Suchergebnisse

Der Autor gibt einen Überblick über die derzeitige Verwendung von Kultur-Konzepten und kulturwissenschaftlich beeinflussten Begrifflichkeiten in der deutschsprachigen Disziplin Internationale Beziehungen. Dabei wird insbesondere die Zielstellung des vorliegenden Sammelbandes beachtet, die Kommunikation über traditionelle (teil-)disziplinäre Grenzen hinweg zu befördern. Das Hauptaugenmerk liegt in einer Verortung von in den Internationalen Beziehungen gebräuchlichen Begriffen von Kultur im Umfeld von Konzepten, die zur selben Zeit die Konjunktur des "cultural turn" begleiten. Ausgehend von der handlungstheoretischen Debatte zwischen rationalistischen und konstruktivistischen Ansätzen, die zu einem großen Teil für die neue Welle "kulturalistischer" Erklärungsansätze in der Teildisziplin verantwortlich ist, werden zunächst Ideen und Weltbilder diskutiert. Unter dem Begriff der Normen werden ferner einige maßgebliche neuere Arbeiten der deutschsprachigen Internationalen Beziehungen vorgestellt. Daran anschließend betrachtet der Beitrag die Einflüsse des Soziologischen Institutionalismus auf das in der Teildisziplin dominante Kulturverständnis, und zwar einerseits hinsichtlich des Forschungsgegenstandes der Weltkultur oder "Weltgesellschaft" sowie andererseits bezüglich der daraus abgeleiteten Annahmen über die Rolle von Kultur als Handlungsrepertoire und den Wirkungsmechanismus der Angemessenheitslogik. Auf dieser Grundlage werden abschließend einige zusammenfassende Eindrücke über den "cultural turn" in den Internationalen Beziehungen skizziert. (ICI2)

Die Implementation der europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU) und der damit verbundene institutionelle Umbau der Europäischen Union sind im vollen Gange. Der Beitrag argumentiert, daß die WWU nicht aufgrund funktionaler Logik und ökonomischer bzw. machtpolitischer Akteursinteressen erklärt werden kann, sondern in erster Linie politischen Charakter hat. Die Einführung des Euro hat längst Symbolfunktion für das politische Projekt der Europäischen Integration insgesamt übernommen. Die Ausführungen konzentrieren sich auf Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien als die maßgeblichen EU-Mitgliedsländer. Dabei wird die Konstruktion nationaler und/oder europäischer Identitäten in den Mittelpunkt der Analyse gestellt und aufgezeigt, wie unterschiedliche Identitätsvorstellungen die Differenzen in den Einstellungen zum Euro erklären. (pre)

This article attempts to explain the variation in post-Maastricht elite attitudes toward the single currency in Western Europe. It concentrates on the British reluctance to join the single currency in the first round as well as the French and German continuing support for it. We argue, first, that explanations based solely on material conceptions of actors' interests — whether economic or geopolitical — are insufficient in explaining the variation in attitudes. There are as many good economic or geopolitical reasons in favour of the Euro as there are against it. In particular, perceived instrumental interests of actors as such do not explain the considerable variation in attitudes. Rather, we claim that actors' perception of their material and instrumental interests with regard to the Euro are deeply influenced by their visions of European political order. Second, the visions about European order which give political meaning to EMU, need to be understood in the framework of identity politics. Differences in the construction of collective elite identities pertaining to the nation-state and to Europe explain the controversies among the political elites in the three countries as well as the variation in attitudes. While the French and German political elites — from the centre-right to the centre-left — have incorporated `Europe' into their nationally defined collective identities, British policy-makers including New Labour remain hesitant. Third, on a more conceptual level, this article does not try to push an `identity versus interest' argument. Rather, we claim that the causal arrows run both ways. Collective nation-state identities define the realm of instrumental or material interests considered legitimate and appropriate in a given political discourse. We claim this to be the case in Britain and Germany. The more identity constructions are contested or in flux in a political discourse, however, the more likely it is that those constructions carry the day which actors see as furthering their perceived instrumental, political or economic interests. We argue that this was the case in France.

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.

Explores why much Europeanization of "Anglo Saxon exceptionalism" can be observed over the past 50 years, while "Germanness" has meant "European" since the end of the 1950s & "French exceptionalism," at least recently, also comes in European colors. It is argued that a combination of three factors accounts for this variation in the extent to which nation-state identities have become European. (1) Any new idea about political order, to be considered legitimate, must resonate with core elements of older visions of the political order; these older understandings of political order therefore delimit the degree to which "Europe" can be incorporated in given nation-state identities. (2) New visions about political order circulating in transnational discourses can most easily be promoted domestically during critical junctures when existing ideas about political order are collectively challenged & contested. Under these circumstances, perceived political interests & the power resources of political actors to a large extent explain which ideas among those available in a given context are being promoted & come to dominate. (3) Nation-state identities that have become consensual in a given polity are likely to remain rather stable over time, since actors tend to become socialized into their new collective identity & gradually internalize its content. Over time, nation-state identities tend to become embedded in political institutions & political culture & the degree to which political elites are able to manipulate identity constructions narrows considerably. Adapted from the source document.