Loss and damage in the global stocktake
In: Climate policy, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 175-183
ISSN: 1752-7457
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In: Climate policy, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 175-183
ISSN: 1752-7457
In: Puig , D 2022 , ' Loss and damage in the global stocktake ' , Climate Policy , vol. 22 , no. 2 , pp. 175-183 . https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2021.2023452
Article 8 in the Paris Agreement is devoted exclusively to climate change-driven loss and damage. It follows that the planned 'global stocktake' of the Paris Agreement, which will assess progress toward reaching the Agreement's goals, should also cover loss and damage. Determining how the assessment for Article 8 should be framed is a question that remains largely unexplored. Doing so is challenging for at least two reasons: the prevailing knowledge gaps in loss and damage research and the contentious nature of inter-governmental negotiations about loss and damage. This article identifies the key framing questions that ought to be answered in the context of Article 8, prior to conducting the 'global stocktake'. Key among these framing questions are critical structural problems, stemming mainly from underrepresentation of Global South worldviews, and from major data gaps and methodological difficulties inherent to assessing progress with managing loss and damage. A 'global stocktake' of Article 8 provides a window of opportunity for making headway on the inter-governmental debate about loss and damage, and the direction of the research efforts that are needed to inform such debate. This article concludes by reflecting on the stakes that developing countries have in that window of opportunity. Key policy insights Imperfect as its output might be, the first global stocktake under the Paris Agreement can help identify and act upon the key barriers that today prevent us from conducting a comprehensive assessment of progress with regard to the goals of Article 8 on loss and damage. The global stocktake should not shy away from considering loss and damage, and should ideally conduct separate assessments for losses and for damages. Developing country governments can use the global stocktake to raise the profile of climate change-driven loss, which is comparatively under-researched, while promoting a concerted effort to fund high-quality domestic research.
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In: Puig , D 2020 , Managing climate change: Challenges related to uncertainty, distributional impacts, technology transfer and transnational governance .
Parisaftalen under FN's klimakonvention fastlægger det internationale samfunds plan for at begrænse den globale opvarmning. Planen er formuleret omkring de individuelle bidrag, som hver part i konventionen er parat til at yde, baseret på den enkeltes evner og det såkaldte princip om fælles men differentieret ansvar. Denne afhandling undersøger, hvordan nationale regeringer reagerer på udfordringerne forbundet med at bestemme typen og omfanget af disse bidrag og på implementeringen af dem. Afhandlingen fokuserer på fire udfordringer, der er fælles for de fleste, hvis ikke alle, regeringer: integration af usikkerheder i politikker og planer på nationalt niveau; reduktion af regressive fordelingsvirkninger forbundet med foranstaltninger til at begrænse og tilpasse klimaforandringer; øgning af adgang til teknologier, der er nødvendige for at begrænse klimaforandringerne, for lavindkomstlande; og "transnational governance" for klimaforandringer. Hver udfordring udforskes gennem to artikler, hvilket giver mulighed for en mere nuanceret analyse. Begrænsede eller ingen krav for visse aspekter af den politiske beslutningsproces er kernen i nogle af de udfordringer, regeringer står overfor. To eksempler kan illustrere dette. For det første bygger politisk planlægning på nationalt plan på fremskrivninger af udledning af drivhusgasser. Ofte afspejler disse fremskrivninger ikke den aktuelle viden med hensyn til styring af usikkerhed. Minimumsstandarder for kvalitet kan hjælpe med at vende denne tendens og dermed øge robustheden i nationale politiske planer og indirekte styrke den internationale indsats mod klimaforandringer. For det andet, fordi indsatsen mod klimaforandringer i stigende grad involverer andre aktører end nationale regeringer – fra virksomheder, til subnationale og overstatslige enheder, til ikke-statslige organisationer – strækker behovet for at indføre præstationskrav sig ud over de nationale regeringer. Specifikt antyder Parisaftalen og efterfølgende beslutninger truffet af parterne i konventionen effektivt, at ikke-statslige aktører vil hjælpe med at opfylde konventionens mål og kompensere for potentielt utilstrækkelige indsatser fra statslige aktører. Uanset ikkestatslige aktørers evne til at leve op til disse forventninger er deres handlinger i de fleste tilfælde ikke underlagt grundlæggende ansvarlighedsmekanismer. En sådan mangel på gennemsigtighed, som performancekrav kunne imødegå, risikerer at underminere det ellers fornuftige mål om at udnytte ikke-statslige