Suchergebnisse

Germany seems to be an ideal case for the cartel theory. Public funding for political parties is strongly advanced and there is much inter-party cooperation with respect to the organisational self-interests of parties. This contribution will take a closer look at the formation of the German party cartel and the three analytical dimensions of the cartel model. I will argue that in terms of party organisations, societal linkages and competitive styles German parties only partly match the expectations of the cartel model. Or, to put it more bluntly, there is a party cartel in Germany, but there are no cartel parties. (German Politics / FUB)

This thesis studies the impact, determinants, organization, internal dynamics and characteristics of Dutch cartels during a period in which most cartels were legal. We concentrate on the legal-cartel era defined as the period 1935–1998 wherein the Dutch legislation was cartel friendly. The first explicit cartel-friendly legislation dates back to 1935. It was only in 1998 that cartels became prohibited according to section 6 of the Dutch competition act. From 1941 until 1998 cartels were required to notify the Ministry of Economic Affairs of their anticompetitive agreements and provide detailed information in the so-called cartel register. The primary data from the Dutch cartel register, containing the Dutch cartel notifications, are disclosed in this thesis and form the basis and novel major contribution of this research. _Chapter 2_ discusses the social, legal and economic transformation processes from the legal-cartel era in the 1930s to the anti-cartel regime in the late twentieth century. For four distinctive periods of the legal-cartel era ((i) cooperation and cartels, (ii) modification, (iii) institutional inertia and (iv) transformation), we examine national and international developments and institutional and regulatory change. _Chapter 3_ sheds light on the degree and nature of registered cartelization in the Netherlands in the 20th century. Chapter 3 provides a quantitative substantiation of chapter 2. _Chapter 4_ investigates the effects of cartel activity on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth. A fixed effects panel analysis for 27 industries of the Dutch economy in the period 1982–1998 is conducted to test whether the presence of cartels had impact on TFP growth. Our research results suggest that cartel presence, indicated by registration status in the cartel register, curbs TFP growth at industry level of the Dutch economy in the period 1982–1998. _Chapter 5_ examines twelve characteristics of legal cartels in relation to their duration. We conduct a time survival analysis for 667 legal cartels such as recorded in the cartel register in the Netherlands. We concentrate on cartels that were active in and from 1980 in the period 1980–1990. In the time survival analysis we test which factors help legal cartels survive. Overall, we conclude that there are specific factors that help cartels survive or fail, while there are also factors that have no particular impact on duration.

On January 1, 1958, the "Cartel Statute" of the Federal Republic of Germany' became effective. American interests in this event are threefold: (1) During the past decade Americans have tried to convince the Western world that in an industrial, democratic society legislation of the American antitrust type is imperative. Is the German cartel statute a piece of legislation of this type? (2) The enactment of the statute brings to an end the application of Law No. 56 enacted by the American Military Government on January 28, 1947. The Paris Treaty between the Allied Powers and Germany provided that the Allied "cartel laws," though administered by the German Minister of Economics, should remain in effect until the German legislature could agree on a new statute. (3) The statute will vitally affect trade between America and Germany as well as the operation of sizable American controlled enterprises there.

This article points out the aim and purpose of the competition law in the European Union. Competition law is one of the most crucial and essential part of law that has to be implemented properly to support and ensure smooth functioning of the economy in the state. At the same time, brief explanation of the most anticompetitive agreements such as called "Cartel Agreements" are being described in the article. It is worth to point out the most important and restrictive types of agreements in details that can be seen on the market and within the European Union, that definitely needs special attention by the relevant competition authorities of the Member States. ; This article points out the aim and purpose of the competition law in the European Union. Competition law is one of the most crucial and essential part of law that has to be implemented properly to support and ensure smooth functioning of the economy in the state. At the same time, brief explanation of the most anticompetitive agreements such as called "Cartel Agreements" are being described in the article. It is worth to point out the most important and restrictive types of agreements in details that can be seen on the market and within the European Union, that definitely needs special attention by the relevant competition authorities of the Member States.

After applying the dilemma illustrated in Garrett Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" to open-access fisheries, which face overfishing, the idea of conservation cartels is discussed. While they have been successful, these cartels are held as uniformly per se illegal arrangements under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Private property is seen as a potential solution, with such regimes manifesting in the form of collective or "common property" rights. However, despite the benefits of such a regime, the most common approach to fishery conservation is government regulation. It is argued that such regulation does little to fend off the tragedy of the commons. Antitrust litigation against marine conservation cartels inhibits the development of nongovernmental cooperative management structures that can address fishery problems. Further, the anticompetitive nature of these cartels does not preclude their working in the interest of the common good.

The study of cartels is important to economists as well as business historians, but, on the whole, there has been little cross cultivation between the two academic fields. This article examines cartel theory developed by economists in the context of the historical case of international aluminum cartels in existence before 1940. By analyzing three basic theoretical questions—when cartels appear, when they break down, and when they are successful—in light of the empirical evidence of the aluminum industry, the article argues that economics and history, although they have very different approaches, can profit from using each other's methods when studying cartels.