Suchergebnisse

In Ukraine, China continues to adhere to the policy of "neutrality benevolent towards Russia", remaining "above the fray" and at the same time looking for its place in the conflict as a "mediator" that does not condemn Russia, but does not recognize the transfer of part of Ukrainian territories to Russia. However, in Chinese society and the expert community controlled by the Communist Party of China (CPC), the attitude towards the Ukrainian crisis is changing. If at the initial stage of Russia's Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine, pro-Russian sentiments prevailed in the context of the Taiwan problem: "Russia is doing well!", "And we need it!" Today, the angle is different: "neither for Russia, nor against", with the addition that "the situation in Ukraine interferes with the normalization of China's relations with the West and, above all, with the EU". At the same time, Beijing is still interested in Russia as the main factor of "pressure on the United States" in the Sino-American confrontation. China's two-tiered approach to Ukraine and Russia was manifested in Beijing's reaction to the "Wagner" PMC mutiny. The official authorities limited themselves to a short statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry: "what happened is an internal affair of Russia". At the same time, the situation around "Wagner" caused active discussions in Chinese social networks. Their main topics were the following: how stable the situation inside Russia is, how what happened can affect Sino-Russian relations, and the development of the SMO in Ukraine. In the past three months, Beijing has stepped up its foreign policy. High-level contacts were organized with the U.S. and the EU, conciliatory proposals were made to Japan and South Korea. However, this has not yet led to an improvement in relations, although, according to Beijing's expectations, it may lay the foundations for normalization in the future. In other areas, progress was achieved where the PRC directed its financial resources – Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc. Relations deteriorated with those countries which improved their ties with the United States – India and the Philippines. Despite some personnel changes the internal political situation remains stable. Xi Jinping' promotion as China's "chief ideologue" in the "new era" continues. Without exception, all CPC members study Xi's writings on "socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era" every day. At the end of June, Xi talked at a group study of the Party's Central Committee members about "sinified Marxism", the importance of combining "Marxism and Chinese civilization". China's main problems are in the area of the economy. According to foreign experts, China's GDP growth rate is too low. Chinese analysts, on the contrary, believe that economic growth rates turned out to be moderately high compared to a low base in 2022. The PRC is starting to react more aggressively to U.S. sanctions. A set of laws has been formed that impose restrictions on foreign companies within China. At the same time, there is a belief in the country that foreign businesses interested in the Chinese market will themselves bypass U.S. restrictions.

In 2022–2023, China is entering a new stage of its development. The combination of a number of crisis-containing factors increases the likelihood of a large-scale socio-economic shock. Partly man-made excessive slowdown in economic development due to the "Zero COVID policy", the ongoing and escalating US-Chinese rivalry and, in particular, the "technological war", the over-concentration of power after the 20th Congress of the CPC, as well as the growing tension around the Taiwan problem – all together, or with the imposition of just two or three components, can lead to serious negative socio-economic consequences that will put into question Beijing's achievement of its second "centennial goal" – the establishment of the PRC as one of the leading world powers by 2049. With the exception of the domestic political sphere, China is trying to find answers to the above-mentioned challenges. In late 2022 – early 2023, Beijing removes anti-coronavirus restrictions, activates trade and economic cooperation in various formats, attempts to find out common ground between Chinese and American global interests, continues to make efforts in the European (also African, Asian, etc.) direction of its foreign policy, as well as emphasizes the high level of Russian-Chinese cooperation. At the same time, trying to provide answers to crisis-containing factors, Beijing faces both opportunities and limitations. The coming year or two seem to be most difficult for China over the last 20 years. The slowdown in the economy and domestic consumption, social protests, new challenges of the pandemic, the search for options to normalize relations with the United States, balancing between the West and Russia against the background of the Ukrainian crisis, etc. will require non-standard solutions from the Chinese leadership. Here we can expect both traditional successes and possible failures. In the near future, the political model chosen by Beijing at the 20th CPC Congress will be tested for effectiveness.

