Boosting vs. Nudging in Low Income Situations: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment
In: ERSS-D-22-00060
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In: ERSS-D-22-00060
SSRN
In: JBEF-D-23-00423
SSRN
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4575
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Working paper
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 14779
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In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 169, Heft 3, S. 433
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: New Zealand economic papers, Band 45, Heft 1-2, S. 47-57
ISSN: 1943-4863
In: CESifo working paper series 4541
In: Labour markets
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects ́costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4541
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Working paper
In: CONSOB Working Papers No. 84
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Working paper
In: 20th Report on the Italian financial system