How can international organizations (IOs) like the United Nations (UN) and their implementing partners be held accountable if their actions and policies violate fundamental human rights? This text provides a new conceptual framework to study pluralist accountability, whereby third parties hold IOs and their implementing partners accountable for human rights violations.
International organizations (IOs) play a key role in promoting multilateral cooperation on critical transnational issues. Yet, their authority has increasingly been contested by member states that cut financial contributions or even withdraw their membership. How do IOs respond to such contestation? While the existing literature has mostly focused on reactions by other member states, I argue in this article that our understanding of IOs' responses to contestation remains incomplete without an analysis of IO bureaucracies. I propose a conceptual framework to analyse three types of bureaucratic responses: inertia, i.e. no immediate response; adaptation, i.e. institutional changes to maintain the support of the challenging member state(s); and resilience-building, i.e. developing organizational capacities to limit contestation. I argue that each of these responses is shaped by specific bureaucratic mechanisms, namely hunkering, negotiation, framing, coalition-building, shaming and professionalization. Based on a comparative within-case study analysing the reactions of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) to budget cuts by the Reagan, Bush and Trump administrations, I further theorize that the organization's threat perception, the position of other member states and bureaucratic leadership are relevant factors that need to be considered to explain the variation in IO responses to contestation.
Abstract International organizations (io s) have repeatedly been challenged in their existence. In this essay, I review arguments about the causes of their decline and survival in existing research. While the majority of research has focused on structural pressures such as geopolitical crises, I argue that io s can also be threatened by member-states reasserting their sovereignty, for example through budget cuts, non-compliance with core norms, obstruction of staff appointments and membership withdrawal. More systematic research is required to investigate when these challenges are more likely to lead to the demise of io s and which factors make io s survive these challenges.
International organizations (IOs) usually cooperate with national actors in order to implement global decisions and policies. This cooperation has become problematic as implementing partners have increasingly been accused of serious human rights violations. This article analyzes how implementing partners from the host state of a United Nations (UN) peace operation are held accountable. I argue that the complexity of contemporary peacekeeping limits the availability of traditional accountability mechanisms. I develop a conceptual model to demonstrate how, instead, different accountability forms interact and complement each other. I illustrate this interplay of accountability with a case study on the emergence of the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). The accountability framework enacted by the Joint Human Rights Unit, the Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court in the context of the UN peace operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo threatened the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping. As a consequence, the UN adopted the HRDDP as a new, UN-based accountability mechanism to hold implementing partners from the host state of peace operations
Die Forschung zu internationalen Organisationen (IOs), die sich bisher überwiegend mit der Entstehung und dem Design von IOs beschäftigte, steht aufgrund des Brexits und der Ankündigung verschiedener Staaten aus dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof auszutreten vor neuen Herausforderungen. Austritte von Mitgliedsstaaten sind nur eine Form von staatlichem Handeln, das die Autorität von IOs beeinträchtigt. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass neben Austritten auch Budgetkürzungen, Personalblockaden, Mandatsbeschränkungen und die Verletzung zentraler Normen IOs unter Druck setzen. Die zentrale Frage hierbei ist, wie IOs selbst mit diesen Herausforderungen umgehen. Basierend auf Theorien der Multilateralismus- und der Organisationsforschung analysiert dieser Beitrag Nicht-Reaktion, Vermeiden von Aufmerksamkeit, Anpassung und Resilienz-Bildung. Diese Herausforderungen und Reaktionen werden anhand des historischen Beispiels des Völkerbundes illustriert. Abschließend werden mögliche Annahmen hinsichtlich des institutionellen Designs von IOs, der Art der Herausforderung, des Status des herausfordernden Staates und der Positionen der übrigen Mitgliedsstaaten diskutiert, um die Varianz in den Reaktionen von IOs zu erklären.
International organizations (IOs) usually cooperate with national actors in order to implement global decisions and policies. This cooperation has become problematic as implementing partners have increasingly been accused of serious human rights violations. This article analyzes how implementing partners from the host state of a United Nations (UN) peace operation are held accountable. I argue that the complexity of contemporary peacekeeping limits the availability of traditional accountability mechanisms. I develop a conceptual model to demonstrate how, instead, different accountability forms interact and complement each other. I illustrate this interplay of accountability with a case study on the emergence of the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). The accountability framework enacted by the Joint Human Rights Unit, the Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court in the context of the UN peace operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo threatened the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping. As a consequence, the UN adopted the HRDDP as a new, UN-based accountability mechanism to hold implementing partners from the host state of peace operations accountable.
Human rights violations committed by international organisations (IOs) have raised demands that IOs should be held accountable for their decisions, policies, and actions. However, traditional forms of accountability have often failed in the context of global governance. This article introduces pluralist accountability as a form of accountability whereby third parties hold IOs and their implementing partners accountable for human rights violations. In pluralist accountability, third parties set the standards for IOs' actions in relation to human rights, review their behaviour and impose normative or material sanctions in case of misbehaviour. The article further reveals two conditions that foster the development of pluralist accountability, namely the competition among third parties and the degree of vulnerability of the implementing actors or the mandating authority with regard to human rights demands. This argument is illustrated with empirical insights from peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, which were accused of human trafficking and the violation of the rights of detainees.
AbstractHuman rights violations committed by international organisations (IOs) have raised demands that IOs should be held accountable for their decisions, policies, and actions. However, traditional forms of accountability have often failed in the context of global governance. This article introduces pluralist accountability as a form of accountability whereby third parties hold IOs and their implementing partners accountable for human rights violations. In pluralist accountability, third parties set the standards for IOs' actions in relation to human rights, review their behaviour and impose normative or material sanctions in case of misbehaviour. The article further reveals two conditions that foster the development of pluralist accountability, namely the competition among third parties and the degree of vulnerability of the implementing actors or the mandating authority with regard to human rights demands. This argument is illustrated with empirical insights from peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, which were accused of human trafficking and the violation of the rights of detainees.
