Suchergebnisse

AbstractCan we educate decision-makers to make better decisions? In the present paper, I argue that we can in at least two broad ways: (1) teaching concrete knowledge about a specific decision or decision type; and (2) teaching more abstract decision-making competencies that are thought to lead to better decisions. Teaching knowledge can be done using decision aids and similar techniques that provide important information about a specific choice (e.g. a medical treatment option). In these cases, information presented using evidence-based techniques to improve comprehension and use of information will have greater effects on judgements and choices. Teaching more abstract decision competencies, on the other hand, involves formal schooling (with the bulk of formal education falling during childhood) or training in a specific competency that is important to decision processes and outcomes; I use numeracy interventions as an exemplar.

Numerical uncertainty ranges are often used to convey the precision of a forecast. In three studies, we examined how users perceive the distribution underlying numerical ranges and test specific hypotheses about the display characteristics that affect these perceptions. We discuss five primary conclusions from these studies: (1) substantial variation exists in how people perceive the distribution underlying numerical ranges; (2) distributional perceptions appear similar whether the uncertain variable is a probability or an outcome; (3) the variation in distributional perceptions is due in part to individual differences in numeracy, with more numerate individuals more likely to perceive the distribution as roughly normal; (4) the variation is also due in part to the presence versus absence of common cues used to convey the correct interpretation (e.g., including a best estimate increases perceptions that the distribution is roughly normal); and (5) simple graphical representations can decrease the variance in distributional perceptions. These results point toward significant opportunities to improve uncertainty communication in climate change and other domains.

We conducted a longitudinal survey of public response to the economic crisis to understand the trajectory of risk perception amidst an ongoing crisis. A nation‐wide panel responded to seven surveys beginning in late September 2008 at the peak of the crisis and concluded in October 2009. At least 600 respondents participated in each survey, with 413 completing all seven surveys. Our online survey focused on perceptions of risk (savings, investments, retirement, job), negative emotions toward the financial crisis (sadness, anxiety, fear, anger, worry, stress), confidence in national leaders to manage the crisis (President Obama, Congress, Treasury Secretary, business leaders), and belief in one's ability to realize personal objectives despite the crisis. We employed latent growth curve modeling to analyze change in risk perception throughout the crisis. Our results suggest that, in general, people's perceptions of risk appear to decrease most rapidly during the initial phase of a crisis and then begin to level off. Negative emotion about the crisis was the most predictive of increased risk perception, supporting the notion of risk as feelings. Belief in one's ability to realize personal objectives was also predictive. Confidence in national leaders, however, was not predictive of perceived risk. Finally, our results demonstrate that groups may experience a crisis differently depending on a combination of personal characteristics such as gender, income, numeracy, and political attitude. Risk management and communication should work in sync with these mechanisms and differences across groups.

Decisionmakers are often presented with explicit likelihood assessments (e.g., there is a 10% chance that an attack will occur over the next three months) and supporting narrative evidence in forecasting and risk communication domains. Decisionmakers are thought to rely on both numerical and narrative information to the extent that they perceive the information to be diagnostic, accurate, and trustworthy. In two studies, we explored how lay decisionmakers varying in numeracy evaluated and used likelihood assessments and narrative evidence in forecasts. Overall, the less numerate reported higher risk and likelihood perceptions. In simple probabilistic forecasts without narrative evidence, decisionmakers at all levels of numeracy were able to use the stated likelihood information, although risk perceptions of the less numerate were more affected by likelihood format. When a forecast includes narrative evidence, decisionmakers were better able to use stated likelihood in a percentage as compared to frequency or verbal formats. The more numerate used stated likelihood more in their evaluations whereas the less numerate focused more on the narrative evidence. These results have important implications for risk analysts and forecasters who need to report the results of their analyses to decisionmakers. Decisionmakers varying in numerical ability may evaluate forecasts in different ways depending on the types of information they find easiest to evaluate.

