Foreign aid and policy concessions
In: Peace research abstracts journal, Band 44, Heft 6, S. 251-252
ISSN: 0031-3599
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In: Peace research abstracts journal, Band 44, Heft 6, S. 251-252
ISSN: 0031-3599
In: International organization, Band 44, Heft Summer 90
ISSN: 0020-8183
The essential problem with multilateral negotiations is that, unlike bilateral negotiations, there is no simple rule that ensures fairness or predictability. Presents a model to predict outcomes of such negotiations. By manipulating perceptions, resulting outcomes can be altered. Illustrates the outcomes achieved through a 6 X 6 perspective map and then analyses prospects for negotiations in the Middle East. (SJK)
In: American political science review, Band 77, Heft 2, S. 347-357
ISSN: 0003-0554
A MODEL OF WAR COSTS IS PRESENTED THAT IS BASED ON THE UTILITY NATIONS EXPECT TO DERIVE FROM THE WAR AS WELL AS ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP BETWEEN ADVERSARIES AND THE SHORT-TERM TACTICAL TIT-FOR-TAT CALCULATIONS THAT MUST OCCUR ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THIS MODEL EXPLAINS NEARLY THREE-QUARTERS OF THE VARIANCE IN BATTLE DEATHS PER MILLION POPULATION PER MONTH OF WAR EXPERIENCED BY WAR INITIATORS. APPROXIMATELY ONE-QUARTER OF THE VARIANCE IN WAR COSTS IS ACCOUNTED FOR BY CONSIDERING THE POSITION OF THE INITIATOR'S OPPONENT. A SECOND MODEL, BASED ON MARGINAL CHANGES IN EXPECTED UTILITY, TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES, AND TIT-FOR-TAT, IS SHOWN TO ACCOUNT FOR MORE THAN ONE-THIRD THE VARIANCE, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER WAR COSTS ARE VIEWED BY THE INITIATOR OR AN OPPONENT IN A WAR. THIS STUDY, THEREFORE, PROVIDES A USEFUL EXPLANATION OF WAR INTENSITY AND CONTRIBUTES TO THE CUMULATIVE, LAWLIKE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPECTEDUTILITY APPROACH ON WHICH IT IS BASED.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 43, Heft 2, S. 147-161
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
THE AUTHORS ADVANCE A THEORY OF THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ON STATE POLICY. THE THEORY EXPLAINS HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AFFECT THE ABILITY OF LEADERS TO MAINTAIN THEMSELVES IN OFFICE, WHY SOME POLITICAL SYSTEMS ARE MORE PRONE TO POLICY FAILURE THAN OTHERS, AND WHY AUTOCRATS CREATE MASS POLITICAL SYSTEMS. THE STATISTICAL TESTS DEMONSTRATE THAT (1) LARGE WINNING COALITIONS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH ENHANCED ECONOMIC GROWTH, (2) TENURE IS SHORTENED BY A LARGE WINNING COALITION BUT LENGTHENED BY A LARGE SELECTORATE, AND (3) IN THE FACE OF POLICY FAILURE, LEADERS WITH A LARGE SELECTORATE ARE MORE LIKELY TO SURVIVE THAN THOSE IN SYSTEMS WITH A LARGE WINNING COALITION.