist accounts of what went wrong and of what needs to be done to prevent another crisis from occurring. It is argued that the existing reform agenda is underpinned by a hierarchical analysis of the causes of the crisis and that this risks narrowing the support base for the reform process.

There is an ongoing debate about whether and how the existence of policy networks can be used to explain policy outcomes. Making use of the concept of priming, it is argued here that network structures create differential opportunities for interest groups to persuade decision makers to act in particular ways. In conditions of uncertainty where there is a pressure to take immediate decisions, priming can help us to understand why some groups are more persuasive than others. This argument is developed against the backdrop of a particular puzzle: the British government's refusal to use emergency vaccination during the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 2001. This decision is routinely accounted for in terms of the bargaining strength of the National Farmers Union. Against this it is argued that farmers' influence over government policy ought to be explained primarily in terms of the way they were able to prime particular arguments and so help persuade the government to act in particular ways.

The first part of this article develops a critique of Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy and, more generally, of rational choice theories of party competition. Drawing on and adapting Joseph Schumpeter's critique of general equilibrium theory, it is argued that the use of the equilibrium method within rational choice theory precludes the analysis of policy innovation. Having developed this theoretical argument, the second part of the article offers a 'Schumpeterian' account of the dynamics of British electoral competition between 1950 and 2005. Drawing on an analysis of 1,984 policy commitments within Conservative, Labour and Liberal general election manifestos, the fate of 758 policy innovations is tracked. Policy innovation, it is argued, generates an ongoing process of divergence and convergence between the political parties very different to that predicted within rational choice equilibrium analysis. (The British Journal of Politics and International Relations / FUB)

The first part of this article develops a critique of Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy and, more generally, of rational choice theories of party competition. Drawing on and adapting Joseph Schumpeter's critique of general equilibrium theory, it is argued that the use of the equilibrium method within rational choice theory precludes the analysis of policy innovation. Having developed this theoretical argument, the second part of the article offers a 'Schumpeterian' account of the dynamics of British electoral competition between 1950 and 2005. Drawing on an analysis of 1,984 policy commitments within Conservative, Labour and Liberal general election manifestos, the fate of 758 policy innovations is tracked. Policy innovation, it is argued, generates an ongoing process of divergence and convergence between the political parties very different to that predicted within rational choice equilibrium analysis.