Die finanziellen Erträge höherer Bildung entscheiden mit darüber, wie viel Menschen in ihre allgemeine und berufliche Bildung investieren. Dieser Bericht zeigt, dass sich die Bildungsrenditen im europäischen Vergleich deutlich unterscheiden, was auch an den institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen in den einzelnen Ländern liegt. Ebenso fallen sie für Männer und Frauen unterschiedlich aus: In den meisten Ländern profitieren Frauen relativ mehr von höherer Bildung als Männer - allerdings nicht in Deutschland.
We study the returns on education in Europe in a comparative perspective. We extend the model of de la Fuente [(2003). Human Capital in a Global and Knowledgebased Economy. part II: Assessment at the EU Country Level. Report for the European Commission], by estimating the values of the relevant parameters for men and women and introducing several variables specifically related to maternity leaves and benefits. As a preliminary step, we evaluate the effect of education on the wage profile. We estimate the Mincerian coefficients for 12 West European countries using the EU-SILC data for 2007 and use them as input in the optimisation problem of the individual to calibrate the model. Finally, we analyse the impact and relevance of several public policy variables. In particular, we evaluate the elasticities of the returns to education with respect to unemployment benefits, marginal and average tax rates, maternity leave and childcare benefits. ; Wir untersuchen die Bildungserträge in Europa in vergleichender Perspektive. Wir erweitern dazu das Modell von de la Fuente [(2003). Human Capital in a Global and Knowledge-based Economy. part II: Assessment at the EU Country Level. Report for the European Commission], indem wir die relevanten Parameter für Männer und Frauen schätzen und einige Variablen für staatliche Leistungen bei Eltern- oder Erziehungsurlaub und für Kinderbetreuung einführen. Daneben untersuchen wir den Einfluss der Bildung auf das Lohnprofil. Wir schätzen die Mincer-Koeffizienten für 12 westeuropäische Länder mit den EU-SILC-Daten für 2007 und nutzen sie als Input zur Kalibrierung eines Modells des Optimierungsproblem eines Individuums. Schließlich analysieren wir die Auswirkung und Relevanz verschiedener Politikbereiche. Insbesondere schätzen wir die Elastizitäten der Bildungserträge im Hinblick auf Änderungen der Arbeitslosenunterstützung, der marginalen und durchschnittlichen Steuersätze und Leistungen bei Mutterschaft und für Kinderbetreuung.
"One of the key questions on international migration concerns its benefits and costs for the receiving economies. Assessing the overall net gain or loss to the economy from immigration is a challenging task both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Immigration can affect the receiving economy through several channels: wages or employment effects on native workers, changes in output structure, fiscal effects, effects on house prices, and so on. In this chapter, we concentrate on one of the most important channel: the impact on wage and employment of natives. We consider the impact of immigration on a subgroup of the population that could particularly benefits from it, the female population. Since international migration may change the prevailing wage rates in the sectors where a large number of migrants looks for a job, we focus on immigrants working in the household service sector. The underlying idea is that migrants could increase the availability of services to households, like childcare, housekeeping, or caring for elderly, reducing their market prices. This effect could induce women to change their decision on participation to the labour market. In the empirical analysis, we use data of countries with quite different institutions (Australia, Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the US). This gives us the opportunity to understand whether the effect of migrants on female labour supply is relevant in countries where policies are more or less supportive to families." (Text excerpt, IAB-Doku) ((en))
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of immigrants on native female labour supply. By segmenting the market by educational levels, we are able to investigate which native-born women are more affected by an increase of low-skilled immigrants working in the household service sector. We present a model of individual choice with home production and, using an harmonized dataset (CNEF), we test its main predictions. Our sample includes countries implementing different family policies. Our results suggest that the share of immigrants working in services in a given local labour market is positively associated with the probability of native-born women to increase their labour supply at the intensive margin (number of hours worked per week), if skilled, and at the extensive margin (participation decision), if unskilled. Moreover, they show that these effects are larger in countries with less family-supportive policies. ; Wir untersuchen die Auswirkungen von Zuwanderung auf das Arbeitsangebot einheimischer Frauen. Insbesondere betrachten wir die Auswirkung des Anstiegs geringqualifizierter Zuwanderer, die im Haushaltssektor arbeiten, auf hoch- und geringqualifizierte einheimische Frauen. Wir modellieren individuelle Entscheidungen über die Haushaltsproduktion und testen die wichtigsten Aussagen dieses Modells anhand eines harmonisierten Datensatzes (CNEF). Unsere Stichprobe enthält Länder mit unterschiedlich großzügiger Familienpolitik. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass mit einem höheren Anteil an Migranten im Dienstleistungssektor eines lokal begrenzten Arbeitsmarktes die einheimischen hochqualifizierten Frauen ihr Arbeitsangebot erhöhen. Gleichzeitig steigt die Partizipationsrate unqualifizierter einheimischer Frauen. Darüber hinaus zeigen wir, dass diese Effekte in Ländern mit restriktiverer Familienpolitik stärker ausfallen.
