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System Justification Theory posits that individuals are less prone to engage in radical action against a system on which they depend. In the present research, we investigated how the association between system‐justifying tendencies and radical intentions is moderated by individuals' orientation towards power differentials, namely their "power distance." A stronger power distance orientation implies that individuals perceive power differentials as a fixed feature of society, curtailing prospects for change. We hypothesized that, at lower levels of power distance orientation, system‐justification tendencies would be associated with reduced radical intentions. We contend this will occur because individuals feel dependent on a system perceived as malleable (dependency hypothesis). Conversely, at higher levels of power distance orientation, we expected system‐justification tendencies to be associated with stronger radical intentions. We argue that this effect reflects the rejection of dependency on a system perceived as fixed (counterdependency hypothesis). This dependency‐counterdependency dynamic was tested using a multigroup latent structural equation model and samples from four countries (NTotal = 2,502), South Korea, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Results were consistent with the hypothesized dynamic across all countries. Theoretical implications of the findings, limitations, and future research directions are discussed.

The coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented health crisis. Many governments around the world have responded by implementing lockdown measures of various degrees of intensity. To be effective, these measures must rely on citizens' cooperation. In the present study, we drew samples from the United States (N = 597), Italy (N = 606), and South Korea (N = 693) and examined predictors of compliance with social distancing and intentions to report the infection to both authorities and acquaintances. Data were collected between April 6th and 8th 2020. We investigated the role of cultural orientations of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism, self-conscious emotions of shame and guilt related to the infection and trust in the government's action. Across all countries, vertical collectivism (VC) predicted stronger shame, whereas horizontal collectivism predicted stronger trust in the government. Only in the United States, VC was associated with stronger trust. Stronger feelings of shame predicted lower compliance and intentions to report the infection to both authorities and acquaintances. In contrast, guilt was associated with stronger intentions to report the infection to the authorities. Finally, trust was associated with stronger compliance and intentions to report the infection to the authorities. Unlike Italy and South Korea, the association between trust on compliance was not statistically significant in the United States, implications of the findings, and directions for future research are discussed.

The coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented health crisis. Many governments around the world have responded by implementing lockdown measures of various degrees of intensity. To be effective, these measures must rely on citizens' cooperation. In the present study, we drew samples from the United States (N = 597), Italy (N = 606) and South Korea (N = 693) and examined predictors of compliance with social distancing and intentions to report the infection to both authorities and acquaintances. Data were collected between April 6th and 8th 2020. We investigated the role of cultural orientations of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism, self-conscious emotions of shame and guilt related to the infection and trust in the government's action. Across all countries, vertical collectivism predicted stronger shame, whereas horizontal collectivism predicted stronger trust in the government. Only in the United States, vertical collectivism was associated with stronger trust. Stronger feelings of shame predicted lower compliance and intentions to report the infection to both authorities and acquaintances. In contrast, guilt was associated with stronger intentions to report the infection to the authorities. Finally, trust was associated with stronger compliance and intentions to report the infection to the authorities. Unlike Italy and South Korea, the association between trust on compliance was not statistically significant in the United States, Implications of the findings, and directions for future research are discussed.

The cultural dimension of power distance refers to individuals' acceptance of power inequalities in society. Countries characterized by high power distance at the collective level face more domestic extremism. However, research has yet to examine how individual differences in power distance orientation may affect individuals' intentions to engage in radical and violent political action. In this research, we test the hypothesis that stronger endorsement of power distance values makes people more prone to express the intentions to engage in radical and violent political action. To test the hypothesis' generalizability across contexts, we sample from two countries characterized by different levels of power distance at the collective level, South Korea (higher power distance) and the United States (lower power distance). Studies 1a and 1b were surveys (Ntot = 1,214) demonstrating an association between power distance orientation and radical political action over and beyond other known predictors of political participation, including political efficacy, perceived justice, emotions of anger and contempt, political orientation, and social dominance orientation. In Studies 2a-2c (Ntot = 430; 2c preregistered), priming a higher (vs lower) power distance orientation heightened individuals' propensity to express the intentions to engage in radical political action. Theoretical implications of the findings, and future research directions, are discussed.

