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AbstractRecent scholarship on retrospective voting has shown that when they go to the polls, voters evaluate not only incumbent performance, but also the performance of parties in opposition. So far, however, these studies have not been able to identify how voters evaluate the performance of parties in opposition. The answers to a unique open-ended question included in a Belgian electoral survey in 2019 provide new insights into voters' minds. First, this study investigates what voters think about when they evaluate a party's performance in opposition. Second, it tests whether voters hold opposition parties responsible for the state of affairs in the country. The results show that voters are most concerned with opposition parties' competence in scrutinizing the government and providing constructive criticism, and dislike unconstructive and overly negative opposition. Furthermore, voters hold opposition parties accountable for the state of affairs in their country, albeit to a lesser extent than incumbent parties.

This study draws attention to an important distinction between different types of models in the field of retrospective voting, namely static and dynamic models. Both types of models are often used interchangeably, but their interpretation and implications are fundamentally different. Furthermore, while both types have been used in aggregate‐level studies, so far, most studies on the individual level rely on static models. However, there is a specific research interest in individual‐level dynamic models. This article introduces the dynamic model at the individual level, and discusses its methodological advantages and disadvantages. It concludes with an empirical application, indicating how different model specifications lead to a different interpretation of model coefficients, and the applicability of previous research findings on the individual level.Related ArticlesDyck, Joshua, and Annika Hagley. 2012. "Political Geography, Direct Democracy, and the Reasoning Voter: Spatial Proximity, Symbolic Politics, and Voting on California's Proposition 83." Politics & Policy 40 (2): 195‐220. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00346.xNielson, Lindsay. 2017. "Ranked Choice Voting and Attitudes toward Democracy in the United States: Results from a Survey Experiment." Politics & Policy 45 (4): 535‐570. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12212Stegmaier, Mary, and Michael S. Lewis‐Beck. 2009. "Learning the Economic Vote: Hungarian Forecasts, 1998‐2010." Politics & Policy 37 (4): 769‐780. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2009.00197.x

This research note adds to the emerging body of literature arguing that retrospective voting works on the level of political parties – for government and opposition parties alike – by investigating the generalisability of previous research findings. Furthermore, it tests whether there is a knowledge gap in retrospective voting on the party level. Using the data of the Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES), support is found for the argument that mechanisms of electoral accountability work both for incumbent and opposition parties. Second, while previous research raised doubts on the electorate's ability to hold governments accountable, there is no evidence of a knowledge gap in retrospective voting on the party level.

Retrospective voting is one of the most frequently investigated theories of voting behaviour. It postulates that voters punish or reward incumbent parties according to their performance. This approach, however, cannot explain why voters cast a stable opposition vote, or switch between incumbent parties or opposition parties, respectively. This study fills this gap by showing that this traditional view should be complemented with the approach of retrospective voting to work at the level of political parties – irrespective of their incumbency status. Using the data of the second module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, it provides the first large-scale test of this new perspective on electoral accountability. The results show that satisfaction with the previously endorsed party is an important determinant of the current party choice, and that it is so for voters for all parties alike. These results provide a theoretical foundation for party switches that could not be explained by the traditional model.

AbstractThe stability of divided societies is an important and recurring concern in political science research. It has been suggested that distinctive socialization processes in the different regions of divided societies will lead to diverging trends in public opinion. Therefore, we investigate trends in public opinion on key political issues and attitudes in three divided societies: Canada (Quebec), the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Spain (Catalonia). Using over two decades of survey data, we show that these distinct communities indeed have a particular ideological profile but also that there is no indication these differences become larger over time. In other words, we do not observe any evidence for an increasing lack of public opinion coherence in these divided societies. We conclude with some observations on why divergence could not be observed at the level of public opinion but might still be present at the level of party elites.

AbstractThere is an ongoing academic debate about the question whether sub‐state nationalist parties should be considered as niche parties, focusing almost exclusively on their core issue of centre‐periphery relations, or whether their electoral appeal can be considered as multidimensional. In that case, these other dimensions can vary with regard to the specific ideological position, historical circumstances and strategic considerations. In this article, we address this theoretical question by relying on the case study of the sub‐state nationalist parties in the Flemish region of Belgium, where they jointly obtained 44% of the vote in the most recent elections. Comparing election surveys from 2009, 2014 and 2019 suggests that the electoral appeal of these parties rests on a mixture of nationalist issues, right‐wing economic policies and a restrictive attitude towards immigration. These results suggest that sub‐state nationalist parties are not purely niche parties, but should be seen as multiple issue parties, and this broader electoral appeal can explain the discrepancy between electoral results and public opinion on the core issues of these parties.

AbstractA standard assumption in realistic threat theories is that the presence of ethnic minorities is associated with a rise of anti‐immigrant sentiments. However, we do not know whether this presence has a specific local effect, or whether one can detect a more general nationwide perception of threat. Using data from a recent Belgian population survey, we assess the association between ethnic diversity within the local community and anti‐immigrant sentiments. Results suggest a strong negative association between the level of ethnic diversity and anti‐immigrant sentiments. Furthermore, while we do not find evidence for an association between ethnic diversity and radical right voting on the individual level, there is a strong negative correlation on the aggregate level. We conclude with some speculation about how anti‐immigrant sentiments are created in areas with a very low levels of ethnic diversity, and what this implies for the electoral potential of radical‐right parties.

Holding the government accountable is a crucial function of elections. The extent to which voters can actually do so depends on the political system. One element that may influence the likelihood that voters hold the government accountable is the difference between wholesale and partial alternation. Prominent political scientists like Mair, Bergman and Strøm and Pellegata and Quaranta propose that in countries with wholesale alternation voters are better able to hold governments accountable because in essence voters have the choice to keep their current government or 'throw the rascals out'. However, this relationship has not been tested. We examine the relationship between partial and wholesale alternation and retrospective voting in a large-N cross-country study. We show that the association between government satisfaction and vote choice is stronger in countries with wholesale alternation than in systems with partial alternation.

It has been assumed that a trend toward devolution within a federal country would be associated with a growing apart of public opinion, and the federal kingdom of Belgium is routinely cited as an obvious example in this regard. Since the publication of the seminal Billiet et al. article, more competences have been devolved toward the autonomous regions, and in this research note we update the expectation that this has led to a further growing apart of public opinion in the country. Based on both electoral studies (2009/2014/2019), and the European Social Survey (2002–2018) we investigate whether these institutional differences are associated with a growing apart of public opinion in the regions of Belgium. Our results suggest that while there are clear attitudinal differences between the two major groups in the country, these differences are stable throughout the three-decade observation period. Differences are becoming more outspoken, however, with regard to the preferred extent of federalism. Interestingly, however, the dynamics in public opinion in this regard do not follow the same pattern as electoral results would suggest.

In this study, we explore heterogeneity in the relationship between dissatisfaction with democratic representation and voting for a populist party. More specifically, we argue that numerous citizens are dissatisfied with modern political elites and processes, but that not all are attracted by populist parties' programmatic appeal. In particular, while citizens with stealth democratic attitudes are also dissatisfied with democratic representation – similar to citizens with populist ideas – voters with high levels of stealth democracy hold preferences for alternative forms of representation other than those proposed by populist parties. Hence, although stealth democrats are similar to populists on the attitudinal level, they will not be appealed to vote for a populist party. Analyses using the data of the Finnish Election Studies provide support for our hypotheses.