Suchergebnisse

Le système partisan représente un poste d'observation privilégié pour étudier la crise systémique de l'État égyptien. En même temps, il constitue une arène au sein de laquelle l'État cherche à résoudre cette crise à travers les élections, afin de trouver un nouveau modèle pour ses relations avec la société. L'ancien parti hégémonique (le parti national démocratique, PND) était entré en crise dès les années 1990, du fait de la montée en puissance de nouvelles élites sociales, principalement les hommes d'affaires. Parallèlement, les partis d'opposition étaient trop faibles pour attirer ces nouvelles élites, ou même pour jouer un rôle dans l'expression de la demande sociale. Ils se sont également avérés incapables de remplir le vide laissé par la dissolution du PND en 2011, laissant le champ libre à l'islam politique, malgré la croissance du corps électoral et la politisation du vote pendant la période 2011-2013. Mais soutenus principalement par les zones pauvres et marginalisées du Sud et des frontières du pays, les islamistes durent faire face à l'hostilité des populations du cœur de l'Égypte (Le Caire, Alexandrie, le Delta et le Canal) lorsqu'ils parvinrent au pouvoir en 2012. Depuis leur chute en 2013, le régime a essayé de mettre en place différents modèles de lien entre l'État et la société : formation d'une nouvelle élite à travers la création du Parti de l'Avenir de la Patrie, coalition nationale des partis séculiers existants, ou fusion desdits partis en trois ou quatre entités. Jusqu'à présent, toutes ces tentatives ont tourné court, et un nouveau modèle de relation entre l'État égyptien et sa société reste à trouver.

International audience ; The results of the 2011–12 Egyptian elections highlight the gap that exists between the 'emotional' and the 'rational' conceptions of the people and its representation. If the revolutionary moment had allowed some organizations to temporarily gain legitimacy to speak in the name of the people, these organizations have been ill-equipped to compete within the existing structure of the social cleavages. This article examines the electoral system, the lack of resources at the disposal of the revolutionaries, the polarization of the political field around the religious issue, and the difficulties involved in conciliating between the electoral campaign and street activism.

International audience ; The results of the 2011–12 Egyptian elections highlight the gap that exists between the 'emotional' and the 'rational' conceptions of the people and its representation. If the revolutionary moment had allowed some organizations to temporarily gain legitimacy to speak in the name of the people, these organizations have been ill-equipped to compete within the existing structure of the social cleavages. This article examines the electoral system, the lack of resources at the disposal of the revolutionaries, the polarization of the political field around the religious issue, and the difficulties involved in conciliating between the electoral campaign and street activism.

International audience ; The results of the 2011–12 Egyptian elections highlight the gap that exists between the 'emotional' and the 'rational' conceptions of the people and its representation. If the revolutionary moment had allowed some organizations to temporarily gain legitimacy to speak in the name of the people, these organizations have been ill-equipped to compete within the existing structure of the social cleavages. This article examines the electoral system, the lack of resources at the disposal of the revolutionaries, the polarization of the political field around the religious issue, and the difficulties involved in conciliating between the electoral campaign and street activism.

International audience ; The results of the 2011–12 Egyptian elections highlight the gap that exists between the 'emotional' and the 'rational' conceptions of the people and its representation. If the revolutionary moment had allowed some organizations to temporarily gain legitimacy to speak in the name of the people, these organizations have been ill-equipped to compete within the existing structure of the social cleavages. This article examines the electoral system, the lack of resources at the disposal of the revolutionaries, the polarization of the political field around the religious issue, and the difficulties involved in conciliating between the electoral campaign and street activism.

International audience ; The results of the 2011–12 Egyptian elections highlight the gap that exists between the 'emotional' and the 'rational' conceptions of the people and its representation. If the revolutionary moment had allowed some organizations to temporarily gain legitimacy to speak in the name of the people, these organizations have been ill-equipped to compete within the existing structure of the social cleavages. This article examines the electoral system, the lack of resources at the disposal of the revolutionaries, the polarization of the political field around the religious issue, and the difficulties involved in conciliating between the electoral campaign and street activism.

International audience ; The results of the 2011–12 Egyptian elections highlight the gap that exists between the 'emotional' and the 'rational' conceptions of the people and its representation. If the revolutionary moment had allowed some organizations to temporarily gain legitimacy to speak in the name of the people, these organizations have been ill-equipped to compete within the existing structure of the social cleavages. This article examines the electoral system, the lack of resources at the disposal of the revolutionaries, the polarization of the political field around the religious issue, and the difficulties involved in conciliating between the electoral campaign and street activism.