Abstract We consider an economy where production may use labor of two different skill levels. Workers are heterogeneous and, by investing in education, self-select into one of the two skills. Ex-ante, when firms choose their investments in physical capital, they do not know the level of human capital prevailing in the labor market they will be active in. We prove existence and constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibria, which are always characterized by overeducation. An increase in total expected surplus can be obtained by shrinking, at the margin, the set of workers investing in high skills. This can be implemented by imposing taxes on the cost of investing in high skills or by imposing a progressive labor earning tax.
We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents choose optimally to invest time and real resources in education. Generically, there is a steady state equilibrium, where some agents, but not all of them, invest. Regular steady state equilibria are constrained inefficient in a strong sense. The Hosios (1990) condition is neither necessary, nor sufficient, for constrained efficiency. We also provide restrictions on the fundamentals sufficient to guarantee that equilibria are characterized by overeducation (or undereducation), present some results on their comparative statics properties, and discuss the nature of welfare improving policies. ; Im Rahmen eines Matching-Modells wird die optimale Investitionsentscheidung heterogener Agenten in Humankapital untersucht. Generisch existiert ein Gleichgewicht, in dem einige, aber nicht alle Agenten investieren. Reguläre Steady-State-Gleichgewichte sind im starken Sinne beschränkt ineffzient. Die Hosios-Bedingung ist für beschränkte Effzienz weder notwendig noch hinreichend. Weiter zeigen wir Restriktionen auf, die hinreichend sind für die Existenz eines Gleichgewichts, das durch Über- oder Unterinvestition in Bildung gekennzeichnet ist. Schließlich diskutieren wir komparativ-statische Eigenschaften des Modells sowie wohlfahrtssteigernde Politikmaßnahmen.
We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents choose optimally to invest time and real resources in education. Generically, there is a steady state equilibrium, where some agents, but not all of them, invest. Regular steady state equilibria are constrained inefficient in a strong sense. The Hosios (1990) condition is neither necessary, nor sufficient, for constrained efficiency. We also provide restrictions on the fundamentals sufficient to guarantee that equilibria are characterized by overeducation (or undereducation), present some results on their comparative statics properties, and discuss the nature of welfare improving policies.
We study a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor markets. Human and physical capital are heterogeneous. Workers and firms endogenously select the sector they are active in, and choose the amount of their sector-specific investments in human and physical capital. To enter the high-skill sector, workers must pay a fixed cost that we interpret as direct cost of education. Given the distribution of the agents across sectors, at equilibrium, in each sector there is underinvestment in both human and physical capital, due to non-contractibility of investments. A second source of inefficiency is related to the self-selection of the agents into the two sectors. It typically induces too many workers to invest in education. Under suitable restrictions on the parameters, the joint effect of the two distortions is that equilibria are characterized by too many people investing too little effort in the high skill sector. We also analyze the welfare properties of equilibria and study the effects of several tax-subsidy policies on the total expected surplus.
"We study the returns on education in Europe in a comparative perspective. We extend the model of de la Fuente ((2003). Human Capital in a Global and Knowledgebased Economy. part II: Assessment at the EU Country Level. Report for the European Commission), by estimating the values of the relevant parameters for men and women and introducing several variables specifically related to maternity leaves and benefits. As a preliminary step, we evaluate the effect of education on the wage profile. We estimate the Mincerian coefficients for 12 West European countries using the EU-SILC data for 2007 and use them as input in the optimisation problem of the individual to calibrate the model. Finally, we analyse the impact and relevance of several public policy variables. In particular, we evaluate the elasticities of the returns to education with respect to unemployment benefits, marginal and average tax rates, maternity leave and childcare benefits." (author's abstract)
"Im Rahmen eines Matching-Modells wird die optimale Investitionsentscheidung heterogener Agenten in Humankapital untersucht. Generisch existiert ein Gleichgewicht, in dem einige, aber nicht alle Agenten investieren. Reguläre Steady-State-Gleichgewichte sind im starken Sinne beschränkt ineffizient. Die Hosios-Bedingung ist für beschränkte Effizienz weder notwendig noch hinreichend. Weiter zeigen wir Restriktionen auf, die hinreichend sind für die Existenz eines Gleichgewichts, das durch Über- oder Unterinvestition in Bildung gekennzeichnet ist. Schliess- lich diskutieren wir komparativ-statische Eigenschaften des Modells sowie wohlfahrtssteigernde Politikmassnahmen." (Autorenreferat)
