Suchergebnisse

The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Economic Development: Overview -- Chapter 3: Economic Growth -- Chapter 4: The New Growth Theories -- Chapter 5: History, Expectations, and Development -- Chapter 6: Economic Inequality -- Chapter 7: Inequality and Development: Interconnections -- Chapter 8: Poverty and Undernutrition -- Chapter 9: Population Growth and Economic Development -- Chapter 10: Rural and Urban -- Chapter 11: Markets in Agriculture: An Introduction -- Chapter 12: Land -- Chapter 13: Labor -- Chapter 14: Credit -- Chapter 15: Insurance -- Chapter 16: International Trade -- Chapter 17: Trade Policy -- Chapter 18: Multilateral Approaches to Trade Policy -- Appendix 1: Elementary Game Theory -- Appendix 2: Elementary Statistical Methods -- References -- Author Index -- Subject Index

El profesor Kenneth Arrow murió el 21 de febrero de 2017 a la edad de 95 años. Era universalmente considerado (junto con Paul Samuelson, John Hicks y posiblemente —dependiendo de los gustos— John Maynard Keynes, Milton Friedman y Gary Becker) como uno de los economistas más extraordinarios del siglo XX. También fue mi economista favorito de todos los tiempos.

We conceptualize and measure upward mobility over income or wealth. At the core of our exercise is the Growth Progressivity Axiom: transfers of instantaneous growth rates from relatively rich to poor individuals increases upward mobility. This axiom, along with mild auxiliary restrictions, identifies an "upward mobility kernel" with a single free parameter, in which mobility is linear in individual growth rates, with geometrically declining weights on baseline incomes. We extend this kernel to trajectories over intervals. The analysis delivers an upward mobility index that does not rely on panel data. That significantly expands our analytical scope to data-poor settings. (JEL D31, D63, I32, O15, O40)

We study collaborative work in pairs when potential collaborators are motivated by the reputational implications of (joint or solo) projects. In equilibrium, individual collaboration strategies both influence and are influenced by the public assignment of credit for joint work across the two partners. We investigate the fragility of collaboration to small biases in the public's credit assignment. When collaborators are symmetric, symmetric equilibria are often fragile, and in nonfragile equilibria individuals receive asymmetric collaborative credit based on payoff-irrelevant "identities." We study payoff distributions across identities within asymmetric equilibria, and compare aggregate welfare across symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. (JEL A11, D82, I23)