Suchergebnisse

Brams and O'Leary (this Review, 64 [June 1970], pp. 449–470) generate a model of the behavior of a voting body by first applying a simple combinatorial argument to the results of voting on a single issue and then extending this model by assuming voting behavior is independent across issues. In this note we show that their argument can be extended to cover voting across issues without relying on the assumption of independence. This alternative approach gives insight into the Brams and O'Leary model and strengthens their results by making several of their indices exact instead of approximate. Thus if the modification proposed in this note is used, the indices proposed by Brains and O'Leary can be used empirically without worrying about independence.

In a recent article ("The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis," APSR, 68 [June, 1974], 525–536) John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina suggest that a (potential) voter may be rational in deciding whether to vote and yet not use the expected-utility calculus introduced for this purpose by Downs and Tullock and extended by Riker and Ordeshook. The authors suggest that a rational voter, in deciding whether to vote, may use the minimax regret criterion due to the late L. J. Savage. Define the regret of an Act A as the difference, if the true state of nature were known (in advance), between the best expected payoff that could be obtained and the expected payoff that would be obtained by act A. Then the minimax regret criterion requires the decision maker to act in such a way as to minimize the maximum regret that he can suffer.They also discuss the fact that the minimax regret criterion does not require the voter to supply any (objective or subjective) estimates of the probabilities associated with the various outcomes of the election. Thus they feel that it is an attractive criterion for decision making under "uncertainty" as opposed to decision making under "risk."

A MODEL WHICH ELIMINATES THE RESTRICTION OF THE DAVIS-HINICH SPATIAL MODEL OF MAJORITY RULE IS INTRODUCED WHICH ALLOWS EACH VOTER TO CHOOSE HIS OWN INDIVIDUAL LOSS FUNCTION AS WELL AS HIS PREFERRED POSITION. THE SOPHISTICATED DAVIS-HINICH SPATIAL MODEL OF MAJORITY RULE REQUIRES THAT ALL VOTERS USE A COMMON LOSS FUNCTION IN EVALUATING CANDIDATES. SEVERAL CANDIDATE STRATEGIES, IE, TOTAL MD STRATEGIES & MEAN STRATEGIES ARE DEFINED & COMPARED. THE TOTAL MD STRATEGY DOMINATES BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE BEATEN UNDER MAJORITY RULE. THE MEAN STRATEGY IS THE MOST BENEFICIAL; IT MINIMIZES SOCIETAL LOSS BUT IT IS NOT A DOMINANT CAMPAIGN STRATEGY UNLESS IT COINCIDES WITH THE TOTAL MD STRATEGY. A GENERALIZED TOTAL MD STRATEGY IS DEFINED & SHOWN TO BE DOMINANT UNDER MAJORITY RULE. THE SPATIAL STRATEGY MINIMIZING SOCIETAL LOSS IS DERIVED. THE MEAN STRATEGY DOES NOT MINIMIZE SOCIETAL LOSS & THE TOTAL MD STRATEGY DOES NOT DOMINATE UNDER MAJORITY RULE. WITHOUT THE RESTRICTIVE ASSUMPTION OF A COMMON LOSS FUNCTION, THE STRATEGIES PLAYING A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE DAVIS-HINICH MODEL ARE NOT OPTIMAL. SEVERAL POLITICAL PLATFORMS WERE DEFINED. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLATFORMS WAS INVESTIGATED THROUGH THEOREMS & EXAMPLES. THE NEW MODEL WAS FOUND TO BE MATHEMATICALLY TRACTABLE. 6 FIGURES. MODIFIED HA.