Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Theoretical background : structures, agents and small state strategies in foreign policy -- Lithuanian foreign policy process and the role of the president -- The Baltic states : between cooperation and competition -- Russia : the reset that never was -- Relations with the USA : CIA prison, defensive plans, Obama, and Trump -- Relationship status with Poland : 'It's complicated' -- Ukraine : the revolution that started in Vilnius -- The European Union and the search for leadership : from the Nordic countries to Germany -- Relationship with Israel -- Conclusions : Lithuanian foreign policy changes and Grybauskaitė's legacy.

In the last decade, we have been facing an interesting phenomenon. On the one hand, after the end of the Cold War, the topic of strategic stability has lost the interest of academic and analytical research. The threat of a nuclear conflict between the US and Russia declined significantly, and strategic disarmament agreements have been seen as a matter of mutually beneficial habits. On the other hand, after the Russia-Georgia War in 2008 and especially after the Russia-Ukraine War in 2014, a need to review strategic stability and deterrence credibility vis-à-vis Russia appeared as a pressing issue. This applies both to the bilateral US-Russia relationship and to the assurance for extended deterrence: i.e. NATO's role and credibility to deter Russia from potential conflicts in Eastern Europe. The Baltic States have come into focus while modelling scenarios for a potential NATO-Russia conflict and calculating actual needs to provide a credible deterrence in the region.

In the last decade, we have been facing an interesting phenomenon. On the one hand, after the end of the Cold War, the topic of strategic stability has lost the interest of academic and analytical research. The threat of a nuclear conflict between the US and Russia declined significantly, and strategic disarmament agreements have been seen as a matter of mutually beneficial habits. On the other hand, after the Russia-Georgia War in 2008 and especially after the Russia-Ukraine War in 2014, a need to review strategic stability and deterrence credibility vis-à-vis Russia appeared as a pressing issue. This applies both to the bilateral US-Russia relationship and to the assurance for extended deterrence: i.e. NATO's role and credibility to deter Russia from potential conflicts in Eastern Europe. The Baltic States have come into focus while modelling scenarios for a potential NATO-Russia conflict and calculating actual needs to provide a credible deterrence in the region.

In the last decade, we have been facing an interesting phenomenon. On the one hand, after the end of the Cold War, the topic of strategic stability has lost the interest of academic and analytical research. The threat of a nuclear conflict between the US and Russia declined significantly, and strategic disarmament agreements have been seen as a matter of mutually beneficial habits. On the other hand, after the Russia-Georgia War in 2008 and especially after the Russia-Ukraine War in 2014, a need to review strategic stability and deterrence credibility vis-à-vis Russia appeared as a pressing issue. This applies both to the bilateral US-Russia relationship and to the assurance for extended deterrence: i.e. NATO's role and credibility to deter Russia from potential conflicts in Eastern Europe. The Baltic States have come into focus while modelling scenarios for a potential NATO-Russia conflict and calculating actual needs to provide a credible deterrence in the region.

This article raises the question of what role does the presidential institution hold in the Lithuanian foreign policy formation mechanism and how a particular actor (president) can change their powers in foreign policy without going beyond the functions formally defined in the Constitution. The period of President Grybauskaitė's term and her efforts as an actor to define her role in shaping Lithuanian foreign policy are analyzed. This is assessed in the context of the activities and behavior of former Lithuanian presidents and in the context of relations with other institutions involved in foreign policy making – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Seimas in particular. This article analyzes the relationship between the actor (Grybauskaitė) and the already established structure of domestic foreign policy formation and the ability of the actor to change this structure. The analysis suggests that it is precisely because of the choices made by Grybauskaite during 2009–2019 that a relationship between the structures of foreign policy making in Lithuania has changed considerably, and that the center of power of foreign policy formation has shifted to the presidency.

This article raises the question of what role does the presidential institution hold in the Lithuanian foreign policy formation mechanism and how a particular actor (president) can change their powers in foreign policy without going beyond the functions formally defined in the Constitution. The period of President Grybauskaitė's term and her efforts as an actor to define her role in shaping Lithuanian foreign policy are analyzed. This is assessed in the context of the activities and behavior of former Lithuanian presidents and in the context of relations with other institutions involved in foreign policy making – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Seimas in particular. This article analyzes the relationship between the actor (Grybauskaitė) and the already established structure of domestic foreign policy formation and the ability of the actor to change this structure. The analysis suggests that it is precisely because of the choices made by Grybauskaite during 2009–2019 that a relationship between the structures of foreign policy making in Lithuania has changed considerably, and that the center of power of foreign policy formation has shifted to the presidency

This article raises the question of what role does the presidential institution hold in the Lithuanian foreign policy formation mechanism and how a particular actor (president) can change their powers in foreign policy without going beyond the functions formally defined in the Constitution. The period of President Grybauskaitė's term and her efforts as an actor to define her role in shaping Lithuanian foreign policy are analyzed. This is assessed in the context of the activities and behavior of former Lithuanian presidents and in the context of relations with other institutions involved in foreign policy making – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Seimas in particular. This article analyzes the relationship between the actor (Grybauskaitė) and the already established structure of domestic foreign policy formation and the ability of the actor to change this structure. The analysis suggests that it is precisely because of the choices made by Grybauskaite during 2009–2019 that a relationship between the structures of foreign policy making in Lithuania has changed considerably, and that the center of power of foreign policy formation has shifted to the presidency

