Ranked-choice voting and the spoiler effect
In: Public choice, Band 196, Heft 1-2, S. 19-50
ISSN: 1573-7101
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In: Public choice, Band 196, Heft 1-2, S. 19-50
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Representation, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 1-16
ISSN: 1749-4001
In: Social choice and welfare
ISSN: 1432-217X
AbstractThe single transferable vote (STV) voting method is used to elect multiple candidates in ranked-choice elections. One weakness of STV is that it fails multiple fairness criteria related to monotonicity and no-show paradoxes. We analyze 1079 local government STV elections in Scotland to estimate the frequency of such monotonicity anomalies in real-world elections, and compare our results with prior empirical and theoretical research about the rates at which such anomalies occur. In 62 of the 1079 elections we found some kind of monotonicity anomaly. We generally find that anomaly rates are similar to prior empirical research and much lower than what most theoretical research has found. Most STV anomalies we find are the first of their kind to be documented in real-world multiwinner elections.
In: Representation, S. 1-19
ISSN: 1749-4001
In: Public choice, Band 178, Heft 1-2, S. 53-65
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Studies in Choice and Welfare
Part I. Description of Delegate Allocation Rules -- Chapter 1. Apportionment in the US Presidential Primaries -- Chapter 2. The Democratic Party Primary -- Chapter 3. The Iowa and Nevada Democratic Caucuses -- Chapter 4. The Republican Party Primary -- Part II. Analysis of Delegate Allocation Rules -- Chapter 5. Properties of the Apportionment Methods used in the Primaries -- Chapter 6. Paradoxes -- Chapter 7. Exploring Alternative Ways to Allocate Delegates.
In: Studies in Choice and Welfare Series
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 108, S. 122-137