International audience ; This article examines how, in a context of conflicting identities and collapsing of states through the Middle East, the model of an Egyptian nation-state has been conversely reinforced during the recent revolutionary and counter-revolutionary waves.At first, the liberation of speech during the 2011-2013 period of the "Arab Spring" allowed the public expression of competing models (pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism, Coptic ethno-nationalism, regionalism) of imagined communities. At the same time, however, the national flag became the most widespread symbol of the revolution, appropriated by all the political actors, from the leftists to the Salafis. Since 2013, the expression of diverging identity views has been disqualified within the political field. Thus, the affirmation of alternative models of identity is occasionally taking a violent path, especially in the North-Sinaï region, where regionalist feelings meet the pan-Islamism of jihadis insurgent movements. Simultaneously, the state has been trying to co-opt some of the most prominent identities, with a first official recognition of the Nubian culture within the 2014 Constitution, and with the adoption of quota for Coptic candidates in the Parliament and local councils.

International audience ; This article examines how, in a context of conflicting identities and collapsing of states through the Middle East, the model of an Egyptian nation-state has been conversely reinforced during the recent revolutionary and counter-revolutionary waves.At first, the liberation of speech during the 2011-2013 period of the "Arab Spring" allowed the public expression of competing models (pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism, Coptic ethno-nationalism, regionalism) of imagined communities. At the same time, however, the national flag became the most widespread symbol of the revolution, appropriated by all the political actors, from the leftists to the Salafis. Since 2013, the expression of diverging identity views has been disqualified within the political field. Thus, the affirmation of alternative models of identity is occasionally taking a violent path, especially in the North-Sinaï region, where regionalist feelings meet the pan-Islamism of jihadis insurgent movements. Simultaneously, the state has been trying to co-opt some of the most prominent identities, with a first official recognition of the Nubian culture within the 2014 Constitution, and with the adoption of quota for Coptic candidates in the Parliament and local councils.

International audience ; This article examines how, in a context of conflicting identities and collapsing of states through the Middle East, the model of an Egyptian nation-state has been conversely reinforced during the recent revolutionary and counter-revolutionary waves.At first, the liberation of speech during the 2011-2013 period of the "Arab Spring" allowed the public expression of competing models (pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism, Coptic ethno-nationalism, regionalism) of imagined communities. At the same time, however, the national flag became the most widespread symbol of the revolution, appropriated by all the political actors, from the leftists to the Salafis. Since 2013, the expression of diverging identity views has been disqualified within the political field. Thus, the affirmation of alternative models of identity is occasionally taking a violent path, especially in the North-Sinaï region, where regionalist feelings meet the pan-Islamism of jihadis insurgent movements. Simultaneously, the state has been trying to co-opt some of the most prominent identities, with a first official recognition of the Nubian culture within the 2014 Constitution, and with the adoption of quota for Coptic candidates in the Parliament and local councils.

International audience ; The party system represents a privileged observation post for studying the systemic crisis of the Egyptian state. At the same time, it constitutes an arena in which the state seeks to resolve this crisis through elections, in order to find a new model for its relations with society.The former hegemonic party (the National Democratic Party, NDP) had entered into crisis as early as in the 1990s, due to the rise of new social elites, mainly businessmen. At the same time, the opposition parties were too weak to attract these new elites, or even to play a role in expressing social demand. They also proved unable to fill the vacuum left by the dissolution of the NDP in 2011, leaving the field open to political Islam, despite the growth of the electorate and the politicisation of the vote during the period 2011-2013. But supported mainly by the poor and marginalised areas in the South and along the country's borders, Islamists had to face hostility from the people in the heart of Egypt (Cairo, Alexandria, the Delta and the Canal) when they came to power in 2012.Since their fall in 2013, the regime has tried to set up different models for linking the state and society: the formation of a new elite through the creation of the Future of the Homeland Party, a national coalition of existing secular parties, or the merging of the aforesaid parties into three or four entities. So far, all these attempts have failed, and a new model for the relationship between the Egyptian state and its society has yet to be found. ; Le système partisan représente un poste d'observation privilégié pour étudier la crise systémique de l'État égyptien. En même temps, il constitue une arène au sein de laquelle l'État cherche à résoudre cette crise à travers les élections, afin de trouver un nouveau modèle pour ses relations avec la société.L'ancien parti hégémonique (le parti national démocratique, PND) était entré en crise dès les années 1990, du fait de la montée en puissance de nouvelles élites sociales, principalement ...

International audience ; This article examines how, in a context of conflicting identities and collapsing of states through the Middle East, the model of an Egyptian nation-state has been conversely reinforced during the recent revolutionary and counter-revolutionary waves.At first, the liberation of speech during the 2011-2013 period of the "Arab Spring" allowed the public expression of competing models (pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism, Coptic ethno-nationalism, regionalism) of imagined communities. At the same time, however, the national flag became the most widespread symbol of the revolution, appropriated by all the political actors, from the leftists to the Salafis. Since 2013, the expression of diverging identity views has been disqualified within the political field. Thus, the affirmation of alternative models of identity is occasionally taking a violent path, especially in the North-Sinaï region, where regionalist feelings meet the pan-Islamism of jihadis insurgent movements. Simultaneously, the state has been trying to co-opt some of the most prominent identities, with a first official recognition of the Nubian culture within the 2014 Constitution, and with the adoption of quota for Coptic candidates in the Parliament and local councils.