This article raises the question of what role does the presidential institution hold in the Lithuanian foreign policy formation mechanism and how a particular actor (president) can change their powers in foreign policy without going beyond the functions formally defined in the Constitution. The period of President Grybauskaitė's term and her efforts as an actor to define her role in shaping Lithuanian foreign policy are analyzed. This is assessed in the context of the activities and behavior of former Lithuanian presidents and in the context of relations with other institutions involved in foreign policy making – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Seimas in particular. This article analyzes the relationship between the actor (Grybauskaitė) and the already established structure of domestic foreign policy formation and the ability of the actor to change this structure. The analysis suggests that it is precisely because of the choices made by Grybauskaite during 2009–2019 that a relationship between the structures of foreign policy making in Lithuania has changed considerably, and that the center of power of foreign policy formation has shifted to the presidency. ; Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas, kokią vietą Lietuvos užsienio politikos formavimo mechanizme užima prezidento institucija ir kaip konkretus veikėjas (prezidentas) gali keisti savo galias užsienio politikoje, neperžengdamas Konstitucijoje formaliai apibrėžtų funkcijų. Analizuojamas D. Grybauskaitės prezidentavimo laikotarpis ir jos, kaip veikėjos, pastangos apsibrėžti savo vaidmenį formuojant Lietuvos užsienio politiką. Tai vertinama buvusių Lietuvos prezidentų veiklos, santykių su kitomis formuojant užsienio politiką dalyvaujančiomis institucijomis– visų pirma Užsienio reikalų ministerija (URM) ir Seimu– kontekste. Straipsnyje analizuojamas veikėjo (D. Grybauskaitės) santykis su jau nusistovėjusia vidine užsienio politikos formavimo struktūra ir galimybės veikėjui keisti šią struktūrą. Atlikta analizė leidžia teigti, kad būtent dėl vidaus politinių sąlygų (silpnos Vyriausybės) ir veikėjo asmeninės lyderystės užsienio politikoje gana reikšmingai per 2009–2019m. pasikeitė santykiai tarp Lietuvos užsienio politikos formavimo struktūrų, o pats užsienio politikos formavimo galios centras pasislinko į prezidentūros pusę.

This article raises the question of what role does the presidential institution hold in the Lithuanian foreign policy formation mechanism and how a particular actor (president) can change their powers in foreign policy without going beyond the functions formally defined in the Constitution. The period of President Grybauskaitė's term and her efforts as an actor to define her role in shaping Lithuanian foreign policy are analyzed. This is assessed in the context of the activities and behavior of former Lithuanian presidents and in the context of relations with other institutions involved in foreign policy making – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Seimas in particular. This article analyzes the relationship between the actor (Grybauskaitė) and the already established structure of domestic foreign policy formation and the ability of the actor to change this structure. The analysis suggests that it is precisely because of the choices made by Grybauskaite during 2009–2019 that a relationship between the structures of foreign policy making in Lithuania has changed considerably, and that the center of power of foreign policy formation has shifted to the presidency

This article raises the question of what role does the presidential institution hold in the Lithuanian foreign policy formation mechanism and how a particular actor (president) can change their powers in foreign policy without going beyond the functions formally defined in the Constitution. The period of President Grybauskaitė's term and her efforts as an actor to define her role in shaping Lithuanian foreign policy are analyzed. This is assessed in the context of the activities and behavior of former Lithuanian presidents and in the context of relations with other institutions involved in foreign policy making – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Seimas in particular. This article analyzes the relationship between the actor (Grybauskaitė) and the already established structure of domestic foreign policy formation and the ability of the actor to change this structure. The analysis suggests that it is precisely because of the choices made by Grybauskaite during 2009–2019 that a relationship between the structures of foreign policy making in Lithuania has changed considerably, and that the center of power of foreign policy formation has shifted to the presidency

