Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism
In: Journal of political economy, Band 121, Heft 1, S. 186-219
ISSN: 1537-534X
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In: Journal of political economy, Band 121, Heft 1, S. 186-219
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: American economic review, Band 103, Heft 5, S. 2050-2051
ISSN: 1944-7981
The matching with contracts model (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) is widely considered to be one of the most important advances of the last two decades in matching theory. One of their main messages is that the set of stable allocations is non-empty under a substitutes condition. We show that an additional irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition is implicitly assumed throughout their analysis, and in the absence of IRC several of their results, including the guaranteed existence of a stable allocation, fail to hold. (JEL C78, D86)
In: American economic review, Band 103, Heft 1, S. 80-106
ISSN: 1944-7981
In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Our methodology formalizes how the old mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism, including the new one. A number of similar transitions took place in England after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes. (JEL C78, D82, H75, I21, I28)
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 4, S. 1636-1652
ISSN: 1944-7981
Empirical and experimental evidence suggests different levels of sophistication among families in the Boston Public School student assignment plan. We analyze the preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism with sincere players who report their true preferences and sophisticated players who play a best response. We characterize the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes as the set of stable matchings of a modified economy, where sincere students lose priority to sophisticated students. Any sophisticated student weakly prefers her assignment under the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium of the Boston mechanism to her assignment under the recently adopted student-optimal stable mechanism. (JEL D82, I21)
In: American economic review, Band 93, Heft 3, S. 729-747
ISSN: 1944-7981
A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.
In: American economic review, Band 92, Heft 5, S. 1669-1686
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: Oxford review of economic policy, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 676-704
ISSN: 1460-2121
In: American economic review, Band 114, Heft 4, S. 1070-1106
ISSN: 1944-7981
We present a proof-of-concept for minimalist market design (Sönmez 2023) as an effective methodology to enhance an institution based on stakeholders' desiderata with minimal interference. Four objectives— respecting merit, increasing retention, aligning talent, and enhancing trust—guided reforms to the US Army's centralized branching process of cadets to military specialties since 2006. USMA's mechanism for the class of 2020 exacerbated challenges in implementing these objectives. Formulating the Army's desiderata as rigorous axioms, we analyze their implications. Under our minimalist approach to institution redesign, the Army's objectives uniquely identify a branching mechanism. Our design is now adopted at USMA and ROTC. (JEL D47, H56, J45)
In: Journal of mechanism and institution design: JMID, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 45-82
ISSN: 2399-8458
In: NBER Working Paper No. w22109
SSRN
Working paper
In: American economic review, Band 110, Heft 7, S. 2198-2224
ISSN: 1944-7981
Over the last 15 years, kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and full benefits from exchange can be realized only if they do. We propose incentivizing compatible pairs to participate in exchange by insuring their patients against future renal failure via increased priority in deceased-donor queue. We analyze equity and welfare benefits of this scheme through a new dynamic continuum model. We calibrate the model with US data and quantify substantial gains from adopting incentivized exchange, both in terms of access to living-donor transplants and reduced competition for deceased-donor transplants. (JEL D47, I11, I12, I18)
In: NBER Working Paper No. w25024
SSRN
Working paper
In: American economic review, Band 97, Heft 3, S. 828-851
ISSN: 1944-7981
Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types. (JEL C78, I12)
In: American economic review, Band 95, Heft 2, S. 376-380
ISSN: 1944-7981