The consequences of COVID 19, both inside and outside China, especially in the countries – major importers of Chinese products, have negatively impacted the Chinese economy. These negative socio-economic consequences forced Beijing to accelerate the transition to a relatively new economic development model, which was marked in the early 2000s. The main component of this model is the expansion of domestic consumption and, accordingly, a further increase of the contribution of this indicator to the Chinese GDP itself and of its growth rate. However, this does not mean that China will abandon economic expansion and the implementation of its foreign economic and initiatives. Their importance as structural parts of the new economic model will continue and even grow. The acceleration of the transition to the dominance of domestic consumption in economic development is additionally conditioned by the foreign policy deadlock in which China found itself at the end of 2020. Despite the world's fastest economic recovery from the COVID 19 pandemic, China has been unable to take advantage of this advantage effectively. Chinese "mask" diplomacy did not bring the desired results for Beijing – the PRC was not able to raise the leader's torch temporarily lost by the United States. On the contrary, under the influence of Western propaganda, the contradiction in the perception of China as "our own" in the market sphere and "an alien" in the sphere of ideology has intensified. At the same time, due to increased competition in high-tech markets, in particular, 5G communication technologies, the ideological "alienation" of China is beginning to be used by Western countries in market wars in their favor. The forecast of economic development both by international and Chinese experts assumes the growth rate of China's GDP in 2021 will be in the range of 6–8%. In our opinion, this is an overly optimistic estimate, and the corresponding figure will probably be 5–6%. The PRC is entering the 14th Five-Year Plan amid greater uncertainty: the prospects for the recovery of the world economy as a whole and, in particular, of the main Chinese trading partners, are not clear; limited instability is possible due to the accelerated change in the model of economic development; the volume of Chinese GDP has reached more than 15 trillion USD, therefore, each percent of its growth has become significantly "heavier" and more difficult to achieve. At the same time, the primacy in economic recovery and the continued potential for the expansion of the Chinese middle class bring positive contribution to the economic prospects of the PRC.

In the last quarter of 2021, a number of important events that consolidated the previously outlined trends in China's development took place but with new significant nuances. In early November, the 6th plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee was held in Beijing, at which, in the official interpretation of the Communist Party of China, the "third historic resolution" was adopted. In fact, it formalized Xi Jinping's monopoly on political power on the eve of the 20th CPC Congress scheduled for autumn 2022, at which Xi is planned to be re-elected as the CPC General Secretary for a third term. In mid-November, an online Summit of Xi and Joe Biden took place, confirming the current course of both sides to develop relations with a "new bipolarity in the context of globalization" emerging around the Sino-American confrontation. In December, the white paper titled "China: Democracy That Works" was published in Beijing. In parallel with the increasing intensity and scale of China's propaganda and diplomatic offensive, it revealed a new detail in Beijing's approaches to bipolar confrontation with the United States – namely, the inclusion of the topic of "democracy" and "value orientations" of world development in the sphere of confrontation. New peculiarities have emerged in the economy. At the December economic meeting of the CPC Central Committee, the views of the Chinese leadership on the country's near economic future were presented to the public much more cautiously than before. In Chinese foreign policy propaganda, the role of China's main partner in the fight against American hegemony, through which Beijing seeks to strengthen the "Chinese pole" of the "new bipolarity", is assigned to Russia. In addition to the growing volumes of economic and military cooperation and political interaction, Beijing counts on Moscow's support in matters significant for active Chinese diplomacy in promoting Chinese ideas of democracy and the "Community of Common Destiny for Mankind" theory as the most important universal reference point in the world ideological and political space.

