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The recent bomb attacks at the Istanbul airport (28 June 2016), in a tourist cafe in Dhaka, Bangladesh (2 July), and in Bagdad (3 July) were part of a "Ramadan campaign" announced by the spokesman of the self‐declared "Islamic State" caliphate in late May 2016. This series of attacks was intended to make the Islamic holy month of Ramadan "a month of calamity everywhere for the non-believers." It has generated significant international attention for an organisation which has recently lost the cities of Ramadi and Falluja in Iraq and which is under serious pressure in the strategic city of Manbij in Syria. This article analyses the Islamic State's (IS) contextual use of different forms of violence and argues that the attacks and the defeats are two sides of one coin: the group is losing territory and credibility by failing to continue with its expansion of the universal Islamic caliphate that "Caliph" Abu Bakr promised in summer 2014; it is now compensating for these territorial losses by expanding its field of action through terrorist attacks, thereby suggesting a fictitious expansion. The article explains how the group has exhibited a three-stage "cycle of violence" in which violence has served specific functions. In the first stage, from roughly 2003 to 2010, violence was used as part of a mobilisation strategy. In the second stage, from 2010 to 2015, violence served mainly to facilitate the group's expansion and rule. In the third stage, which began in 2015, the increasingly brutal violence and the fictitious expansion have constituted the centrepiece of a survival strategy. Against this background, the article suggests that the Islamic State will most likely not have a future as a territorial entity but will, at best, survive as a terrorist apocalyptic sect.

In the last two years, the Syrian uprising has turned from a civil protest movement against an authoritarian regime into an outright civil war in which the antagonists affiliations' and identities are increasingly framed in sectarian speech. In summer 2012, various politicians and analysts suggested a power-sharing agreement between regime and opposition representatives as a solution to break the vicious circle of escalating violence. They called it a "Syrian Taifh" after the 1989 peace accord that ended Lebanon's long-lasting civil war (1975-1990) by dividing power among religious communities. Others rejected the idea of a consociational power-sharing deal outright because they hold it responsible for the continued sectarian pillarization of Lebanese society. Moreover, Syria's experience is said to differ significantly from Lebanon's, making the effective transmittal of the Lebanese model impossible. This paper takes these differing arguments into consideration and investigates whether power sharing could help to deescalate the Syrian conflict and what lessons should be taken from Lebanon's experience. Lebanon shows that consociationalism tends to stabilize - even deepen - social cleavages. Therefore, a Syrian Taif should gradually substitute fixed guarantees of shares of power with centripetal and unitary state institutions. Furthermore, in addition to internal actors, external powers have to be convinced that power sharing may be the only viable option for ending the devastating civil war in Syria and for preventing the further spread of violence into neighboring countries. -- power sharing ; civil war ; sectarianism ; Syria ; Lebanon ; Taif

In the last two years, the Syrian uprising has turned from a civil protest movement against an authoritarian regime into an outright civil war in which the antagonists affiliations' and identities are increasingly framed in sectarian speech. In summer 2012, various politicians and analysts suggested a power-sharing agreement between regime and opposition representatives as a solution to break the vicious circle of escalating violence. They called it a Syrian Taifh after the 1989 peace accord that ended Lebanon's long-lasting civil war (1975-1990) by dividing power among religious communities. Others rejected the idea of a consociational power-sharing deal outright because they hold it responsible for the continued sectarian pillarization of Lebanese society. Moreover, Syria's experience is said to differ significantly from Lebanon's, making the effective transmittal of the Lebanese model impossible. This paper takes these differing arguments into consideration and investigates whether power sharing could help to deescalate the Syrian conflict and what lessons should be taken from Lebanon's experience. Lebanon shows that consociationalism tends to stabilize - even deepen - social cleavages. Therefore, a Syrian Taif should gradually substitute fixed guarantees of shares of power with centripetal and unitary state institutions. Furthermore, in addition to internal actors, external powers have to be convinced that power sharing may be the only viable option for ending the devastating civil war in Syria and for preventing the further spread of violence into neighboring countries.

