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AbstractGames, which philosophers commonly invoke as models for diverse phenomena, are plausibly understood in terms of rules and goals, but this gives rise to two puzzles. The first concerns the identity of a single game over time. Intuitively one and the same game can undergo a change in rules, as when the rules of chess were modified so that a pawn could be moved two squares forward on its first move. Yet if games are individuated in terms of their constitutive rules and goals, this is incoherent—new rules mean a new game. The second concerns the individuation of games at a point in time. Intuitively, there can be different versions of a single game, where the versions differ in the details of their rules. I offer a solution to this problem that draws on an analogy with individuating languages. The resulting theory should illuminate the metaphysics of games more generally.

Two major critiques of M. Scanlon's contractualism are analyzed & dismissed. With respect to the position of the agent who decides about principles of behavior, Scanlon's view is that the reasons that ground reasonable rejection of principles of behavior must necessarily by agent-relative & personal, not agent-neutral & impersonal, as critics imply. In addition, there can be moral & nonmoral reasons for rejection. If only moral notions are acceptable for rejection, then the grounds for rejection would be responsible for the rejection, making the rejection itself (& Scanlon's theory) irrelevant. Scanlon also argues that the most common forms of moral bias occur when other agent-relative complaints are not taken seriously enough. Scanlon's rejection of consequentialism is discussed. M. Pflum

A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism and pure noncognitivism by adopting views that seek to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other such views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. These essays examine the prospects for such 'hybrid views' of normative thought and language (focusing mainly but not exclusively on moral thought & talk)