In China, the topics of pandemic and economic recovery gradually lose their importance and give place to another deterioration in U.S.–China relations due to pressure from the United States on Hong Kong, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous region, and the insufficient, according to the American side, pace of implementation of China's first phase of commercial transactions with the United States. Beijing takes Washington's threats to deprive Hong Kong of the status of a special customs territory in trade and economic cooperation with the U.S. quite seriously. However, Chinese experts note that the implementation of these threats will not lead to the collapse of the Hong Kong economy, since the most-favored-nation regime applies to about 5% of Hong Kong's exports to the United States. At the same time, Beijing is trying to find an alternative to Hong Kong as a financial center in the face of Macao. However, the main characteristics of the Macao economy do not yet allow us to seriously talk about a full-fledged replacement, since most of the GDP of this special administrative region is formed by the gaming, tourism and restaurant industries. To a certain extent, the "position" of Hong Kong is claimed by Shanghai, but the extent of its claims is limited by the Chinese legal system, which is less flexible and liberal than that of Hong Kong. In May 2020, the so-called "Two sessions" were held in Beijing: the national Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council of China (CPPCC) and the National People's Congress (NPC). The latter presented a report on the government's work in 2019 and the first quarters of 2020. The report contains the main guidelines and targets for the country's socio-economic development for the current year, as well as a list of measures to support the economy in the so-called "post-crisis" period. Most of the mechanisms for stimulating growth are of a fiscal nature: the authorities do not want to inflate the amount of debt owed by public and private companies too much, and they go, first of all, for tax breaks. At the same time, the Central budget deficit is expected to increase to 3.6% due to reduced tax revenues because of quarantine measures and increased government spending to support consumer demand. At the same time, Beijing announced a reduction in spending by the central and provincial governments on "unimportant" and "non-priority items": construction of buildings, business trips, celebrations, etc. The report on the government's work reflected the desire of the Chinese leadership to accelerate the ongoing work on "launching" a new economic model of China's development, aimed not at achieving high growth rates, but at quality indicators. For the first time, the NPC session did not specify the expected GDP growth rate in 2020. However, the main characteristics of this model have not yet been fully clarified. In the first approximation, it is a bet on the production of high-tech products, the implementation of traditional infrastructure projects within China and the expansion of domestic consumption – while maintaining the strategy of going outside in the format of the "Belt and Road" (or the "Silk Road Economic Belt"). The so-called "separation" of China and the United States in the financial and economic spheres, which is widely discussed in the world press, has not yet taken place. D. Trump's "return of American business to the United States" is not yet perceived by the American private business itself, which is interested in expanding its presence in Chinese financial and other markets. China, for its part, by opening previously closed sectors of its economy is trying to provide new business opportunities to American companies in a "compromise" way, in contrast to military and political issues, where Beijing acts extremely harshly. In Russian-Chinese relations, there is still a trend to deepen strategic partnership in the military-political sphere and, if possible, in the economy – taking into account the negative consequences of the pandemic and adjusting for the scale of the Russian economy.

Linking the 100th anniversary of the CPC, celebrated in 2021, with long-term goals, the Chinese leadership is talking about the country's entry into the next stage of development – the stage of the "second century of the CPC." The 14th plan for the socio-economic development of the country for 2021–2025, adopted in March 2021 and long-range objectives through 2035 are seen as the first steps in a new round of China's evolution. According to the Chinese leadership, the goals of the first century have been largely achieved. Now China faces more ambitious tasks: 1) achieve socialist modernization by 2035, doubling its GDP per capita to the level of an average developed country; 2) to reach the German or Japanese level of industrial and innovative development by 2050; 3) to ensure the innovative and scientific and technological self-sufficiency of China in order to get away from the current technological dependence on the United States and the West in general, which, in the opinion of the Chinese leadership, poses a threat to the national security of the PRC; 4) to create by 2027 (100th anniversary of the PLA) a strong modern army; 5) Ensure China's global leadership by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2049. The peculiarities of the new 14th five-year plan include the absence of targets for GDP growth rates for 2021–2025. The benchmark will now be set every year. For example, for 2021, this indicator is set in the highly redundant formulation "6 percent or more". Beijing records the nearing transition from quantitative planning to qualitative planning. The aggravation of relations between China and the United States under the Biden administration and Beijing's retaliatory, in a new way, actions in almost all areas, from ideology to security and defense, in the near future will change the global balance of power and lead to the formation of a "new bipolarity" implying in the context of globalization, that in addition to the two new planetary "poles" in the world, regional and subregional centers of power will persist and develop, forming, as saying in China, modern "polycentricity". Against such a background, the "new bipolarity" will be characterized not only by a direct clash of Chinese and American interests, but also by a struggle for dominance, influence, and alliance with the leaders of the "polycentric world." Within the framework of the "new bipolarity", the United States is strengthening relations with allies, opposing the "democratic economy" of the West to the "authoritarianism of China". The concept of financing by the West of the world transport infrastructure of a "democratic sense" as opposed to the "authoritarian" Chinese "Belt and Road" is put forward. In the reciprocal steps of China to attract partners to the "Chinese pole", the main place is given to Russia, relations with which are characterized as "exemplary" for the whole world. At the same time, there is an opinion among Chinese experts that "excessive rapprochement" with Russia is unprofitable for China, since for Russia, as well as for the United States, China is not only a partner, but also a "strategic competitor." China has become the main Russian trade and economic partner, in many directions it has turned into an uncontested supplier. At the same time, the "Sino-Russian Comprehensive Partnership in a New Era" contains many tactical and long-term problems.

