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Working paper
The IT Revolution and Southern Europe's Two Lost Decades
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12843
SSRN
Working paper
The IT Revolution and Southern Europe's Two Lost Decades
SSRN
Working paper
Are They All Like Bill, Mark, and Steve? The Education Premium for Entrepreneurs
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12312
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Working paper
Exports and Wages: Rent Sharing, Workforce Composition, or Returns to Skills?
In: Journal of labor economics: JOLE, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 945-978
ISSN: 1537-5307
Demand or productivity: what determines firm growth?
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 47, Heft 3, S. 608-630
ISSN: 1756-2171
We disentangle the contribution of unobserved heterogeneity in demand and productivity to firm growth using Italian data containing unique information on firm‐level prices. Demand and total factor productivity (TFP) shocks are equally important in shaping firm growth. However, the pass‐through of shocks to growth is highly incomplete, more so for productivity shocks. We argue that incompleteness and asymmetry of the pass‐through can be explained by frictions that, unlike those studied by the literature on factor misallocation, have differential effects according to the nature of the shock. We propose hurdles to firms' ability to reorganize as an example of these types of frictions.
Corporate control and executive selection
In firms with concentrated ownership the controlling shareholder may pursue nonmonetary private returns, such as electoral goals in a firm controlled by politicians or family prestige in family firms. We use a simple theoretical model to analyze how this mechanism affects the selection of executives and, through this, the firm's productivity compared to a benchmark where the owner only cares about the value of the firm. We discuss identification and derive two structural estimates of the model, based on different sample moments. The estimates, based on a matched employer–employee data set of Italian firms, suggest that private returns are larger in family- and government-controlled firms than in firms controlled by a conglomerate or by a foreign entity. The resulting distortion in executive selection can account for total factor productivity differentials between control types of up to 10%.
BASE
Exports and Wages: Rent Sharing, Workforce Composition or Returns to Skills?
In: Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano Development Studies Working Paper No. 333
SSRN
Working paper
Entry Barriers in Retail Trade
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 121, Heft 551, S. 145-170
ISSN: 1468-0297
Spillovers in Industrial Districts
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 117, Heft 516, S. 68-93
ISSN: 1468-0297
Identifying the Sources of Local Productivity Growth
In: Local Economies and Internationalization in Italy Conference, p. 93, 2003
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Working paper
Exports and Wages: Rent Sharing, Workforce Composition or Returns to Skills?
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 6466
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Interlocking Directorates and Competition in Banking
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 1173
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Interlocking Directorates and Competition in Banking
We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation which forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 16 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment and sales.
BASE
Credit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 132, Heft 641, S. 391-423
ISSN: 1468-0297
Abstract
Using data on bank-firm relationships in Italy during the Eurozone financial crisis, we show that: (i) compared to healthy banks, under-capitalised banks cut credit to healthy but not to zombie firms and are more likely to prolong a credit relationship with a zombie; (ii) in area sectors with more low-capital banks, zombies are more likely to survive; (iii) bank under-capitalisation does not hurt the growth rate of healthy firms. We provide evidence that extending credit to the weakest firms during the recession mitigated the disruption of supply chains and adverse local demand externalities.