aktørers opfindsomhed og ressourcer til at supplere staters handlinger. På områder, hvor der foreligger evaluerende bevismateriale, såsom teknologioverførsel eller distributionskonsekvenser, repræsenterer begrænset anvendelse af dette bevismateriale i den politiske beslutningsproces en anden type udfordring, som regeringerne står overfor. Denne afhandling undersøger en række sager inden for disse to områder og finder undgåelige mangler ved programdesign. Årsagerne til udbredelsen af disse mangler er sandsynligvis strukturelle: evalueringer af politik kæmper med at bestemme "counterfactuals" og etablere "attribution", og regeringsførelse og lovgivningsmæssige rammer har ofte brug for revision. ; The Paris Agreement, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, lays out the international community's blueprint for curbing global warming. It is a blueprint articulated around the individual contributions that each party to the Convention is prepared to make, in light of its capabilities and the so-called principle of common-but-differentiated responsibilities. This thesis explores how national governments are responding to the challenges associated with determining the nature and scope of those contributions, and implementing them. The thesis focuses on four challenges that are common to most, if not all, governments: integrating uncertainty into national-level policies and plans; reducing regressive distributional impacts associated with measures to mitigate, and adapt to, climate change; increasing low income-country access to the technologies needed to curb climate change; and governing climate change transnationally. Each challenge is explored through two articles, thus allowing for a more nuanced analysis. Limited or no performance requirements for certain aspects of the policy-making process is at the heart of some of the challenges faced by governments. Two examples serve to illustrate this point. First, national-level policy planning relies on projections of greenhouse-gas emissions. For the most, these projections fail to reflect current knowledge with regard to uncertainty management. Minimum quality standards could help reverse this trend, thus increasing the robustness of national policy plans and, indirectly, strengthening the international climate change regime. Second, because climate change governance increasingly involves actors other than national governments – from businesses, to subnational and supranational governmental entities, to non-governmental organisations –, the need to introduce performance requirements extends beyond national governments. Specifically, the Paris Agreement, and subsequent decisions by the parties to the Convention, effectively suggest that non-state actors will help deliver on the goals of the Convention, making up for potentially insufficient delivery by state actors. Irrespective of the ability of non-state actors to live up to these xpectations, in most cases their actions are not subject to basic accountability mechanisms. Such lack of transparency, which performance requirements could counter, risks undermining the otherwise sensible goal of harnessing non-state actor ingenuity and resources, to complement state actor action. In areas where evaluative evidence is available, such as technology transfer or distributional impacts, limited uptake of that evidence in the policy-making process represents a second type of challenge faced by governments. The thesis studies a number of cases in these two areas, and notes avoidable programme-design shortcomings. Reasons for the prevalence of these shortcomings are likely to be structural: policy evaluations struggle to determine counterfactuals and establish attribution, and governance arrangements and regulatory frameworks often need revision.
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In: International environmental agreements: politics, law and economics, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 93-111
ISSN: 1573-1553
In: Puig , D & Bakhtiari , F 2019 , ' Incorporating uncertainty in national-level climate change-mitigation policy: possible elements for a research agenda ' , Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences , vol. 9 , no. 1 , pp. 86-89 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-018-0514-5
Decision making for climate change management seldom incorporates uncertainty in the analysis that underpins the policy process. First, uncertainty is seldom characterised fully, and attempts to reduce uncertainty—when this is possible—are rare. Second, scientists are ill-equipped to communicate about uncertainty with policy makers, and policy makers most often favour pretended certainty over nuance and detail. Third, the uncertainty analysis that may have been conducted most often fails to actually influence policy in a significant manner. The case is made for (i) characterising and, to the extent possible, reducing uncertainty, (ii) communicating uncertainty, and (iii) reflecting uncertainty in the design of policy initiatives for climate change management. Possible elements for a research agenda on each of these areas are proposed.
