Suchergebnisse

This article presents a formal model of path dependence inspired by England's history. The introduction of feudalism after the Norman Conquest – the critical juncture – created a large elite that rebelled frequently. The king fought these revolts with the help of collaborators he recruited from the masses. In compensation, he made these collaborators members of the elite. This was a cost-effective form of compensation: rents were only partly rival, and so new elite members only partially diluted the rents received by the king. The dilution from adding new members decreased as the elite grew in size, generating positive feedback and path dependence. This mechanism can account for the extension of rights in England in the early stages of its journey towards democracy.

This article presents a formal model of path dependence inspired by England's history. The introduction of feudalism after the Norman Conquest – the critical juncture – created a large elite that rebelled frequently. The king fought these revolts with the help of collaborators he recruited from the masses. In compensation, he made these collaborators members of the elite. This was a cost-effective form of compensation: rents were only partly rival, and so new elite members only partially diluted the rents received by the king. The dilution from adding new members decreased as the elite grew in size, generating positive feedback and path dependence. This mechanism can account for the extension of rights in England in the early stages of its journey towards democracy.

One of the most striking institutional differences across countries is the extent to which their militaries intervene in politics. This article examines the role of war in generating these differences. It presents a model that shows that when governance institutions are weak, increasing military spending makes a country more likely to win in a war and increases the probability that coups succeed. An incumbent can avoid coups by strengthening governance institutions, but this limits the rents he can extract. Both the optimal choice of military spending and the strength of governance institutions depend on the probability of war. The article predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the frequency of wars and coups and presents empirical evidence consistent with this prediction.

We show that drought-induced changes in the intensity of riots lead to moves towards democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, and that these changes are often a result of concessions made as a result of the riots. This provides evidence that low-intensity conflict can have a substantial short-run impact on democratic change, and supports the .window of opportunity. hypothesis: droughts lead to an increase in the threat of conflict, and incumbents often respond by making democratic concessions.

We show that drought-induced changes in the intensity of riots lead to moves toward democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and that these changes are often a result of concessions made as a result of the riots. This provides evidence that low-intensity conflict can have a substantial short-run impact on democratic change and supports the "window of opportunity" hypothesis: droughts lead to an increase in the threat of conflict, and incumbents often respond by making democratic concessions.

We show that drought-induced changes in the intensity of riots lead to moves toward democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and that these changes are often a result of concessions made as a result of the riots. This provides evidence that low-intensity conflict can have a substantial short-run impact on democratic change and supports the "window of opportunity" hypothesis: droughts lead to an increase in the threat of conflict, and incumbents often respond by making democratic concessions.

Social unrest often erupts suddenly and diffuses quickly. What drives people to overcome their collective action problem and join a riot or protest, turning what is initially a small event into a widespread movement? We address this question by examining the Swing riots of 1830-31. The communication constraints of the time induced spatio-temporal variation in exposure to news about the uprising, allowing us to estimate the role of contagion in the spread of the riots. We find that local (rather than national) sources of information were central in driving contagion, and that this contagion magnified the impact that social and economic fundamentals had on riots by a factor of 2.65. Our historical data allow us to overcome a number of econometric challenges, but the Swing riots are of independent interest as well: they contributed to the passage of the Great Reform Act, a key step in Britain's institutional development.