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The BRICS' impact can be evaluated based on the degree of political coherence among them, as well as their capacity to influence the international system. This article will from the outset assume that the BRICS form a heterogeneous coalition of often competing powers that share a common fundamental political objective: to erode Western hegemonic claims by protecting the principle which these claims are deemed to most threaten, namely the political sovereignty of states. The BRICS form a coalition of sovereign state defenders. While they do not seek to form an anti-Western political coalition based on a counter-proposal or radically different vision of the world, they are concerned with maintaining their independence of judgment and national action in a world that is increasingly economically and socially interdependent. They consider that state sovereignty trumps all, including, of course, the political nature of its underpinning regimes. Thus, the BRICS -- even the democratic ones -- fundamentally diverge from the liberal vision of Western countries. Adapted from the source document.

Der Beitrag befasst sich mit dem Zusammenhang zweier Dimensionen: dem Ende des Kalten Krieges, welches die Herausbildung einer Welt ohne stabile Referenzen markiert, und der Globalisierung, die die Entstehung einer Welt ohne Grenzen bedeutet. An zwei Beispielen wird diese Verschränkung zwischen dem Ende der bipolaren Strukturen und der Globalisierung aufgezeigt: dem Ende der Supermächte und der Krise der Universalität. In der neuen weltweiten gesellschaftlichen Ordnung sind drei Dynamiken bestimmend: die zwischenstaatliche Logik, die weltweite gesellschaftliche Integration und die gegenseitige Durchdringung der Gesellschaften. Auf dieser Grundlage stellt der Autor einige Hypothesen zur Frage auf, welche Art von Regulierung für dieses im Entstehen begriffene System angemessen erscheint. Abschließende Überlegungen befassen sich mit der Herausbildung von Sinnräumen, die als Werte- und Interessengemeinschaften zwischen politischen Gesellschaften langfristig für eine relative Stabilisierung der Weltordnung verantwortlich sind. (ICH)

There has been much recent debate concerning the role of the state. What should we make of this unease? There are two possibilities: the first involves taking a clear position on the debate by stating that globalization leads to the downgrading of states in global regulation, to the benefit of the market. This suggests that the era of the state will be followed by the era of the market. While this thesis has many elements of truth, it underestimates the capacity of the state to transform itself, at the risk of opposing the state too systematically to the market. The second takes the opposite point of view by saying that globalization leaves the state neither defenseless nor weakened. The tenants of this analysis use the historical plasticity of the state & the falling numbers of states in the world as evidence. At the same time, they hide the size of the crisis of legitimacy of public policies. The problem comes from the fact that these two theses, reputed to be mutually antagonistic, are in fact perfectly complementary. Accordingly, instead of choosing between them, it seems useful to address them simultaneously before moving beyond them to propose the following thesis: globalization develops at once against & with the state. This inherent contradiction transforms the state into a fractal actor, that is to say a state that no longer poises itself over society, but who at the same time remains the guarantor of a public rationality. Adapted from the source document.

Les relations entre mondialisation et démocratie sont pour le moins ambiguës, d'autant quelles donnent souvent lieu à des analyses réduisant la seconde à la seule « démocratie de marché ». La démocratie a en effet deux dimensions : elle est à la fois procédure et culture. La mondialisation favorise sans doute le développement d'une démocratie mondiale en tant que procédure : élections libres et alternance politique sont devenues le modèle politique de référence. Mais ce mode de gouvernement n'est qu'une dimension de la démocratie, une condition nécessaire mais pas suffisante, car une véritable culture démocratique se construit sur le « temps long » et ne peut se limiter aux procédures électorales. À cet égard, le « temps mondial » pense la démocratie comme un phénomène anhistorique, un « espace de services à la carte » mis à disposition de chaque individu. La mondialisation tend ainsi à réduire la démocratie à une revendication exigible immédiatement, qui délégitime l'idée de la démocratie comme construction collective d'une nation, lente, singulière et complexe.

(First published in French in Le Temps mondial, 1997, pp 11-52.) World time is a matrix of problems, questions, & new problematizations based on events located in time. World time can be defined as the point when all the geopolitical & cultural consequences of the post-Cold War period link up with the acceleration of the process of economic, social, & cultural globalization. It is therefore neither the post-Cold War period since it is in Europe that its geopolitical consequences are greatest -- nor the period of globalization -- since the process started a very long time ago -- but the linking up of these two major processes. If it is necessary to contextualize globalization, it is even more necessary to temporalize it. Of course, the political, social, & cultural consequences of the market revolution & the liberal turning point are & will in the long term be considerable. But none of them can directly or immediately be interpreted or identified. That is why the acceleration of globalization is separate from world time. This idea of the mutual involvement of events, prior to their linking up, is absolutely essential because it makes it possible to understand conversely why, until then, linking up could not occur despite the existence of many early indications. Analyzing some major events of the 1970s & 1980s shows that the world order has changed (event), the change brought about by these events made it possible to distinguish before from after by giving the change the meaning of a break with no possibility of going back (irreversibility), & if so many events accelerate & multiply, this is not "purely by chance" but in fact because market forces & democratic aspirations inevitably combine (coherence). Yet world time is a matrix, not a system. All attempts at coherence that it may be subjected to bring out "bifurcations" & disjunctions & integrate into different mediations. Adapted from the source document.

Ce qui caractérise le monde d'aujourd'hui est l'interaction entre la fin de la guerre froide et l'accélération de la mondialisation. Or, les stratèges ont plutôt tendance à parler de stratégie, et les globalistes, de globalisation. En effet, la fin de la guerre froide marque l'émergence d'un monde sans repères fixes tandis que la mondialisation consacre l'émergence d'un univers sans frontières, processus qui sont difficiles à appréhender. Autrement dit, c'est au moment où nous avons le plus besoin de repères que cette notion même disparaît. C'est cette articulation entre fin des structures bipolaires et mondialisation que j'appelle le temps mondial, qu'il faut essayer de comprendre et d'analyser, à travers deux exemples différents : la fin des superpuissances et la crise de l'universalité. Le premier renvoie à une interrogation sur la puissance et le second, aux enjeux de sens dans un espace mondialisé.