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In: de Coninck , H & Puig , D 2015 , ' Assessing climate change mitigation technology interventions by international institutions ' , Climatic Change , vol. 131 , no. 3 , pp. 417-433 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-015-1344-z
Accelerating the international use of climate mitigation technologies is key if effortsto curb climate change are to succeed, especially in developing countries, where weakdomestic technological innovation systems constrain the uptake of climate change mitigationtechnologies. Several intergovernmental agencies have set up specific programmes to supportthe diffusion of climate mitigation technologies. Using a simplified technological innovationsystem-based framework, this paper aims to systematically review these programmes, with thedual aim of assessing their collective success in promoting technological innovation, andidentifying opportunities for the newly formed UNFCCC Technology Mechanism. We concludethat, while all programmes reviewed have promoted technology transfer, they have givenlimited attention to innovation capabilities with users, government and universities. Functionsthat could be further developed include knowledge development, legitimation and marketformation. These could be focal areas for the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism. We recommendthat, in future programmes, part of the funding is dedicated to programmes doingresearch and development as well as capability development.
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In: International environmental agreements: politics, law and economics, Band 18, Heft 5, S. 659-669
ISSN: 1573-1553
In: Puig , D , Haselip , J A & Bakhtiari , F 2018 , ' The mismatch between the in-country determinants of technology transfer, and the scope of technology transfer initiatives under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ' , International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics , vol. 18 , no. 5 , pp. 659-669 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-018-9405-1
Despite decades of international political emphasis, little is known about the in-country determinants of technology transfer for climate change mitigation. We draw upon the conclusions of a series of standardised, official governmental statements of technology priorities, coupled with questionnaire-based data collection, to shed light on the nature of those determinants. We find that there is a disconnect between what developing country governments perceive as the key enablers of, and barriers to, technology transfer, and what bilateral and multilateral technology transfer programmes can offer, given budgetary constraints and the logic of development aid spending. We show that the well-established notion of making climate change mitigation actions an integral part of sound development plans is especially relevant for technology transfer. We offer pointers as to how this might be done in practice, in the context of the 'technology action plans' developed as part of the United Nations-sponsored technology needs assessment process.
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In: Bakhtiari , F , Hinostroza , M L & Puig , D 2018 , Institutional capacities for NDC implementation: a guidance document . UNEP DTU Partnership .
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are commitments by parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Each party defines its own NDC, which in all cases includes mitigation-related goals and, in most cases, adaptation-related goals too. For most parties, the time horizon for implementing NDC goals is 2030. By ratifying the 2015 Paris Agreement of the UNFCCC, parties commit to submitting revised NDCs every five years. The revised NDCs must have an implementation period of five years, and must be submitted five years in advance of the start date for implementation. The Paris Agreement further calls on parties to increase progressively the level of ambition of their NDCs. Implementation of the first NDCs is to start in 2021. Delivering on this requirement and within this time horizon requires increased institutional capacities on the part of national governments. These capacities relate to six main sets of issues: - Ability to launch and coordinate a whole-of-government process, incorporating contributions from all relevant governmental agencies, and non-governmental parties, as relevant. - Capacity to integrate NDC priorities into sectoral and cross-sectoral programmes and projects, to ensure that the latter do not undermine efforts to achieve the former, or vice versa. - Resources to train relevant government agency staff (and possibly non-government agency staff too), with a view to increasing the technical and managerial skills of these individuals. - Capability to engage all relevant stakeholders, through consultations designed to elicit their input, so that it can be taken into consideration, thus increasing buy-in from stakeholders. - Competence to conduct a regulatory framework revision, to streamline and complement existing laws and regulations, and strengthen related governmental processes and entities. - Aptitude to monitor progress, and report on it, making best use of existing data collection mechanisms, and strengthening related capabilities wherever needed.
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In: Climate policy, Band 18, Heft 4, S. 459-470
ISSN: 1752-7457
In: Global policy: gp, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 429-431
ISSN: 1758-5899
AbstractTargeted improvements in the way energy is transformed, distributed and used can accelerate progress toward achieving the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Compared to a situation in which no indicators are defined and monitored, tracking progress through indicators would make it easier to reap the full developmental benefits associated with improvements in energy efficiency. We call upon G20 leaders to adopt SDG‐specific energy‐efficiency indicators, with a view to ultimately accelerating progress toward achieving the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals.
