Suchergebnisse

Sulla copertina del rapporto annuale del Ministero della difesa giapponese del 2021, o terzo anno dell'era Reiwa, si staglia nero il profilo dipinto a china di un guerriero a cavallo (kibamusha 騎馬武者) con arco. Il dipinto sulla copertina del Libro bianco della difesa attinge a piene mani dal repertorio della storia nazionale giapponese. In particolare, pare rievocare il lungo "medioevo" dell'arcipelago, epoca di conflitti brutali tra signori della guerra e incubatore della premodernità e delle trasformazioni della fine del XIX secolo. Un periodo segnato anche da scontri epocali con altre potenze regionali. Ma quanto quest'immagine assertiva rispecchia una percezione di minaccia concreta da parte della Repubblica Popolare Cinese (RPC), diffusa nella popolazione civile? Quanto questo desiderio di rivalsa e di protagonismo internazionale è in realtà solo uno schema elitario, un accesso di hỳbris di stato che ignora, con i suoi piani di semplificazione della complessa realtà che ci circonda?

In the late 1980s, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam, hereafter) underwent a period of reforms known as doi moi (renovation), opened its economy to global flows of goods and capitals and adopted an "omnidirectional" strategy aimed at building relations with former "enemy" states like Japan and the US. These multiple transitions presented the country's communist leadership with new challenges: first and foremost, transforming the country's governance from socialist to a partially neoliberal one in the attempt to accommodate international partners' and investors' demands. The present study will address the following research question: by which means did the Vietnamese leadership succeed in surviving the demise of the USSR and conform to the emerging neoliberal global order? Against the backdrop of the global rise of the good governance model for international development, this article will shed light on Japan's role during Vietnam's first phase of reforms in the early 1990s through its government-led knowledge-based aid initiatives up until the draft of the country's first Comprehensive Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy. It will argue that Japan offered a certain development know-how and a model of state-mediated growth which suited Vietnam's Communist party's needs to keep the single-party rule.

Japan ranks second in the world in terms of the number of Twitter users. Since 2009, under the Democratic Party's 3-year permanence in power, politicians and administrators have turned to Twitter massively to build a direct communication with their constituency. It was, however, only in 2017 that Twitter has become a propaganda tool and a locus of political debate among Japanese politicians and netizens. The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) is an exemplary case of this transition. Born a few weeks before the vote of 22 October 2017, it managed to get attention and consensus, also thanks to a massive use of social networks, and, finally, to confirm itself as the first opposition party. A year after its foundation, however, it has failed to broaden its electoral base and consolidate itself locally. However, the article aims to identify the factors behind its swift success: on the one hand the role of the leader Edano Yukio and on the other the construction of a "counterhegemonic" narrative (though short-lived) capable of obtaining consensus in the immediacy of the election. This analysis intends to use the textual material available online (for example: tweets more relevant from a political-programmatic point of view) to identify the narrative framing of the political campaign, regularities and innovations within it to enlarge the CDP's chances to gain at the ballot. In addition, the article intends to assess the role of social networks such as Twitter for politicians even in a seemingly neutral web space such as Japan's.

In recent years, "smart city" has become a buzzword in discussions about urbanisation. While in Europe and North America the initial utopian optimism has now receded, due to booming implementation costs and surveillance concerns, the smart city model has taken root in rapidly urbanising Asia in particular, thanks to the activism of China and Japan. For the latter, smart city technologies and technical know-how represent the new frontier of export goods. In April 2018, the Government of Japan and that of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam announced the construction of a new smart city on the outskirts of the Vietnamese capital Hanoi that is set to become Japan's largest ODA project to date. Despite changes in the global hegemonic narratives on smart cities, the new project bears the features of an urban settlement that revolves around technological data collection for the sake of perfect efficiency, rather than for its prospective inhabitants. Against this backdrop, how did the Government of Japan succeed in constructing a convincing narrative for made-in-Japan smart cities? Since 2011, thanks to specific initiatives by Japan's government and investments by Japanese tech companies in the sector, a Japanese discourse on smart cities has emerged. Through an examination of earlier critiques of the smart city model and a close analysis of official policies and books by energy policy intellectuals, this paper will identify the main features of the Japanese discourse on smart cities and place it in the context of an evolving broader global narrative. The study demonstrates how the Japanese discourse on smart cities largely reflects a corporate managerial vision of the city and, at the same time, a "technonationalist" approach that informs the country's foreign policy.

