Suchergebnisse

AbstractWe study the problem of allocating projects to heterogeneous workers. The simultaneous execution of multiple projects imposes constraints across project teams. Each worker has preferences over the combinations of projects in which he can potentially participate and his team members in any of these projects. We propose a revelation mechanism that is Pareto-efficient and group strategy-proof (Theorem 1). We also identify two preference domains on which the mechanism is strongly group strategy-proof (Theorem 2). Our results subsume results by Monte and Tumennasan (2013) and Kamiyama (2013) .

JEL–Numbers: C78, D60 ; We show that the full version of the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' (Roth, 1986) generalizes to many-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market have separable and substitutable preferences. ; Financial support from Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2008–04784), the Consolider-Ingenio 2010 (CSD2006–00016) program, the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and the Government of Catalonia (SGR2009–01142) is gratefully acknowledged. The first draft of this paper was written while the author was visiting Universidad del Rosario, Bogot´a (Colombia). He gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Universidad del Rosario and a research fellowship from CSIC. ; Peer reviewed

In the context of resource allocation on the basis of responsive priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition for the deferred acceptance rule to satisfy a consistency principle. In this note, we extend this result to the domain of substitutable priorities, complementing results of Kojima and Manea (2010) and Kumano (2009). ; Financial support from Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2008–04784), the Consolider-Ingenio 2010 (CSD2006–00016) program, the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and the Government of Catalonia (SGR2009–01142) is gratefully acknowledged.

© 2014 Elsevier B.V. We show that the full version of the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents' preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of weakly separable preferences is also maximal for the rural hospital theorem to hold. ; F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, the Government of Catalonia (SGR2009-01142), and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2011-29847) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) ; Peer Reviewed

This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with another set of agents (firms/hospitals). We first give a short overview of a selection of classical results. Then, we review recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with couples. We discuss contributions from computer scientists, economists, and game theorists. © 2013 World Scientific Publishing Company. ; P. Biró gratefully acknowledges financial support from OTKA grant K69027 and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under its Momentum Programme (LD-004/2010). F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2011–29847), the Government of Catalonia (SGR2009–01142) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) ; Peer Reviewed

El pdf del artículo es el documento de trabajo. ; We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. We introduce a so-called bi-choice graph for each pair of stable matchings and characterize its structure. Exploiting this structure we obtain as a corollary the "lone wolf" theorem and a decomposability result. The latter result together with transitivity of blocking leads to an elementary proof of the so-called stable median matching theorem, showing how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems. Finally, we extend our results to two-sided matching problems. ; Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2008–04784), Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2009–01142), the Barcelona GSE Research Network, and the Consolider-Ingenio 2010 (CSD2006–00016) program.

We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched as pairs or remain single. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we review a key result for roommate problems (the ``lonely wolf'' theorem) for which we provide a concise and elementary proof. Second, and related to the title of this paper, we show how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems. ; F. Klijn's research was supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (SEJ2005- 01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of XREA).

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 ; Ç. Kayı gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and financial support from Colciencias/CSIC (Convocatoria No: 506/2010), El Patrimonio Autónomo Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento para la Ciencia, la Tecnología y la Innovación, Francisco José de Caldas. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from CSIC/Colciencias through grant 2010CO0013 and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2011–29847) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) ; Peer Reviewed

Publicado como: Barcelona GSE Working Paper, nº 610, February 21, 2012; May 6, 2013. Publicado como: Documento de Trabajo de la Facultad de Economía de la Universidad del Rosario, nº 119, Marzo 2012 Trabajo presentado como comunicación de congreso al "3rd UECE Lisbon Meeting on Game Theory and Applications" (2011); al Workshop "Recent Developments in Market Design" (2011); al "VIII Encuentro de la Red Española en Elección Social" (2011); y al "XXXVI Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía" (2011). ; We want to allocate an object among two agents who have property rights over the object; the dispossessed agent and the owner, and compensate the one who does not get the object. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee the participation of both agents, and satisfy the budget constraint. ; Financial support from Colciencias/CSIC (Convocatoria No: 506/2010), El Patrimonio Autónomo Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento para la Ciencia, la Tecnología y la Innovación, Francisco José de Caldas. Financial support from CSIC/Colciencias 2010CO0013, Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2011{29847), the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and the Government of Catalonia (SGR2009{01142). ; Peer Reviewed

We study farsighted stability for roommate markets. We show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present a roommate market without a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 1) and a roommate market with a nonsingleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 2). © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. ; B. Klaus thanks the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for its support under grant VIDI-452-06-013. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges the support from Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2008–04784), the Consolider-Ingenio 2010 (CSD2006–00016) program, the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and the Government of Catalonia (SGR2009– 01142). ; Peer Reviewed

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy (JEL D82, I21)