In: Puig , D , Morales-Nápoles , O , Bakhtiari , F & Landa , G 2018 , ' The accountability imperative for quantifying the uncertainty of emission forecasts: evidence from Mexico ' , Climate Policy , vol. 18 , no. 6 , pp. 742-751 . https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2017.1373623
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Governmental climate change mitigation targets are typically developed with the aid of forecasts of greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions. The robustness and credibility of such forecasts depends, among other issues, on the extent to which forecasting approaches can reflect prevailing uncertainties. We apply a transparent and replicable method to quantify the uncertainty associated with projections of gross domestic product growth rates for Mexico, a key driver of GHG emissions in the country. We use those projections to produce probabilistic forecasts of GHG emissions for Mexico. We contrast our probabilistic forecasts with Mexico's governmental deterministic forecasts. We show that, because they fail to reflect such key uncertainty, deterministic forecasts are ill-suited for use in target-setting processes. We argue that (i) guidelines should be agreed upon, to ensure that governmental forecasts meet certain minimum transparency and quality standards, and (ii) governments should be held accountable for the appropriateness of the forecasting approach applied to prepare governmental forecasts, especially when those forecasts are used to derive climate change mitigation targets. POLICY INSIGHTSNo minimum transparency and quality standards exist to guide the development of GHG emission scenario forecasts, not even when these forecasts are used to set national climate change mitigation targets.No accountability mechanisms appear to be in place at the national level to ensure that national governments rely on scientifically sound processes to develop GHG emission scenarios.Using probabilistic forecasts to underpin emission reduction targets represents a scientifically sound option for reflecting in the target the uncertainty to which those forecasts are subject, thus increasing the validity of the target.Setting up minimum transparency and quality standards, and holding governments accountable for their choice of forecasting methods could lead to more robust emission reduction targets nationally and, by extension, internationally.
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In: Climate policy, Band 18, Heft 6, S. 742-751
ISSN: 1752-7457
Governmental climate change mitigation targets are typically developed with the aid of forecasts of greenhouse-gasemissions. The robustness and credibility of such forecasts depends, among other issues, on the extent to whichforecasting approaches can reflect prevailing uncertainties. We apply a transparent and replicable method to quantify theuncertainty associated with projections of gross domestic product growth rates for Mexico, a key driver of greenhouse-gasemissions in the country. We use those projections to produce probabilistic forecasts of greenhouse-gas emissions forMexico. We contrast our probabilistic forecasts with Mexico's governmental deterministic forecasts. We show that,because they fail to reflect such key uncertainty, deterministic forecasts are ill-suited for use in target-setting processes.We argue that (i) guidelines should be agreed upon, to ensure that governmental forecasts meet certain minimumtransparency and quality standards, and (ii) governments should be held accountable for the appropriateness of theforecasting approach applied to prepare governmental forecasts, especially when those forecasts are used to deriveclimate change mitigation targets.
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Governmental climate change mitigation targets are typically developed with the aid of forecasts of greenhouse-gasemissions. The robustness and credibility of such forecasts depends, among other issues, on the extent to whichforecasting approaches can reflect prevailing uncertainties. We apply a transparent and replicable method to quantify theuncertainty associated with projections of gross domestic product growth rates for Mexico, a key driver of greenhouse-gasemissions in the country. We use those projections to produce probabilistic forecasts of greenhouse-gas emissions forMexico. We contrast our probabilistic forecasts with Mexico's governmental deterministic forecasts. We show that,because they fail to reflect such key uncertainty, deterministic forecasts are ill-suited for use in target-setting processes.We argue that (i) guidelines should be agreed upon, to ensure that governmental forecasts meet certain minimumtransparency and quality standards, and (ii) governments should be held accountable for the appropriateness of theforecasting approach applied to prepare governmental forecasts, especially when those forecasts are used to deriveclimate change mitigation targets.
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