In recent years, "smart city" has become a buzzword in discussions about urbanisation. While in Europe and North America the initial utopian optimism has now receded, due to booming implementation costs and surveillance concerns, the smart city model has taken root in rapidly urbanising Asia in particular, thanks to the activism of China and Japan. For the latter, smart city technologies and technical know-how represent the new frontier of export goods. In April 2018, the Government of Japan and that of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam announced the construction of a new smart city on the outskirts of the Vietnamese capital Hanoi that is set to become Japan's largest ODA project to date. Despite changes in the global hegemonic narratives on smart cities, the new project bears the features of an urban settlement that revolves around technological data collection for the sake of perfect efficiency, rather than for its prospective inhabitants. Against this backdrop, how did the Government of Japan succeed in constructing a convincing narrative for made-in-Japan smart cities? Since 2011, thanks to specific initiatives by Japan's government and investments by Japanese tech companies in the sector, a Japanese discourse on smart cities has emerged. Through an examination of earlier critiques of the smart city model and a close analysis of official policies and books by energy policy intellectuals, this paper will identify the main features of the Japanese discourse on smart cities and place it in the context of an evolving broader global narrative. The study demonstrates how the Japanese discourse on smart cities largely reflects a corporate managerial vision of the city and, at the same time, a "technonationalist" approach that informs the country's foreign policy.

In the late 1980s, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam, hereafter) underwent a period of reforms known as doi moi (renovation), opened its economy to global flows of goods and capitals and adopted an "omnidirectional" strategy aimed at building relations with former "enemy" states like Japan and the US. These multiple transitions presented the country's communist leadership with new challenges: first and foremost, transforming the country's governance from socialist to a partially neoliberal one in the attempt to accommodate international partners' and investors' demands. The present study will address the following research question: by which means did the Vietnamese leadership succeed in surviving the demise of the USSR and conform to the emerging neoliberal global order? Against the backdrop of the global rise of the good governance model for international development, this article will shed light on Japan's role during Vietnam's first phase of reforms in the early 1990s through its government-led knowledge-based aid initiatives up until the draft of the country's first Comprehensive Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy. It will argue that Japan offered a certain development know-how and a model of state-mediated growth which suited Vietnam's Communist party's needs to keep the single-party rule.

Entro il 2030, Tokyo ridurrà del 26% le proprie emissioni rispetto al livello del 2013. Un impegno che si è rinnovato con la pubblicazione di una strategia di lungo periodo che, se da un lato, punta ad una crescita sostenibile e a basse emissioni, dall'altro rimane ancora fortemente ancorata al nucleare e alle fonti fossili.

Japanese ODA has attracted much attention in the last three decades. This paper aims to shed light on the intellectual evolution of the official discourse on Japanese ODA based on the analysis of two main 'modes of thought' at the foundation of it, namely national interest and international affiliation. Based on a detailed content analysis of official documents and public debates, the paper will take the role of institutional actors-Japanese political leaders, foreign ministers and intellectuals-into consideration. The role of such "entrepreneurs" has been crucial for shaping the current official discourse on Japanese foreign aid. The paper will argue, in fact, that the official discourse is a juxtaposition of two clashing ideas carefully shaped to enlarge the consensus (both domestic and external) toward the Japanese government's policies.

Abe Shinzō è tra i primi ministri più longevi del suo paese, con più di duemila giorni alla guida dell'esecutivo. Nel corso del suo mandato sono state approvate riforme fondamentali (anche se non sempre popolari), come le modifiche alle Leggi di pace e sicurezza che espandono il ruolo dell'esercito e promuovono un nuovo attivismo giapponese in campo internazionale. L'analisi delle costruzioni discorsive su cui fonda la sua azione di governo rappresenta uno strumento utile a comprendere le motivazioni alla base del suo successo politico fuori e dentro il partito. Obiettivo di questo lavoro è esaminare i fattori determinanti della popolarità e della permanenza a capo del governo del premier giapponese, con particolare attenzione al suo stile discorsivo. Le modalità di presentazione dei problemi, oltre all'assegnazione di una maggiore o minore urgenza alle rispettive soluzioni non solo restituiscono un'immagine precisa della vita politica, ma sottolineano quanto il discorso sia un fattore decisivo nella creazione o nella riforma di assetti istituzionali consolidati. I risultati dell'analisi condotta mettono in luce come la costruzione di discorsi e narrative ricorrano a dinamiche di stampo prevalentemente populista, facendo appello alla sfera emotiva dell'elettorato più che alla razionalità.

Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt die Beziehungen zwischen Japan und Vietnam unter dem Gesichtspunkt eines spezifischen Kooperationsprogramms: des "Japanese Grant Aid for Human Development Scholarship" (JDS); ein Stipendienprogramm, das in den zahlreichen japanischen Entwicklungshilfe-Initiativen in Entwicklungsländern Asiens enthalten ist. Das JDS-Programm, das im Jahr 2000 gestartet wurde, bietet jungen Staatsbeamten und zukünftigen Führungskräften aus Entwicklungsländern in Zentral-, Süd- und Südostasien sowie Afrika Weiterbildungsmöglichkeiten in Bereichen wie Recht, Wirtschaft und Staatsverwaltung an öffentlichen und privaten Universitäten in Japan. Es wird argumentiert, dass Japan auch durch die JDS seine regionalen Beziehungen, insbesondere mit einigen Nationen Südostasiens, neugestaltet hat. Aus diesem Grund werden in der vorliegenden Studie die Hilfsbeziehungen zwischen dem südostasiatischen Land und Japan von 2000 bis 2015 dargestellt. Die ausgewählte Fallstudie zeigt eine diskursive Ambiguität der heutigen japanischen Außenpolitik auf. Es wird argumentiert, dass Hilfsinitiativen Japans für die Humanressourcenentwicklung von den verschiedenen Akteuren der öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe diskursiv konzipiert wurden. Anstatt das Konzept der Entwicklung als einen einzigen diskursiven Apparat zu analysieren, untersucht diese Forschungsarbeit, wie unterschiedliche Diskurse und "Denkstile" zwischen Geber- und Empfängerland, Geber und anderen Gebern und sogar zwischen verschiedenen Geberorganisationen interagieren. Diese Denkstile wurden durch qualitative Interviews und dokumentarische Analysen ausgewertet. Zusammenfassend wird argumentiert, dass ein Zusammenspiel von Überlegungen, wie Japans "nationalem Interesse", Japans Zugehörigkeit zur internationalen Gesellschaft und Humanität die japanische wissensbasierte Hilfe seit 2000 geprägt habe. Das nationale Interesse scheint jedoch immer noch der stärkste Antrieb bei der Auszahlung von Beihilfen zu sein. ; The study sheds light on contemporary Japan-Vietnam relations from the point of view of a specific cooperation program : the "Japanese Grant A id for Human Development Scholarship" (JDS), a scholars hip program included in the vast range of Japanese foreign aid initiatives in developing Asia. The JDS programme, started in 2000, offers training in areas like law, economics and public administration to young state officials and future leaders from developing countries in Central, South and Southeast Asia and Africa, in public and private universities in Japan. It is argued that also through the JDS, Japan has reshaped its regional relations, in particular with a number of Southeast Asian nations. The present study aid relations between the Southeast Asian country and Japan from 2000 to 2015 are presented. The study aims to shed light on an apparent discursive ambiguity of today's Japanese foreign policy. It is assumed that aid initiatives in human resource development, have been discursively conceptualised by the different actors participating in Japanese official development assistance (ODA). Instead of looking at the concept of development as a single discursive apparatus, this research looks at how different discourses and "styles of thought" interact between donor/recipient country, donor/other donors and even among different donor's agencies. These styles of thought have been assessed through qualitative interviews and documentary analysis. It is argued, in sum, that an interplay of considerations such as Japan's "national interest", Japan's affiliation to the international society and humanitarianism have shaped Japanese knowledge-based aid since 2000. National interest, however, still appears to be the strongest drive in aid disbursement.

Between Kim Ma, Dao Tan and Linh Lang streets, in the central district of Ba Dinh in Hanoi, lies what has been called a 'Japanese quarter' (nihonjin gai). The aim of this paper is to shed light, based on qualitative analysis, on the dynamics that led to the formation of a 'Japanese' neighbour-hood and the response of the local community as a result of the government of Japan's cultural policies and thriving economic and diplomatic relations.