A few weeks prior to the EU referendum (23rd June 2016) two broadly representative samples of the electorate were drawn in Kent (the south‐east of England, N = 1,001) and Scotland (N = 1,088) for online surveys that measured their trust in politicians, concerns about acceptable levels of immigration, threat from immigration, European identification, and voting intention. We tested an aversion amplification hypothesis that the impact of immigration concerns on threat and identification would be amplified when political trust was low. We hypothesized that the effect of aversion amplification on voting intentions would be mediated first by perceived threat from immigration, and then by (dis) identification with Europe. Results in both samples were consistent with this hypothesis and suggest that voters were most likely to reject the political status quo (choose Brexit) when concerns that immigration levels were too high were combined with a low level of trust in politicians.

A few weeks prior to the EU referendum (23rd June 2016) two broadly representative samples of the electorate were drawn in Kent (the south-east of England, N = 1,001) and Scotland (N = 1,088) for online surveys that measured their trust in politicians, concerns about acceptable levels of immigration, threat from immigration, European identification, and voting intention. We tested an aversion amplification hypothesis that the impact of immigration concerns on threat and identification would be amplified when political trust was low. We hypothesized that the effect of aversion amplification on voting intentions would be mediated first by perceived threat from immigration, and then by (dis) identification with Europe. Results in both samples were consistent with this hypothesis and suggest that voters were most likely to reject the political status quo (choose Brexit) when concerns that immigration levels were too high were combined with a low level of trust in politicians.

Previous research (Zick et al. 2008) suggested that animosity toward social minorities in Europe is intertwined, forming a syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity (GFE). In the current research, we extended the notion of GFE by identifying the GFE structure in a non-European context (South Korea). We also tested a novel hypothesis that stipulates an interplay between individuals' self-concept and their value orientation in predicting the overall level of GFE. Two nation-wide surveys in South Korea showed that antagonism toward social minorities that have typically been marginalized and devalued in that country forms GFE while reflecting the unique intergroup context of Korean society. Further, we found as expected that independence in self-concept and a collectivistic value orientation jointly predict lower levels of GFE (Study 1). When political orientation and national identification were taken into account, the predicted interaction was observed only on antagonism toward ingroup minorities but not toward outgroup minorities by race or ethnicity (Study 2). Implications of these findings and directions for research on GFE are discussed.

Criminal organizations have a strong influence on social, political, and economic life in Italy and other parts of the world. Nonetheless, local populations display collective passivity against organized crime, a phenomenon known as omertà. Omertà is linked to the concepts of honor and masculinity. That is, in order to fit ideological constructions of manliness, individuals should display indifference toward illegal activities and should not collaborate with legal institutions. In two studies, we investigated the link between endorsement of a masculine honor ideology and collective action intentions against criminal organizations (antimafia). Study 1 (N = 121) involved a Northern Italian sample, and Study 2 (N = 301) involved a Southern Italian sample. Across studies, results showed that endorsement of masculine honor ideology was associated with lower willingness to engage in social activism against criminal organizations. This relationship was mediated by attitudes toward criminal organizations (Study 1 and 2) and, in line with the notion of omertà, by lower levels of collective motive and more anxiety about interacting with police (Study 2). Directions for future research are discussed.

We conducted two studies examining the factors underlying individuals' legitimization of hackers (digital actors operating on the internet). Drawing on the social banditry framework, and research on political action, we focused on the mediating role of anger in the association between external political efficacy and perceived legitimization of hackers' actions. Specifically, we manipulated whether the system was responsive to participants' demands following unfair treatment in a university (Study 1) and in an online work platform (Study 2) context. In Study 1 (N = 259) British undergraduate students read about unfair 'grading' practices. They were then informed that the management was either willing (high external political efficacy) or unwilling (low external political efficacy) to investigate the matter. In Study 2 (N = 222), British participants were recruited via Prolific Academic and were presented with a scenario describing an unfair rejection of their work. They were then informed that the platform admin was either willing or not willing to investigate their case. Across studies, participants were informed that hackers had attacked the website. Supporting the social banditry framework, results indicated that individuals who perceive the system as unresponsive to their demands tended to legitimize hackers' actions via stronger perceived anger against the system. Implications of the results, and future directions are discussed.

