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Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force From Korea to Kosovo by Jeffrey Record
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 118, Heft 1, S. 147
ISSN: 0032-3195
Divergent beliefs in "Bargaining and the nature of war": a reply to Fey and Ramsay
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 50, Heft 4, S. 614-618
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
Political institutions, coercive diplomacy, and the duration of economic sanctions
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 48, Heft 2, S. 154-172
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
Bargaining and the nature of war
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 48, Heft 6, S. 783-813
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
Mediation and peacekeeping in a random walk model of civil and interstate war
In: International studies review, Band 5, Heft 4, S. 115-135
ISSN: 1521-9488
World Affairs Online
Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation
In: American political science review, Band 97, Heft 2, S. 333-338
ISSN: 0003-0554
Understanding victory: Why political institutions matter
In: International security, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 168-179
ISSN: 0162-2889
World Affairs Online
A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 44, Heft 3, S. 451-480
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
Democracy, war initiation, and victory
In: American political science review, Band 92, Heft 2, S. 377-389
ISSN: 0003-0554
How do nation-states' political institutions affect the relations between states? This article addresses that question by testing the predictions of different theories linking political institutions to war outcomes. Specifically, rent-seeking and regime legitimacy theories predict that all democratic belligerents are more likely to win wars because they fight more effectively. Alternatively, other theories focusing on the domestic political vulnerability of leaders and the marketplace of ideas predict that democracies are likely to be more careful about choosing when to start war. This would mean that only democratic initiators are more likely to win. Analyzing all interstate wars from 1816 to 1982 with a multivariate probit model, we find that democratic initiators are significantly more likely to win wars; democratic targets are also more likely to win, though the relationship is not as strong. We also find empirical support for several control variables, including strategy, terrain, and capability. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
World Affairs Online
Courting disaster: an expanded NATO vs. Russia and China
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 113, S. 361-382
ISSN: 0032-3195
Examines plans for NATO expansion, potential power and dangers of a Russia-China alliance, objections and rebuttals to admitting Russia to NATO, and Chinese reaction to it.
How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders
In: International organization, Band 68, Heft 3, S. 527-559
ISSN: 0020-8183
Predicting the length of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq war
In: Foreign policy analysis: a journal of the International Studies Association, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 101-115
ISSN: 1743-8586
World Affairs Online
A cross-validation of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's international interaction game
In: British journal of political science, Band 30, Heft 4, S. 541-560
ISSN: 0007-1234
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's version of an expected utility theory of war is one of the most widely cited theories of international conflict. However, the testing of the theory has lagged its theoretical development. To date, the theory has been tested on only 707 dyad-years, all drawn from Europe between 1816 and 1970. We present a broader test of War and Reason's expected utility theory of war using the same methods as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman. Our tests include the full international system from 1816 to 1984. We find that the theory receives empirical support using the set of politically relevant dyads for testing, but the relationship is less clear among the population of all interstate dyads. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)
World Affairs Online
Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 44, Heft 5, S. 653-685
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
Researchers face three basic questions when testing theoretically driven hypotheses. First is research design: for example, what population should be analyzed, what sample should be drawn from that population, & what cases should be excluded from the sample? What statistical estimator should one use? What set of control variables should one employ? Results drawn from several permutations of the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute data set are compared using three statistical models. For some theories & variables (international institutionalism -- intergovernmental organization & alliance membership; realism -- balance of power; expected utility theory -- international interaction game equilibria), research design & estimator choices substantially influence the findings. For others (trade & democratic peace theory), the relationship between the dependent & independent variables is relatively impervious to research design & estimator choices. 7 Tables, 2 Appendixes, 39 References. Adapted from the source document.