The aim of this proposal is to analyze the role of Japan in contemporary international relations. More specifically, my analysis will focus on the relationships Japan has forged with Southeast Asian countries, particularly underlining the strong link between Japan and Vietnam over the last decade. What will be taken into consideration in this context is the image requalification process Japan has been implementing since the promotion of the "Fukuda Doctrine" in 1977. Japan has indeed become one of the most active promoters of economic cooperation and development in Asia. I shall therefore consider to what extent Vietnam has benefitted from Japan's economic proactivity and on the other hand, to what extent Japan has affirmed itself in the region, countering the rising of China. From the point of view of economic and democratic development, in fact, since 1945 Japan has undergone a massive transformation that impacted on the relation with other Asian countries. The military occupation of Asia in the 30's, promoted under the banners of dōbun dōshu ("same culture, same race") propaganda led to deep exploitation of countries natural resources, workforce and reduced millions of people to poverty. Instead, after 1945, Japan started considering that a peaceful context could help its expanding economy. As a result, through the promotion of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) since 1954, Japan began to rehabilitate itself in the eye of its neighbouring countries. As for the Vietnamese case, Ōno (2009; 84-86) pointed out that since 2001, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has been among the top four recipients of Japan's aid. Official Development Assistance has provided nearly two trillion yen in infrastructural and social development projects in the last few years. In my paper, Japanese ODA in Vietnam could therefore be interpreted as a "branding" tool to enhance what Simon Anholt calls "national reputation" (Anholt 2010). As also underlined by Negri and Hardt (2000) in fact in the new political order of globalization, "sovereignty has taken new forms". In conclusion, the questions I shall address are how Japan has succeeded in "rehabilitating its image" and what is the real aim behind this strategy in a future perspective.

Almost a third of bariatric surgery patients present suboptimal weight loss or important weight regain in the first five postoperative years. While the reasons underlying this are not fully understood, it is known that pathological eating styles (such as emotional or binge eating) can thwart efforts to maintain weight loss. However, detailed characterization and understanding of these eating styles have yet to be achieved. In particular, research on gender differences in pathological eating styles and psychiatric symptoms before bariatric surgery is lacking. To characterize gender differences in eating styles and their association with clinical symptoms, we prospectively enrolled 110 bariatric surgery candidates, collecting eating styles and clinical scores. Women displayed a higher frequency of emotional eating as compared to men (x2 = 9.07, p = 0.003), while men showed a higher frequency of quantitative eating behavioral style (x2 = 4.58, p = 0.044). Binge eating style was associated with higher Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS), Hamilton Depression Scale (HAM-D), and Hamilton Anxiety Scale (HAM-A) scores (p < 0.05). Emotional eating style was associated with higher HAM-D and HAM-A scores (p < 0.05). The present findings highlight the importance of understanding the role of gender differences in emotion regulation processes involved in the development and maintenance of pathological eating styles in bariatric surgery candidates. This paves the way to gender- and symptoms-specific interventions on eating behaviors to improve surgery long-term outcomes.

Introduction. In Italy, regional governments are in charge of implementing cervical, breast and colorectal cancer screening programmes. The 2020 Coronavirus pandemic led to a national lockdown and the temporary suspension of several non-urgent healthcare activities, including cancer screening. This paper aims to describe the results of a national survey carried out by the National Centre for Screening Monitoring (ONS) on cervical, breast and colorectal cancer screening activities in 2020.Materials and methods. A national survey was conducted by ONS in 2020 to assess: the number of screening invitations by Region; the volumes of screening tests and the attitude to attend the screening programme compared to 2019; the number of delayed diagnoses of malignant or pre-malignant lesions caused by the slowing down of screening programmes, based on the average Region-specific screening detection rate for cervical, breast and colorectal cancers.Results. Screening tests for breast, colorectal and cervical cancer decreased by 37.6%, 45.5% and 43.4% in 2020 compared with 2019. In 2020 the estimated numbers of undiagnosed lesions are: 3,324 breast cancers, 1,299 colorectal cancers, 7,474 colorectal advanced adenomas and 2,782 CIN2 or more severe cervical lesions. Participation in cancer screening programmes decreased by 15%, 15% and 20%, for cervical, breast and CRC screening, respectively.Discussion and conclusions. An urgent call to action is needed to prevent further delaysand to limit the impact of the pandemic on cancer diagnosis and prevention.