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The effect of immigration on redistribution has been widely debated. This paper contributes to this debate by testing two explanations, which are that (i) immigration tends to reduce redistribution due to people's higher levels of xenophobia, and that (ii) immigration affects redistribution because immigrants do not have the right to vote. Since the demand for redistribution depends on the (expected) gap between median voter income and mean income, immigrants affect the demand for redistribution because, as non-citizens, they do not change the median voter's income, but, as economic stakeholders, they do affect the mean income. Four empirical consequences of (i) and (ii) are tested at the individual level. Evidence from the European Values Survey in 45 countries confirms (ii), showing that immigrants' expected competitiveness on the labor market affects preferences for redistribution and that it is amplified when the perceived number of immigrants is high. In contrast, (i) is globally rejected since the impact of the citizens' declared level of solidarity with immigrants tends to be weak and depends on the type of measurement or specification used. Adapted from the source document.

Recent discussions about global justice have focused on the arguments in favor of including political and social rights within the set of human rights. In doing so, the issue of the existence of specific rights, enjoyed exclusively by citizens of a given community, is raised. This article deals with the problem of distinguishing human and citizen rights. It argues the existence of citizens' rights based on specific solidarity in each country - the stockholder principle - that is compatible with a broad idea of human rights defined by international law and enforced according to the stakeholder principle. Moreover, the stockholder principle is compatible with the psychological concept of citizenship as based on a specific collective identity and, last but not least, it leads to fair consequences at a global level.

According to some political economists, equality of outcome and equality of opportunity are substitutable. Assuming that people wish to equalize their opportunities in life, their level of demand for equalizing outcomes depends on their perception of social mobility in their society. On the other hand, substitutability can be criticized because equalizing opportunities introduces higher risk for an individual's future rank in their society, and this causes yet more demand for equalizing outcomes. Evidence based on the French Survey "Dynegal" shows that both expectations are correct and that the relationship between perceived equality of opportunity and preference for equality of outcomes is robustly U-shaped.

The oldest definition of semi-presidentialism requires a president possessing considerable constitutional power. Subsequent research has listed presidential competences, but has not empirically set their respective weighting. In order to assess the relevant competences that determine presidential power, this article presents an indicator of relative turnout in 28 parliamentary democracies with a popularly elected president. The core hypothesis is that if presidents have considerable power, the turnout is higher for presidential elections than for legislative ones. The results show that presidents are deemed 'strong' when they play a central role in foreign policy. This finding is compatible with different analyses of presidential regimes and provides a clear and coherent criterion for identifying semi-presidential regimes. Adapted from the source document.

Recent discussions about global justice have focused on the arguments in favor of including political and social rights within the set of human rights. In doing so, the issue of the existence of specific rights, enjoyed exclusively by citizens of a given community, is raised. This article deals with the problem of distinguishing human and citizen rights. It argues the existence of citizens' rights based on specific solidarity in each country - the stockholder principle - that is compatible with a broad idea of human rights defined by international law and enforced according to the stakeholder principle. Moreover, the stockholder principle is compatible with the psychological concept of citizenship as based on a specific collective identity and, last but not least, it leads to fair consequences at a global level.

According to some political economists, equality of outcome and equality of opportunity are substitutable. Assuming that people wish to equalize their opportunities in life, their level of demand for equalizing outcomes depends on their perception of social mobility in their society. On the other hand, substitutability can be criticized because equalizing opportunities introduces higher risk for an individual's future rank in their society, and this causes yet more demand for equalizing outcomes. Evidence based on the French Survey "Dynegal" shows that both expectations are correct and that the relationship between perceived equality of opportunity and preference for equality of outcomes is robustly U-shaped.

Recent discussions about global justice have focused on the arguments in favor of including political and social rights within the set of human rights. In doing so, the issue of the existence of specific rights, enjoyed exclusively by citizens of a given community, is raised. This article deals with the problem of distinguishing human and citizen rights. It argues the existence of citizens' rights based on specific solidarity in each country - the stockholder principle - that is compatible with a broad idea of human rights defined by international law and enforced according to the stakeholder principle. Moreover, the stockholder principle is compatible with the psychological concept of citizenship as based on a specific collective identity and, last but not least, it leads to fair consequences at a global level.

This article advocates two criteria to distinguish good and bad paternalism in a liberal perfectionist view. It identifies paternalism based on the value of autonomy and paternalism based on other values. Only the first is compatible with liberalism. Within the first group, I identify paternalism based on a specific definition of autonomy and another that does not assume a specific definition of autonomy. Whereas the first is morally justified, legally, only the second is compatible with liberalism. Through a discussion of how care economics works and is justified -- and other particular examples -- this article shows how paternalistic policies may be desirable, acceptable or unacceptable according to their compliance with these criteria. Adapted from the source document.