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"Dynamics, Endogeneity, and Complexity in Protest Campaigns" published on by Oxford University Press.

An evolutionary framework is argued to be the most appropriate approach to the study of deescalation of conflicts. This is especially true when conflicts are protracted or when environmental crises exist. Though political shocks are "necessary but not sufficient" for deescalation, certain political shocks have been shown to facilitate deescalation. These shocks include such major events as defeat in war, economic crises, loss of foreign aid, & withdrawal of societal support for existing policies. When an evolutionary framework is utilized to describe the Israeli-Palestinian case, it becomes evident that political shocks helped to bring about deescalation & the 1993 Oslo Accords. Palestinian shocks included Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the PLO rebellion, the Intifada (accompanied by changes in Soviet support), & the 1990-1993 financial crisis. Each of these shocks allowed Arafat to strengthen his power in the PLO. Israeli shocks, such as the Likud policy monopoly, changes in Israeli public opinion, & the end of the Likud monopoly, allowed Yitzhak Rabin to dramatically alter his policies & strategies. 2 Tables, 78 References. K. Larsen

This article introduces an evolutionary framework for the de-escalation of protracted conflicts. Key variables are political shocks, expectancy revision, policy entrepreneurship, third-party pressure, and reciprocity. The model is tested in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian case, 1979-98. A quantitative assessment is made with the use of Middle East KEDS data as well as a qualitative assessment of the intervening impact of shocks on the expectations and strategies of key decisionmakers. The results show that while shocks by themselves did not always change the expectations and strategies of the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships, their combined influence with entrepreneurship, third-party pressure, and reciprocity did indeed improve the frequency of Israeli and Palestinian agreements in the long term. In fact, the joint effect of shocks and entrepreneurship appears to play a crucial first step in the overall deescalation process. In addition, shocks had important intervening effects for both sides by reducing major institutional constraints that paved the way for an initial political settlement reached in the 1993 Oslo Accords. Finally, the results suggest that without political shocks, inertia overrides the inclination of decisionmakers to pursue new, risky policies that could undermine their political positions.

War, postwar demobilization, and economic depression are national crises that ultimately test the state's capacity to respond simultaneously to internal and external challenges. This analysis probes the nexus between crises and domestic violence, investigating how this relationship is mediated by the influence of two variables: the severity of crisis and the presence or absence of government accommodation. Box-Tiao impact assessment models are used to estimate the separate and combined effects of American involvements in wars (the Spanish-American War, World Wars I and II, and the Korean and Vietnam Wars), their postwar periods, and the 1930s depression on economic, social, and political forms of American violence from 1890 to 1970. After establishing historical evidence for the role of national accommodation, I demonstrate that strong, positive associations between severe crises and domestic violence are to be found during the tenure of nonaccommodating administrations. Accommodating governments are associated with either negative or historically weak linkages between severe crises and domestic violence. Overall, the evidence underscores the benefit of using broad theoretical perspectives for understanding the linkages between international and domestic conflict.

This study involves a longitudinal investigation of the short-term and long-term effects of the Syrian military intervention (June 1976) on Lebanese domestic conflict. The inquiry also includes an analysis of the strategic timing of the intervention in Lebanon. Variables such as the level of Lebanese domestic conflict, social polarization, and linkages of internal-external cooperation are examined as possible precipitating factors. The study reveals that the Syrian intervention increased the short-term conflict (June-October 1976) in Lebanon, but ultimately it was responsible for an overall decline in civil strife throughout most of the country (with the exception of southern Lebanon). Moreover, the Syrian military action did not occur in the midst of extreme Lebanese domestic conflict and social polarization. Rather, the Syrian action occurred when civil strife, social polarization, and Lebanese-Syrian cooperation were declining. In the final analysis, the findings reflect the necessity for better specification of the causal linkages between civil war and foreign military intervention.

Aus US-amerikanischer Sicht