At the Boao Forum-2015 China fixed the main directions of its domestic and foreign policy. The major goal of its foreign policy is to actively influence the global economy development in the coming decades. The main impact directions are the following: restructuring of the world's infrastructure, changing of the global financial system, becoming one of the drivers in the global innovation economy. On a personal level, Xi Jinping continues to consistently implement its "strategic goal" – to go down in history as China's "number three leader" after Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Xi is developing his major innovations: fight against corruption, establishment of the National Security Council, development of the "Chinese Dream" concept, formulation of the "New Norm" concept in the economy and of a new foreign policy doctrine. In the foreign policy, the course of improving China's global role and building a "new type" relationship with the United States is being strengthened. In relations with Russia and the United States, Beijing is following the dual-track policy of "hedging" political risks: on one hand, talking about a "special relationship with Russia", and on the other – using the worsening of relations between Russia and the United States in order to receive dividends from both "Russia's turn to the East" and the U.S.' desire to prevent the rapprochement between Russia and China in a new version of the "Cold War". Prospects for a new balance of forces configuration in the West-China-Russia triangle over the next five to ten years do not appear favorable for Russia. China will continue the trend to global leadership and "partnership-rivalry" relationship with the United States. Acknowledgement. The article is prepared with fi nancial support of the Russian Humanitarian Foundation (grant no. 15-27-21002 "Eastern Europe and Russia Factor in Implementation of Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt Megastrategy").

Against the background of the aggravation of the US-Chinese rivalry, as well as the increasing level of criticality of internal socio-economic problems, Beijing is trying to accelerate the implementation of national development strategies, the main of which are the general "Great revival of the Chinese nation" and more focused "Common prosperity" and "Double circulation". In general, these programs are interrelated and interdependent, and without the implementation of one of them it is impossible to implement the rest. They are designed to reduce the criticality of socio-economic imbalances formed in China during economic reforms and especially after 2008, as well as lay the foundation for the future socio-economic development of the PRC based on the dominance of domestic final consumption of households in order to avoid Beijing's dependence on external economic and political conditions. This article considers, first of all, the "Common prosperity" program, the implementation of which in the medium term should level the social situation in China, as well as expand demand from the middle class. In addition, "Common prosperity" also has a pronounced ideological character, since it is a relatively new idea of the CPC General Secretary and, ultimately, the reputation of both Xi Jinping himself and the Communist Party of China as a whole depends on the success of its implementation. In an economic sense, "Common prosperity" is one of the stages of achieving the "Second centennial goal", according to which Beijing plans to become in 2049, if not the first power, then the "second" first power at the level of the United States. That is, victory or at least parity in strategic rivalry with the United States depends on "Common prosperity". At the same time, despite the importance of "Common prosperity" the final clear plan still doesn't exist. The main question remains: where, in the context of a decrease in the effectiveness of traditional growth factors of the Chinese economy, to take resources for its implementation. If you increase the taxation of the Chinese middle class, which is already not rich by world average standards, then you can reduce the demand on its part and hit the "double circulation". If you introduce taxes on real estate, you can hit the Chinese real estate market on the income from which provincial budgets depend a lot. If rely on tertiary distribution, that is, to form a tradition of charity, it is not clear whether this will be sustainable. In a difficult economic environment, Beijing will have to look for mutually satisfying and balanced solutions to very difficult tasks.

The article discusses the conditions under which the Russian "turn to the East" is implemented. It emphasizes that the basis for the "turn" is the Russian-Chinese relations. However, there is a number of intense changes in the foreign policy of China itself as long as it becomes a primary tool for supporting economic growth. The main characteristics of the emerging concept of China's foreign policy are: raise of military power of China, "investment attack" on emerging markets, consolidation of regional "zones of new influence of China", development of the "new type" relations with the US. These features make the behavior of China in defense of their own interests more aggressive (including relations with Russia). Therefore, Russian innovation in the field of geo-economic strategy must be adapted to the new elements of Chinese foreign policy. Despite the status of a "strategic partnership" a number of problems have developed between China and Russia in recent years. These include, mainly, lack of trust because of the unwillingness to provide to each other full political and military-political support and non-optimal consideration of the United States factor in relations between Russia and China. This presupposes the partial "strategic partnership" only. However, the "new interest" of China in Russia is becoming more urgent since China uses Russian "turn to the East" for its own strategic purposes. It is impossible not to see that China refused to support Western sanctions not due to political solidarity with Russia but due to the Chinese business interests' protection. China is developing plans of entering into those sectors and niches of the Russian economy, which are released as a result of leaving or "non-arrival" of the Western capital. The "turn to the East" strategy (which means the "turn to China") can soften the internal losses of Russia from the "war of sanctions" with the West, but will not replace the Russian-American cooperation in the sphere of strategic stability, nuclear nonproliferation, space, terrorism, and climate change.