Anfang 2011 kam es in fast allen arabischen Ländern zu Protesten und Aufständen, denen ähnliche Konfliktstrukturen zugrunde lagen: Autoritäre Regime, die sich meist säkular-nationalistisch legitimieren, verloren massiv an Legitimität, weil sie ihre Versprechen von Unabhängigkeit, Freiheit, Gleichheit und wirtschaftlichem Fortschritt nicht erfüllten. Nahöstliche Gesellschaften weisen außerdem massive Partizipationsdefizite auf, da große Segmente der Bevölkerung - Jugendliche, Frauen, ländliche Regionen und in einigen Ländern Ethnien und Konfessionsgemeinschaften - politisch, ökonomisch und sozial diskriminiert werden. Die Frustration über die allgemeine Perspektivlosigkeit brach im Arabischen Frühling aus. Der Beitrag geht auf die Entwicklungspfade im Arabischen Frühling ein, betrachtet Diktaturen, Bürgerkrieg und die Machtteilungsarrangements. Ein gesonderter Blick erfolgt dabei auf Bahrain und Syrien. (ICA2)

In Syria, the civilian uprising against an authoritarian regime has become a civil war and proxy war. There is a risk that the conflict could escalate and turn into a regional conflagration. Neither military intervention from abroad, nor a one-sided military victory offers a solution. Each risks expansion of the conflict. Only a political solution with the inclusion of external mediators such as Russia and Iran can offer a way out. The goal should first be power-sharing. After that, it would be a matter of creating integrating government structures. Lebanon offers a model. There, a fifteen-year civil war was ended with the compromise formula 'no victor, no vanquished'. Adapted from the source document.

In Syrien ist der zivile Aufstand gegen ein autoritäres Regime zu einem Bürgerkrieg und Stellvertreterkrieg geworden. Er droht zu eskalieren und die gesamte Region in Brand zu setzen. Weder eine Militärintervention von außen noch der militärische Sieg einer Seite bieten eine Lösung. Jeweils droht die regionale Ausweitung des Konflikts. Nur eine politische Lösung unter Einschluss externer Vermittler wie Russland und Iran kann einen Ausweg bieten. Ziel sollte zunächst eine Machtteilung sein. Danach ginge es um den Aufbau integrativer staatlicher Strukturen. Der Libanon bietet das Vorbild. Dort war der fünfzehnjährige Bürgerkrieg mit der Kompromissformel "Kein Sieger, kein Besiegter" beendet worden. (Osteuropa (Berlin) / SWP)

In the last two years, the Syrian uprising has turned from a civil protest movement against an authoritarian regime into an outright civil war in which the antagonists affiliations' and identities are increasingly framed in sectarian speech. In summer 2012, various politicians and analysts suggested a power-sharing agreement between regime and opposition representatives as a solution to break the vicious circle of escalating violence. They called it a "Syrian Taifh" after the 1989 peace accord that ended Lebanon's long-lasting civil war (1975-1990) by dividing power among religious communities. Others rejected the idea of a consociational power-sharing deal outright because they hold it responsible for the continued sectarian pillarization of Lebanese society. Moreover, Syria's experience is said to differ significantly from Lebanon's, making the effective transmittal of the Lebanese model impossible. This paper takes these differing arguments into consideration and investigates whether power sharing could help to deescalate the Syrian conflict and what lessons should be taken from Lebanon's experience. Lebanon shows that consociationalism tends to stabilize - even deepen - social cleavages. Therefore, a Syrian Taif should gradually substitute fixed guarantees of shares of power with centripetal and unitary state institutions. Furthermore, in addition to internal actors, external powers have to be convinced that power sharing may be the only viable option for ending the devastating civil war in Syria and for preventing the further spread of violence into neighboring countries. -- power sharing ; civil war ; sectarianism ; Syria ; Lebanon ; Taif ; Stephan Rosiny

In Syrien ist der zivile Aufstand gegen ein autoritäres Regime zu einem Bürgerkrieg und Stellvertreterkrieg geworden. Er droht zu eskalieren und die gesamte Region in Brand zu setzen. Weder eine Militärintervention von außen noch der militärische Sieg einer Seite bieten eine Lösung. Jeweils droht die regionale Ausweitung des Konflikts. Nur eine politische Lösung unter Einschluss externer Vermittler wie Russland und Iran kann einen Ausweg bieten. Ziel sollte zunächst eine Machtteilung sein. Danach ginge es um den Aufbau integrativer staatlicher Strukturen. Der Libanon bietet das Vorbild. Dort war der fünfzehnjährige Bürgerkrieg mit der Kompromissformel "Kein Sieger, kein Besiegter" beendet worden. (Osteuropa (Berlin) / SWP)