Digitale Transformation und Job Strategie in der deutschen Automobilindustrie
In: Koreanische Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 1-21
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In: Koreanische Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 1-21
In: Koreanische Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 27-44
In: The Journal of Asiatic Studies, Band 62, Heft 4, S. 133-161
In: The Journal of Asiatic Studies, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 49-77
In: Koreanische Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 129-148
In: Contemporary economic policy: a journal of Western Economic Association International, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 237-248
ISSN: 1465-7287
This article considers the vertical structure of the telecommunications industry and examines the welfare effects of privatization on the public enterprise, where the public enterprise supplies the essential network service of the upstream market and competes against private, independent firms in a mixed downstream market. It is shown that the cost advantage of the independent rivals improves welfare postprivatization. Several relevant and current policy issues on the process of privatization in the telecommunications industry are also discussed. (JEL L50, D42)
In: The Economics of Rebuilding Fisheries, S. 197-218
In: Energy economics, Band 136, S. 107766
ISSN: 1873-6181
In: Journal of economics
ISSN: 1617-7134
In: Bulletin of economic research
ISSN: 1467-8586
AbstractWhen managers face relative profit performance competition, we formulate a green managerial delegation contract where the owners impose profit‐oriented environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) on their managers. We show that the owner adopts ECSR as a commitment device to reduce outputs under quantity competition if the degree of relative profit performance competition is sufficiently high, which can increase not only industry profits but also environmental quality. We also examine an endogenous choice of ECSR and find that the profitable level of ECSR in the asymmetric ECSR case is higher than that in the symmetric ECSR case while both firms undertake ECSR in equilibrium if the severity of competition is sufficiently high.
In: Environment and development economics, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 234-256
ISSN: 1469-4395
AbstractThis paper examines the impact of cross-ownership on the strategic incentive of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) within a green managerial delegation contract in a triopoly market engaged in price competition. It demonstrates that bilateral cross-ownership between insiders provides weak incentives to undertake ECSR, which has a non-monotone relationship with cross-ownership shares, while it provides strong incentives for outsiders, which increases the ECSR level as cross-ownership increases. It also compares unilateral cross-ownership and finds that a firm that owns shares in its rival has a greater incentive to undertake ECSR than its partially-owned rival, while an outsider has more incentive than firms in bilateral scenarios. These findings reveal that a firm's incentive to increase a market price through ECSR critically depends on its cross-ownership share, while it decreases environmental damage and increases social welfare when the environmental damage is serious.
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 399-418
ISSN: 1935-1704
Abstract
This paper adopts a green managerial delegation model in a polluting network industry wherein consumers form fulfilled rational expectations of network externalities. We show that firms are consistently incentivized to undertake ECSR (environmental corporate social responsibility) under price competition, while positive network externalities can increase the strategic level of ECSR. We also show that product substitutability between network products can play an important role in determining a firm's strategic level of ECSR and resulting profits. Finally, ECSR is conducive to increasing environmental quality and social welfare in a high-polluting network industry. Therefore, the strategic adoption of ECSR in a network industry is Pareto-improving as environmental damage becomes serious.
In: The Manchester School, Band 91, Heft 2, S. 89-117
ISSN: 1467-9957
AbstractThis study constructs a vertical structure model in which a foreign firm holds upstream partial passive ownership and examines tariff‐induced free technology transfer from the firm to its downstream rival. We show that a strategic tariff can induce technology transfer when the share of foreign ownership is large, which always yields higher welfare under both vertical separation and integration, while vertical integration can better induce technology transfer. We also consider an extensive analysis with some variations, such as upstream or downstream competition, downstream passive ownership, government commitments to no‐tariff policies, and foreign firm commitments to no‐licensing strategies, and discuss policy implications regarding the pro‐competitive effect of foreign passive ownership when free technology transfer is involved.
SSRN
In: Annals of public and cooperative economics, Band 94, Heft 1, S. 273-299
ISSN: 1467-8292
AbstractThis study considers a vertical structure model in which an upstream state‐owned enterprise (SOE) and a downstream domestic firm compete with a vertically integrated foreign firm (VIFF). We consider the cost‐inefficiency of the SOE and examine the entry decisions of a VIFF under downstream subsidization. We find that without upstream privatization, the VIFF's entry decision might not be socially desirable unless it enters both markets and the cost inefficiency is intermediate. Additionally, a policy to reduce the cost inefficiency might cause a drastic welfare increase or loss when the VIFF changes its entry decision. We then examine upstream privatization and show that a substantial improvement in cost efficiency can increase welfare with privatization. When the SOE maximizes welfare, however, lesser (greater) cost efficiency improvement is necessary to increase welfare with privatization if the ex‐ante cost inefficiency is high (low).