A study(N= 198)was conducted to examine hypotheses derived from an emotion‐based model of stigma responses to radiation sources. A model ofstigma susceptibilityis proposed in which affective reactions and cognitive worldviews activate predispositions to appraise and experience events in systematic ways that result in the generation of negative emotion, risk perceptions, and stigma responses. Results of structural equation modeling supported the hypotheses. Radiation sources that scored higher on a measure of stigma were included in the analyses (i.e., nuclear power plants, radioactive waste from nuclear power plants, radiation from nuclear weapons testing). Individual differences in negative reactivity and worldviews were associated with the strength of emotional appraisals that were associated, in turn, with negative emotion toward stigmatized radiation sources. As hypothesized, the model fit better with perceived risk as a function of negative emotion rather thanvice versa. Finally, a measure of stigma was associated with negative emotion and, to a lesser extent, with risk perceptions. Risk communication about stigmatized objects may benefit from a more complete understanding of how affective and emotional reactions are constructed and the routes through which they affect responses and behaviors.

In this article, we consider a novel criterion for evaluating representations of uncertainty ranges, namely, the extent to which a representation enhances motivated reasoning. In two studies, we show that perceptions of the distribution underlying ambiguous numerical ranges are affected by the motivations and worldviews of end users. This motivated reasoning effect remained after controlling for objective numeracy and fluid intelligence but was attenuated when the correct interpretation was made clear. We suggest that analysts and communicators explicitly consider the potential for motivated evaluation when evaluating uncertainty displays.

37 pages ; Why does public conflict over societal risks persist in the face of compelling and widely accessible scientific evidence? We conducted an experiment to probe two alternative answers: the "Science Comprehension Thesis" (SCT), which identifies defects in the public's knowledge and reasoning capacities as the source of such controversies; and the "Identity-protective Cognition Thesis" (ICT) which treats cultural conflict as disabling the faculties that members of the public use to make sense of decision-relevant science. In our experiment, we presented subjects with a difficult problem that turned on their ability to draw valid causal inferences from empirical data. As expected, subjects highest in Numeracy — a measure of the ability and disposition to make use of quantitative information — did substantially better than less numerate ones when the data were presented as results from a study of a new skin-rash treatment. Also as expected, subjects' responses became politically polarized — and even less accurate — when the same data were presented as results from the study of a gun-control ban. But contrary to the prediction of SCT, such polarization did not abate among subjects highest in Numeracy; instead, it increased. This outcome supported ICT, which predicted that more Numerate subjects would use their quantitative-reasoning capacity selectively to conform their interpretation of the data to the result most consistent with their political outlooks. We discuss the theoretical and practical significance of these findings. ; National Science Foundation, Grant SES 0922714; Cultural Cognition Lab at Yale Law School

22 pages ; Why does public conflict over societal risks persist in the face of compelling and widely accessible scientific evidence? We conducted an experiment to probe two alternative answers: the "Science Comprehension Thesis" (SCT), which identifies defects in the public's knowledge and reasoning capacities as the source of such controversies; and the "Identity-protective Cognition Thesis" (ICT) which treats cultural conflict as disabling the faculties that members of the public use to make sense of decision-relevant science. In our experiment, we presented subjects with a difficult problem that turned on their ability to draw valid causal inferences from empirical data. As expected, subjects highest in Numeracy — a measure of the ability and disposition to make use of quantitative information — did substantially better than less numerate ones when the data were presented as results from a study of a new skin-rash treatment. Also as expected, subjects' responses became politically polarized — and even less accurate — when the same data were presented as results from the study of a gun-control ban. But contrary to the prediction of SCT, such polarization did not abate among subjects highest in Numeracy; instead, it increased. This outcome supported ICT, which predicted that more Numerate subjects would use their quantitative-reasoning capacity selectively to conform their interpretation of the data to the result most consistent with their political outlooks. We discuss the theoretical and practical significance of these findings.