Suchergebnisse

IN THE SUMMER OF 1983 THE CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY AND THE CENTRE PARTY IN NORWAY JOINED THE CABINET TO CREATE A MAJORITY GOVERNMENT OF THE THREE MAJOR BOURGEOIS PARTIES. THE AUTHOR DESCRIBES THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY BOTH BEFORE AND DURING THE CAMPAIGN. THE AUTHOR ANALYZES THE IMPACT, IF ANY, OF TELEVISION DEBATES, AND ROLES IN THE CAMPAIGN PLAYED BY REGIONALISM AND BY THE INTEREST ORGANIZATION IN THE SOCIAL SECTOR, WHICH PROVIDED AN ABUNDANCE OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION TO SUPPORT THE DEMANDS OF THE SOCIALIST PARTIES. THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION REFLECT A CONTEXT BETWEEN CENTRE AND PERIPHERY.

A BODY OF ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE APPEARS TO SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC CONCERNS AND ASSESSMENTS OF GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DIRECTLY INFLUENCE VOTING BEHAVIOR INDEPENDENT OF OTHER PREDISPOSITIONS AND CLEAVAGES. THIS SEEMS REASONABLE AND IS WELL DOCUMENTED ACROSS BOTH CULTURES AND TIME PERIODS. WHAT REMAINS MORE INCONCLUSIVE IS HOW TO EXPLAIN FLUCTUATIONS IN THE ELECTORAL IMPACT OF PERSONAL ECONOMIC WORRIES. OUR COMPARISON OF NORWEGIAN AND U.S. DATA HAS SUGGESTED THAT COGNITIVE, SOCIAL AND POLTICAL FACTORS MAY ALL INFLUENCE THIS ASSOCIATION. THE POLITICAL INFORMATION AND CUES FOR CONNECTING THE TWO SPHERES MAY BE ABSENT FOR MOST ELECTIONS AND FOR MOST PEOPLE. NEVERTHELESS, IN SOME ELECTIONS AND UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS INDIVIDUAL ECONOMIC WORRIES CAN HAVE A SIGNIFICANT, INDEPENDENT IMPACT ON ELECTION OUTCOMES. A MAJOR GOAL OF FUTURE POLITICAL-ECONOMY RESEARCH, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE TO SPECIFY MORE COMPLETELY THOSE FACTORS THAT FACILITATE THE LINKAGE OF PERSONAL AND COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC CONCERNS.

THIS ARTICLE COMPARES TWO SPATIAL MODELS OF PARTY COMPETITION: (A) THE TRADITIONAL PROXIMITY MODEL AND (B) THE DIRECTIONAL MODEL OF VOTER CHOICE. THE ARTICLE FIRST LAYS OUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO MODELS IN MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS. THE TRADITIONAL PROXIMITY MODEL MAKES NO CLEAR PREDICTION ABOUT THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL PARTIES: THE DIRECTIONAL MODEL PREDICTS THAT OPTIMAL PLACEMENT FOR PARTIES WILL BE ALONG THE CIRCUMFERENCE OF A CIRCLE AT A MODERATE DISTANCE FROM THE CENTER. BOTH THEORIES HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR OVERTIME STRATEGY AND THE SUCCESS OF NEW POLITICAL PARTIES. TRADITIONAL PROXIMITY THEORY EMPHASIZES THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A LOCATION WITH HIGH DENSITY OF VOTERS, WHILE DIRECTIONAL THEORY EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF A DISTINCT DIRECTIONAL STRATEGY. THE AUTHORS EXAMINE THE NORWEGIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM FROM 1969-1985 AND THE SWEDISH SYSTEM FROM 1979-1982 AND FIND THE DIRECTIONAL THEORY MORE STRONGLY SUPPORTED.

PARTISANSHIP WAS THE DOMINANT FACTOR AFFECTING THE REFERENDA ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN BRITAIN AND NORWAY, BUT LEFT-RIGHT LOCATIONS, IN THE DOWNSIAN SENSE OF ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT CENTER-PERIPHERY CONSIDERATIONS ALSO INFLUENCED THE OUTCOMES. THESE FINDINGS ARE CONSISTENT WITH EARLIER STUDIES THAT EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY POINT FIRST TOWARD PARTISANSHIP AND SECOND TOWARD BASIC ATTITUDES AS DETERMINING FACTORS IN REFERENDUM VOTING. STILL, FOR PARTISANSHIP TO HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT THE PARTIES MUST TAKE CLEAR AND UNIFORM POSITIONS. WHEN PARTIES DIVIDE, SO DO THEIR FOLLOWERS. AND FOR BASIC ATTITUDES TO OPERATE, THEY MUST BE ENGRAINED IN THE FABRIC OF NORMAL POLITICAL CONFLICT AND BE RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE AT STAKE.

The experience of political parties in Norway from 1969 to 1985 and the Swedish system from 1979 to 1982 is used to test proximity and directional theory models of party competition. Directional theory has clear implications for the kind of system that ought to exist in multiparty democracies--of'moderate pluralism.' (SJK)