Pasikeitus valdančiosioms jėgoms, 2012–2013 m. Gruzija sustabdė savo saugumo sektoriaus stiprinimą, sušvelnino retoriką Rusijos atžvilgiu ir pasirinko laukimo bei neprovokavimo taktiką. Rusijos nebelaikymas grėsme Gruzijoje nesutapo su ES ir NATO šalyse stiprėjančio sugrėsminimo kryp­timi. Priešingai – Rusijos keliami pavojai Gruzijoje tikslingai buvo nebelai­komi grėsme, stengiantis nedidinti įtampos su Rusija ir vengti galimos agre­syvios reakcijos iš Maskvos pusės. Straipsnyje remiamasi konstruktyvistine prielaida, kad pastarųjų metų pokyčiai Gruzijos saugumo ir užsienio politi­koje įvyko dėl saugumo tapatybės dinamikos. Ši dinamika buvo galima tiek dėl Gruzijos vidaus pokyčių – elito ir visuomenės sutarimu iš naujo persvars­tytų vertybių ir prioritetų, – tiek dėl pasikeitusios tarptautinės aplinkos, kuri susiaurino galimus strateginius Gruzijos pasirinkimus saugumo politikoje. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kokios dažniausiai nurodomos mažųjų valstybių saugumo strategijos, Gruzija išlieka neapibrėžtoje ir neužtikrintoje "strateginio lauki­mo" fazėje – kai norima vienu metu ir siekti euroatlantinės integracijos, ir nekonfliktuoti su Rusija. Vis dėlto straipsnyje daroma išvada, kad tokia tar­pinė padėtis tarp "aljansų siekimo" ir "autonomijos saugojimo" gali būti ne tik strategiškai stokojanti aiškaus pagrindimo, bet ir labai priklausoma nuo išorinių aplinkybių, visų pirma – pokyčių santykiuose tarp Rusijos ir Vakarų.

After the Russian – Georgian war in 2008 the conflicts over separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia became typical frozen conflicts. At the same time, Georgia's aspiration to get the NATO membership also has become frozen. The treat of Russia has been securitized by the government of President Michael Saakashvili and has been clearly reflected in all main strategic documents of Georgia. The NATO membership was the main goal of Georgia's security and foreign policy even before 2008. According to many authors, this strategic choice of allying against potential aggressor is a logical option for a small state seeking security. Right after the 2008 war the support for the NATO membership among Georgian society was extremely high – 70 percent was "fully supporting" the NATO membership and another 17 percent "somewhat supporting". However, the mood of Georgian population has started to shift quite soon and the trust for Saakashvili has diminished. The society has become tired over the securitization of Russia without clear perspective of the NATO membership. The perspective of the NATO membership in the eyes of Georgian population has not been abolished but rather postponed: the support for the membership during 2010–2012 was still high despite softer attitude towards Russia. After the change of government in 2012–2013 Georgia in fact suspended the development of national security sector. Georgian politicians since 2012 have softened the rhetoric towards Russia and have chosen a tactics of "let wait and do not provoke". The attempts to desecuritise Russia in Georgia is in opposite to the increased securitisation of Russia in NATO and the EU. The potential threats coming from Russia have been deliberately desecuritized in Georgia in seeking to avoid any increasing tension with Russia and to evade the potential aggressive reaction from Moscow. The article relays on the constructivist approach and argues that the changes in Georgia's security and foreign policy did occur due to the dynamics of security identity. The dynamics of social identity in Georgia might have happened because of the changes in its domestic politics – a tacit agreement between Georgia's society and political elite to review the priorities and values of national politics – as well as the changes in the international environment that restricted certain choices of security strategies for Georgia. Having in mind the security strategies prescribed for small states in academic literature, most often Georgia remains in an undefined and uncertain phase which could be labelled as "strategic waiting". Georgia is still aspiring for the Euro-Atlantic integration and seeking to not confront Russia at the same time. However, the article concludes that such an interim status in between "alliance" and "sitting of the fence" (or preserving an autonomy) is lacking clear argumentation and remains very dependent on external influences, first of all – on the dynamics of relations between the West and Russia. ; Pasikeitus valdančiosioms jėgoms, 2012–2013 m. Gruzija sustabdė savo saugumo sektoriaus stiprinimą, sušvelnino retoriką Rusijos atžvilgiu ir pasirinko laukimo bei neprovokavimo taktiką. Rusijos nebelaikymas grėsme Gruzijoje nesutapo su ES ir NATO šalyse stiprėjančio sugrėsminimo kryp­timi. Priešingai – Rusijos keliami pavojai Gruzijoje tikslingai buvo nebelai­komi grėsme, stengiantis nedidinti įtampos su Rusija ir vengti galimos agre­syvios reakcijos iš Maskvos pusės. Straipsnyje remiamasi konstruktyvistine prielaida, kad pastarųjų metų pokyčiai Gruzijos saugumo ir užsienio politi­koje įvyko dėl saugumo tapatybės dinamikos. Ši dinamika buvo galima tiek dėl Gruzijos vidaus pokyčių – elito ir visuomenės sutarimu iš naujo persvars­tytų vertybių ir prioritetų, – tiek dėl pasikeitusios tarptautinės aplinkos, kuri susiaurino galimus strateginius Gruzijos pasirinkimus saugumo politikoje. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kokios dažniausiai nurodomos mažųjų valstybių saugumo strategijos, Gruzija išlieka neapibrėžtoje ir neužtikrintoje "strateginio lauki­mo" fazėje – kai norima vienu metu ir siekti euroatlantinės integracijos, ir nekonfliktuoti su Rusija. Vis dėlto straipsnyje daroma išvada, kad tokia tar­pinė padėtis tarp "aljansų siekimo" ir "autonomijos saugojimo" gali būti ne tik strategiškai stokojanti aiškaus pagrindimo, bet ir labai priklausoma nuo išorinių aplinkybių, visų pirma – pokyčių santykiuose tarp Rusijos ir Vakarų.