Crazy Like a Fox? Are Leaders with Reputations for Madness More Successful at International Coercion? - CORRIGENDUM
In: British journal of political science, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 294-307
ISSN: 1469-2112
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In: British journal of political science, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 294-307
ISSN: 1469-2112
In: British journal of political science, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 275-293
ISSN: 1469-2112
AbstractAccording to the 'Madman Theory' promoted by Richard Nixon and early rationalist scholars, being viewed as mentally unstable can help a leader coerce foreign adversaries. This article offers the first large-N test of this theory. The author introduces an original perception-based measure of leaders' reputations for madness, coded based on news reports, and analyzes its effect on both general deterrence and crisis bargaining. The study also tests several hypotheses about the conditions under which perceived madness is expected to be more or less helpful. The author finds that perceived madness is harmful to general deterrence and is sometimes also harmful in crisis bargaining, but may be helpful in crisis bargaining under certain conditions. The analysis suggests that the harmful effect of perceived madness results from a commitment problem.
In: Security studies, Band 28, Heft 5, S. 976-1009
ISSN: 1556-1852
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 80, Heft 3, S. 982-995
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 465-466
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 469-469
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 453-479
ISSN: 1547-7444
In: Journal of peace research, Band 51, Heft 6, S. 726-740
ISSN: 1460-3578
This article examines the effectiveness of public statements of resolve in international conflict. Several prominent theories, including domestic audience cost theory and theories regarding international reputation, suggest that issuing resolved statements can help a leader achieve a more favorable outcome in conflict bargaining. Because they entail costs for backing down, these statements are believed to credibly convey resolve to an adversary. This can help to alleviate the uncertainty created by private information about resolve and persuade the adversary to back down. Despite the prevalence of this theoretical logic, the effectiveness of statements of resolve at influencing conflict outcomes has rarely been subjected to direct tests, and some recent empirical work has raised doubts about statements' effectiveness. This article is the first to directly examine the effect of resolved statements on conflict outcomes using large-N analysis. It introduces original data, created using content analysis, which directly measure the level of resolved statements made by US presidents during militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Analysis of these data demonstrates that a higher level of resolved statements is indeed associated with a greater chance of prevailing in disputes. This finding is substantively significant and robust, providing support for the argument that public statements play an important role in international conflict.
In: Journal of peace research, Band 51, Heft 6, S. 726-740
ISSN: 0022-3433
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of peace research, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 364-378
ISSN: 1460-3578
Major powers signal support for protégés in order to reassure them and deter harm against them. Yet, it is not always clear how to identify who a major power's protégés are or the degree of support signaled. Major powers have a variety of complementary signals to choose among, including alliances, arms transfers, joint military exercises, and others. It can be difficult to weigh the importance of individual signals, especially since different major powers do not deploy each signal in the same way. We address this challenge using a Bayesian latent measurement model, which provides a theoretically coherent means of identifying the overall level of support signaled by a major power for a protégé. Our approach yields a cross-sectional time-series dataset, providing a continuous measure of the degree of support signaled by major powers for all minor powers from 1950 to 2012. Our model also provides insights regarding which signals of support are most informative when sent by each major power. We find considerable variation among major powers regarding which of their signals are most meaningful, but in general alliances and military exercises tend to be among the most important signals. In further applications using our latent measure, we also assess under which conditions major powers are likely to increase their signals of support for protégés, as well as predict whether a major power will intervene in conflicts involving its protégés.
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 71, Heft 4, S. 701-733
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractThis paper explores the question of how major powers signal support for their protégés. We develop a theory that explains why major powers show support for some protégés using highly visible "frontstage" signals of support, while supporting other protégés through less visible, but nonetheless costly, "offstage" signals. From an international strategic perspective, it is puzzling that major powers do not always send the most visible signal possible. We argue that this can be explained by considering the domestic environments in which the leaders of major powers and protégés operate. Focusing particularly on the United States as we develop our theory, we argue that the US will prefer to send offstage signals of support for more autocratic protégés for several reasons. First, sending frontstage support signals for autocracies would expose US leaders to charges of hypocrisy. Second, frontstage signals of support for autocracies face an impediment to credibility because of the public backlash in the United States that overt support for dictators could generate. Third, many autocratic protégés would be reluctant to accept a frontstage signal of support from the US because it could undermine their regime stability. We test our theory in a data set that records various support signals sent by the United States for other countries between 1950 and 2008, finding strong support for our expectations. We also find evidence of the causal mechanisms posited by our theory in a case study of relations between the US and the Shah's Iran.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 61, Heft 2, S. 325-348
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 61, Heft 2, S. 325-348
ISSN: 1552-8766
Both threats and assurances can be useful in international negotiations. Threats help convince the adversary that a state will fight if challenged, and assurances can convince the adversary that a state will not attack if not challenged. We develop a model that analyzes when threats and assurances are used. Threats are widely useful because there is typically a range of outcomes that are preferable to war for each side, and threats can secure a better deal within that range by strengthening a state's bottom line. In contrast, assurances are only necessary when war would result without them because of insufficiently valued intermediate outcomes or shifting power. We discuss insights from the model, including the role of false assurances, in the context of both the Sudetenland crisis and Cold War Europe.
In: American political science review, Band 117, Heft 2, S. 609-628
ISSN: 1537-5943
Existing research finds that leaders develop international reputations based on their past behavior on the international stage. We argue that leaders' domestic choices can also influence their international reputations, perhaps as much as their past foreign policy decisions do. Using formal theory and intuitive argumentation, we develop an overarching framework to predict how much any domestic choice will affect a leader's international reputation. We theorize that certain domestic choices can inform expectations about future international crisis behavior based on the extent to which (1) the costs at stake are similar to those of an international crisis and (2) the domestic issue is salient relative to foreign policy. We use conjoint experiments and other evidence to show that many domestic choices have significant international reputational effects. There is some evidence that the reputational effect of certain domestic choices may equal that of fighting in a previous international crisis.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 64, Heft 2, S. 469-475
ISSN: 1468-2478
Abstract
In a recent article, Gibler, Miller, and Little (2016) (GML) conduct an extensive review of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data between the years 1816 and 2001, highlighting possible inaccuracies and recommending a substantial number of changes to the data. They contend that, in several instances, analyses with their revised data lead to substantively different inferences. Here, we review GML's MID drop and merge recommendations and reevaluate the substantive impact of their changes. We are in agreement with about 76 percent of the recommended drops and merges. However, we find that some of the purported overturned findings in GML's replications are not due to their data, but rather to the strategies they employ for replication. We reexamine these findings and conclude that the remaining differences in inference stemming from the variations in the MID data are rare and modest in scope.