Administration, civil service, and bureaucracy
In: The Blackwell companion to political sociology, S. 127-138
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In: The Blackwell companion to political sociology, S. 127-138
In: The good cause : theoretical perspectives on corruption, S. 21-35
Um die soziologischen Positionen von Max Weber zur Korruption aufzuzeigen, skizzieren die Autoren zunächst den historischen "Zeitgeist", in dem Webers Forschungen zur Vetternwirtschaft und Korruption in Europa und in der Welt stattfanden, wie z. B. die Dreyfus-Affäre und der Skandal zum Panamakanal. Sie stellen anschließend einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Entstehung einer Weberianischen Bürokratie in England im 19. Jahrhundert und den Verdachtsfällen von Protektion und Vetternwirtschaft her. Eine theoretische Analyse der Korruption aus der Perspektive Webers muss ihres Erachtens zwischen drei Idealtypen der Herrschaft (traditionell, charismatisch und rechtlich-rational) unterscheiden, die die Grundlage für die Beziehung zwischen Herrschern und Beherrschten bildet. Die Webersche Perspektive bietet damit sowohl einen Forschungsansatz zur systematischen Analyse der Korruption als einem "Netz von Reziprozitäten", als auch ein Konzept zur rechtlich-rationalen Ordnung, die dem abweichenden ökonomischen Verhalten und dem auf privaten Gewinn ausgerichteten wirtschaftlichen Handeln zu Grunde liegt. (ICI)
In: The good cause: theoretical perspectives on corruption, S. 21-35
In: Guidance, control, and evaluation in the public sector: the Bielefeld interdisciplinary project, S. 265-278
Discusses political institutions & professional politicians in Japan. The historical background information illuminates today's institutional context & political class. Recent institutional reform concerning the political class & differentiation of Japan's political system from other states are highlighted. 1 Table, 33 References. L. Collins Leigh
Discusses political institutions & professional politicians in Japan. The historical background information illuminates today's institutional context & political class. Recent institutional reform concerning the political class & differentiation of Japan's political system from other states are highlighted. 1 Table, 33 References. L. Collins Leigh
The establishment of ethnic networks by immigrant communities enhances immigrant workers' access to jobs in certain employment sectors, but this has the effect of excluding native-born ethnic minority groups, particularly African Americans. In-depth interviews with owners & managers (N = 230) of businesses in Los Angeles were conducted to determine the effects of ethnic networks on immigrants' & native-born ethnic minority workers' access to jobs. Findings demonstrate that ethnic networks, especially those created by the Mexican & Central American communities, significantly influenced hiring practices for entry-level positions, but not for skilled positions, for which more formal procedures (eg, interviews & tests) were used, thus decreasing the efficacy of ethnic networks. Even though African American workers are more inclined to seek government jobs due to formal hiring procedures, they are often excluded for other reasons, including prejudice. It is concluded that both ethnic networks & bureaucracy systematically exclude African Americans. 21 References. J. W. Parker
In: Bürokratie im Irrgarten der Politik: Gedächtnisband für Hans-Ulrich Derlien, S. 125-146
In: Public governance and leadership: political and managerial problems in making public governance changes the driver for re-constituting leadership, S. 251-271
In: Future of civil society: making Central European nonprofit organizations work, S. 601-633
In: Experiments in public management research
In: The European Commission in the Post-Lisbon era of crises: between political leadership and policy management, S. 53-66
"This article elaborates on the concept of technocrat, contrasting it with that of a bureaucrat. The impact of the 'Delors heritage' on the administrative culture of the Commission contributed to the perceived politicisation of the Commission that gave way to a 'shifting definition of European administrative excellence' in which 'fundamental skills... [became] subordinated to managerial skills'. A more conservative culture arose that discouraged risk-taking, perhaps explaining the declining leadership role of the Commission." (contract)
In: Governing development across cultures: challenges and dilemmas of an emerging sub-discipline in political science, S. 17-65
The issue of whether bureaucratic corruption hinders or benefits economic development is investigated. An overview of groups & perspectives that have been critical of corruption emphasizes the tendencies for these parties & approaches to confuse inefficiency with corrupt action. Several ways in which bureaucratic corruption can facilitate economic development are identified: (1) The bureaucracy can convince the government to take interest in certain economic enterprises. (2) Corruption can increase investment by reducing investors' fears about government policy. (3) An individual's economic innovations can be implemented without acquisition of political power. (4) Corruption can prevent complete losses from poor government policy. The traditional complaints that corruption hinders taxation, prevents accountability in expenditures, & promotes cynicism are challenged. It is acknowledged that corruption can be highly detrimental to economic development under certain conditions. Harmful bureaucratic corruption could be remedied by redistributing resources to ensure greater economic productivity. J. W. Parker
The prevalence of political corruption in Israel, the UK, & the US is studied. Whereas public officials' acceptance of material inducements terminated in the UK during the 19th century, it is contended that these practices are common in contemporary Israel & the US. Noting the inadequacy of existing explanations for the decline/prevalence of political corruption in these nations, Marxist & populist accounts of the perseverance of corrupt behavior by public officials are explored. It is argued that the political elite is primarily responsible for political corruption's longevity; however, bureaucratic elites capable of controlling political elites can effectively reduce corrupt actions by public officials. The cases of Israel, the UK, & the US are then discussed to bolster these assertions. It is asserted that all three cases demonstrate that the politicization of the bureaucracy led to the use of material inducements by private individuals to influence public officials' decision making. It is concluded that true democratic processes cannot be realized unless the bureaucratic elite is able to control the political elite in a given nation. 33 References. J. W. Parker