People comply with governmental restrictions for different motives, notably because they are concerned about the issue at hand or because they trust their government to enact appropriate regulations. The present study focuses on the role of concern and political trust in people's willingness to comply with governmental restrictions during the Covid-19 pandemic. We conducted a survey amongst Italian and French participants (N = 372) in March 2020 while both countries had imposed full lockdown. Moreover, a subsample of participants reported on their actual levels of compliance one week later (N = 130). We hypothesised that either concern or trust should be sufficient to sustain participants' willingness to comply and actual behaviour, but that the absence of both (distrustful complacency) would reduce compliance significantly. Results supported this hypothesis. We discuss implications of the interaction between concern and trust for public behaviour strategies as the pandemic progresses.

This is Study 2 reported in a paper by Abrams, Travaglino et al. on the Deviant Ingroup Protection Effect, in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Methods complied with APA ethical standards and were approved by the University of Kent's Psychology ethics board (ID 2011855) The data are in an SPSS .sav file called DIP_Study2_Tax Design Participants viewed and evaluated either six In-Category or six Out-Category groups. Measures for the four 'consolidator'groups were averaged so that data were analysed in a 2 (Category: In-Category vs Out-Category) x 3 (Group: accentuator, consolidator, attenuator) design with repeated measures on the Group factor. Participants One-hundred-and-sixty-five US residents were recruited from the crowdsourcing platform Academic Prolific. To ensure there were equal numbers of participants in our Norm Validity factor (In-Category Valid vs. Out-Category Valid), participants were first pre-screened and answered the subjective validity measures from Experiment 1 to assess whether they thought US or EU norms on taxation were more valid. Participants were classified as belonging to the in-category valid condition if their mean score on the US subjective validity measure was greater than their score on the EU subjective validity measure. There were 80 participants in the in-category valid condition and 85 in the out-category condition. Participants were then randomly assigned to condition (85 in the In-Category condition, 80 in the Out-Category condition). Group Position (Attenuator, Consolidator, Accentuator) was the within participants factor. There were 94 males, 67 females, and four participants who identified as other. Procedure Participants read a short article on previous survey research on personal income tax that set out the views of the US and EU. The US was positioned as adopting a more liberal perspective on taxation, which gave citizens the right to spend their money as they pleased and limited the amount taken by Government. The EU was positioned as placing higher ...

Six experiments examined responses to groups whose attitudes deviated from wider social norms about asylum and immigration (in the United Kingdom), or taxation levels (in the U.S.). Subjective group dynamics (SGD) theory states that people derogate in-group individuals who deviate from prescriptive in-group norms. This enables members to sustain the subjective validity of those norms and, hence, a positive social identity. Research also shows that in-group deviants who accentuate the difference between the in-group and out-group norm (e.g. extremists) are derogated less than deviants who attenuate that difference (e.g. a member who veers toward the outgroup's norm; Abrams et al., 2000). We hypothesized that these effects and the associated group dynamics should scale up when people evaluate deviant groups that are part of larger in-categories. Consistent with SGD theory, participants in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 derogated an in-category attenuating deviant group and upgraded an out-category attenuating deviant group relative to groups that consolidated or accentuated the respective norms of those categories – thereby reinforcing in-category norms relative to out-category norms. Across all experiments, this pattern of differential evaluation was associated with greater subjective validity of the in-category norm. We also hypothesized a novel Deviant Ingroup Protection (DIP) effect, wherein people should curtail derogation of an in-category deviant group when that group is their own. Consistent with this hypothesis, , participants in Experiments 4, 5 and 6 evaluated an accentuating in-group (Experiments 4 and 6), or an attenuating in-group (Experiments 5 and 6) equally to or more positively than other in-category groups. Implications for political and organizational entrenchment are discussed.