Suchergebnisse

No other disaster management practice has undergone as much change than has emergency communication. The components of emergency communication, from situational awareness, to response coordination and public information provision are influenced by factors that are fundamentally different from 20 or even ten years ago. It is a fast-evolving environment, involving new technologies and changing communication preferences. Adapting to a highly dynamic and demanding information environment takes up resources from other activities. One response to this rapid change has been the establishment of Virtual Operation Support Teams to monitor social media, support situational awareness, counter rumours and disseminate official communication. To date, the establishment, utility and added value of these teams has not been the subject of research. This paper examines the evolution of Virtual Operation Support Teams across the globe and how they are being used in seven countries. The paper suggests ways that governments and emergency management authorities can support similar teams and how integration with formal operations might be managed. This may assist countries where Virtual Operation Support Teams are not yet established or where teams are only activated during an emergency event.

Vom 4. bis zum 6. Juni 2018 trafen sich Behördenvertreterinnen und -vertreter aus den Bereichen Sicherheitspolitik und Bevölkerungsschutz zum vierten trilateralen Workshop D-A-CH Schutz Kritischer Infrastrukturen (SKI/KRITIS). Der diesjährige Workshop wurde durch das deutsche Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK) an dessen Amtssitz in Bonn organisiert und gemeinsam mit dem österreichischen Bundeskanzleramt, dem österreichischen Bundesministerium für Inneres (BM.I), dem schweizerischen Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz (BABS) und dem Center for Security Studies (CSS) der ETH Zürich durchgeführt. Ziel des Workshops war es, die Diskussion zu aktuellen Ansätzen und Herausforderungen beim Schutz Kritischer Infrastrukturen zu fördern und von den unterschiedlichen Erfahrungen in den drei Ländern zu profitieren. Zudem diente der Workshop dazu, den Expertenaustausch hinsichtlich internationaler Entwicklungen und grenzüberschreitender Herausforderungen fortzuführen.

Städte gewinnen in der Sicherheitspolitik zunehmend an Bedeutung. Bereits heute lebt weltweit mehr als die Hälfte der Menschen in urbanen Räumen. Gemäss Schätzungen der UNO wird die Zahl der Stadtbe¬wohner bis 2045 um das Eineinhalbfache auf sechs Milliarden weltweit wachsen. Städte sind die Zentren modernen sozialen und wirtschaftli¬chen Lebens, deren Bedeutung weit über die Stadtgrenzen hinausreicht. Zugleich sind Städte anfällig für unterschiedliche Risiken, die leicht katastrophale Auswirkungen haben können. So werden in Folge des Klimawandels urbane Räume verstärkt durch Wetterextreme bedroht. Hinzu kommen technische Risiken, unter anderem im Zuge der wachsenden Abhängigkeit von kritischen Infrastrukturen. Nicht zuletzt sind Städte häufig Zentren sozialer und politischer Konflikte, die in Unruhen und terroristischen Anschlägen münden können. ; ISSN:1024-0608

Die europäische Flüchtlingskrise 2015/2016 stellte sowohl Aufnahme- als auch Transitstaaten vor zahlreiche Herausforderungen. Deutschland, Österreich und die Schweiz waren von der Flüchtlingskrise in unterschiedlichem Masse betroffen. Die in die Bewältigung der Krise involvierten Organisationen und Entscheidungsträger waren aber häufig mit ähnlichen Herausforderungen konfrontiert. Einerseits mussten unter Zeitdruck politisch-strategische Entscheide mit weitreichenden Konsequenzen getroffen werden, andererseits standen auch die staatlichen Strukturen und Prozesse auf operativer Ebene unter grosser Belastung: die Kapazitäten für die Anmeldung, Registrierung und Unterkunft der Flüchtlinge mussten in kürzester Zeit deutlich erhöht bzw. gänzlich neu geschaffen werden. Aufgrund der Grösse der Krise und der unbekannten Elemente, die sie enthielt, gestaltete sich die Planung schwierig. Lösungen wurden häufig ad hoc getroffen. Welche längerfristigen Erkenntnisse lassen sich aus der Krise ziehen? Wie lässt sich das durch die Krisenerfahrung gewonnene Wissen sichern und zur Verbesserung der personellen, institutionellen und materiellen Infrastruktur des Krisenmanagements nutzen? Um diese und weitere Fragen rund um das Thema Flüchtlingskrise zu diskutieren und den Erfahrungsaustausch zwischen Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz (D-A-CH) zu fördern, organisierte das Center for Security Studies (CSS) gemeinsam mit dem Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz (BABS) vom 27.-28. Oktober 2016 einen D-A-CH Expertenworkshop in Zürich. Die vielfältigen Beiträge und Diskussionen sind im kürzlich erschienenen Workshop-Bericht dargestellt.1 In Ergänzung hierzu präsentiert das vorliegende Dokument, basierend auf den Workshop-Beiträgen, einige der zentralen Herausforderungen der Flüchtlingskrise in stark verdichteter Form. Zudem werden einige der diskutierten Lösungsansätze umrissen. Im Folgenden werden zunächst die auf politisch-strategischer Ebene relevanten Herausforderungen und Lösungswege skizziert. Anschliessend werden Erkenntnisse, die primär auf operativer Ebene wichtig sind, aufgeführt.