The main trends of the current development of China are the following. First, the growth of domestic political tensions in light of the fight against corruption, and the growing, albeit covert, counter of it by party and military elite. Secondly, the external expansion – as an attempt to compensate for internal political and economic problems. China enters a new path of development, which implies multivariant decisions taken by the government and, therefore, multivariant effects of these decisions both for China itself and for its partners, including Russia. China may intensify or, conversely, slow down the anti-corruption struggle. And, in fact, in both cases domestic political position of Xi Jinping becomes more complicated: either he will make even more enemies, or lose credibility as "the Leader number Three" (after Mao and Deng Xiaoping) in the eyes of society. China could rapidly increase its external economic and military-political expansion, risking to face the growing suspicion of the international community and, above all, of its neighbors. But it may hamper the implementation of the "Silk Road Economic Belt" ("One belt, one road"), with negative consequences for China. In these circumstances, Xi Jinping is to intensify the anti-corruption campaign and offer a strategic response to the increased political tension – the initiative "One belt, one road", a global process with no space or time restrictions. Its main goal is to build a new transport infrastructure as a basis for the economic expansion of the Chinese capital. Acknowledgements. The article is prepared with financial support of the Russian Science Foundation (project №. 14-28-00097 "Optimization of Russian foreign investment relations in conditions of worsening relations with the EU") at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

The article analyzes current socio-political and economic situation in China after Xi Jinping coming to power. The article emphasizes the most critical problems in the ideological sphere, domestic policy, economy, social and foreign policy of China, inherited from the previous leaders. Also the short term forecast of socio-political and economic development of China is submitted. New details of emerging Chinese foreign policy doctrine marked. The article shows China's "New concernment" in the development of Sino-Russian relations as a counterweight to Sino-US relations.

This paper raises the problem of the place determination and the role of the Popular Republic of China in the context of the modern multipolar world. The author reveals this question in the light of Chinese experience of political development in the XXth century, modern achievements as well as problems and contradictions in its foreign and domestic policy. The article also analyses "problem points" of the Chinese foreign policy and the contemporary international relations system which are China's greatest concern for they threaten global stability. The author expounds and elucidates Chinese foreign policy strategy in the XXIth century and China's mission in a changing world.

The article deals with the development of China. Forward-looking assessments are made on the basis of an analysis of the country's new concept of national development. The authors specify five areas that demand for new conceptual solutions: ideology, domestic policy, economy, social issues and foreign policy. As for Russia and its positions in the hierarchic and polycentric world, the authors point out that the ongoing change of China's social development model is no less important than the dynamics of development of the United States and the EU.

This forecast examines the major trends in Russia's relations with the world and in the Russian view of the world in 2016. The forecast looks firstly at Russia's role in the world in the context of the extant and emergent state of geopolitics. In a confused international environment, caught between the multiple, discordant and disorderly games of checkers of the present and the emerging design of a new grand chessboard for international relations, Russia and the West have been forced into cooperation. While far from easy and far from guaranteed to work – or last – this situation does offer the possibility of overcoming divides to pursue mutual interests. These interests become particularly apparent in the context of increased shared threats and the need to act jointly against them, the uncertainties created by rising powers, and the difficulties that Russia finds itself in. The key role of new mega-regional trade agreements in this emerging great game is also emphasised in the subsequent sections of the forecast, which deal, respectively, with foreign policy and political economy. The foreign policy analysis sees the US in flux in a presidential election year, and the EU caught at the crossroads of its own failure to capitalise on integration and a migration crisis of unprecedented proportions. Meanwhile, foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is characterised more by stasis than by substantial change, with frozen conflicts and stagnant reforms in Ukraine and limited room for manoeuvre for other players the order of the day. The Russian involvement in the Middle East, however, is anything but stagnant, with the military operations in Syria having dramatic effects in both the situation in Syria and global and regional geopolitics. The sustainability of this quest for influence, however, is questioned by the attitude of other players, but also by Russia's own internal weaknesses, notably its serious and deepening economic crisis.