Resilience has become a dominant paradigm in a wide range of risk and security agendas. In this article we describe the modes in which resilience approaches in the domain of civil protection responsibilize social actors and citizens to 'do their part'. We also examine some of the problems such attempts to 'make the people resilient' might raise. Specifically, by using an historical case study of the Swiss civil defense system as example illustrating how a political agenda can be used to proliferate individual responsibility for societal safety and security through instruction, we argue that measures labeled as 'resilience-building' can easily fail to meet their stated goals. Policies aiming at building resilience in a top-down fashion risk becoming counterproductive, especially if public policy aims to persuade or 'nudge' individual perceptions and behavior, as people feel manipulated or scared. It appears imperative to address the political and ethical boundaries of resilience-building efforts in order to understand and improve the effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of current resilience policies.

Accurate and timely maps are a vital resource in contemporary disaster and crisis management. Maps are essential for identifying vulnerabilities, monitoring the effects of disasters and organizing countermeasures. Traditionally, the mapping of crises was the exclusive domain of experts, including cartographers and crisis management professionals. But with the growing availability of participatory information and communications technology, this monopoly is disappearing. Recent disasters have witnessed a new generation of online maps, created by civil society actors and relying on volunteers to collect, organize, verify, visualize, and share geo-referenced information. To address the emerging phenomenon of crisis mapping with a particular focus on the Swiss context, the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the ETH Zürich, the Swiss Federal Office for Civil Protection (BABS,) and the Institute of Geomatics Engineering at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland (FHNW) jointly organized an expert workshop. The event was conducted at the Center for Security Studies in Zürich on 5 September 2013. As the discussion showed, realizing the potential of crowdsourced crisis mapping for professional disaster and crisis management remains a challenge on many levels, including technical as well as social and political issues. In order to overcome these challenges, it will be particularly important to improve the coordination of the different social actors to develop joint strategies to integrate crisis mapping into prevention and response processes in crisis and disaster management.

Resilience has become a dominant paradigm in a wide range of risk and security agendas. In this article we describe the modes in which resilience approaches in the domain of civil protection responsibilize social actors and citizens to 'do their part'. We also examine some of the problems such attempts to 'make the people resilient' might raise. Specifically, by using an historical case study of the Swiss civil defense system as example illustrating how a political agenda can be used to proliferate individual responsibility for societal safety and security through instruction, we argue that measures labeled as 'resilience-building' can easily fail to meet their stated goals. Policies aiming at building resilience in a top-down fashion risk becoming counterproductive, especially if public policy aims to persuade or 'nudge' individual perceptions and behavior, as people feel manipulated or scared. It appears imperative to address the political and ethical boundaries of resilience-building efforts in order to understand and improve the effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of current resilience policies. ; ISSN:1866-2447 ; ISSN:2191-7582

Today, the majority of the globe's inhabitants live in urban areas. According to all forecasts cities will continue to grow in the coming decades. At the same time, cities have become increasingly connected as a result of economic, political and cultural globalization. In the context of urban security, the growing complexity these connections bring may present a double-edged sword: cities can be both the most secure, or most dangeropus places when disaster strikes. The very characteristics of urban life – such as population concentrations, compact architectural structures, diverse socio-demographics, as well as complex, interconnected infrastructure systems – present both challenges and opportunities in terms of managing disasters in cities.

This report assessed and analyzed the current state of Switzerland's disaster management at the city level. More specifically, the study provides an overview of how major Swiss cities prepare and plan for large-scale disasters. The study examined cities' planning and organization concerning the major risks they identified. A key element of the analysis was an examination of the institutional set-up that cities have put in place in the area of disaster prevention and management The present study was designed as a qualitative case description of Switzerland's largest urban areas. Seven major Swiss cities and their agglomerations were selected for the study: Zurich, Geneva, Basel, Bern, Lausanne, Lucerne, and Lugano. The results of the analysis provides a systematic and deeper understanding of the role Swiss cities are playing in modern civil protection: First, conducting systematic risk analyses is a relatively recent development in Swiss cities, and is as such characterized by a marked diversity in approaches. On the political-strategic level, legal mandates, plans and strategies are less established in this area than in the response phase. Also, on the operational level, little standardization exists across cities with regard to how risk identification and analyses are carried out. Second, to fulfill their tasks, civil protection organizations depend on a broad array of partners and resources. Results from this analysis demonstrate that three factors are particularly important in urban disaster management practice: adequate financial support, and other resources; political support (both at the city level, and at higher levels); and a strong partnership with the public. Third, institutional ambiguities impacts on civil protection efficiency. While responsibilities are clear in legal terms, responsibility, competency, and task sharing are in reality rather complicated in Switzerland's subsidiary system. These challenges are further intensified by accelerated urbanization. A clearer allocation of responsibilities across the different political levels, acknowledging the changing role of cities in civil protection would help cities establish more systematic and steady structures (institutional organization, budget, etc.) for disaster management. This means tailoring initiatives and concepts developed at higher political levels to the operational needs of the city. While in normal times, cooperation between the city and the federal level works well, the decentralized system underlines potential weaknesses in large-scale events.

When a crisis is unfolding, people no longer wait for an official statement from government actors; rather they turn to the news media, they go to Twitter or Facebook, they log onto forums and blogs, etc., because they expect information and they can get it quickly from various sources. In such a dynamic information environment, if a government lacks a policy on how to use social media, particularly in crisis situations (meaning it does not act, or act appropriately), then it may face a loss of credibility and struggle with the management of a crisis. To get ahead of this curve, debating the risks and opportunities of using social media is a critical first step to building a sound social media policy and identifying certain engagement guidelines. This report examines four different issue areas to analyze how social media is used in the context of risk and crisis communication. These areas include: public safety and preparedness; emergency warnings, alerts and requests for assistance; recovery efforts; and, finally, monitoring and situational awareness. In the context of each of these areas, we highlight the key literature and real-life examples to explore the risks vs. opportunities in the utility of social media. These four areas capture the role of engagement and strategy in both the risk and crisis space.