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A los pocos meses de su fundación, para el Partido Comunista de Chile fue una preocupación la instauración del fascismo en su país. El antifascismo comunista fue un discurso que se fue construyendo tempranamente y que correlacionó factores nacionales e internacionales. En este artículo explicamos el desarrollo histórico de este proceso y su incidencia en la práctica política del partido desde su fundación hasta la inflexión de las políticas de "clase contra clase" en 1934. Planteamos que la construcción del antifascismo comunista estuvo dividida en dos fases. La primera estuvo marcada por las similitudes y correspondencias que ciertos actores y coyunturas tuvieron respecto al fascismo europeo, lo que generó un amplio abanico de recepciones en torno a la relación entre la violencia, el fascismo y el capitalismo, lo que finalmente les permitió identificar un modus operandi fascista en Chile. Así, la segunda fase se abocó a la construcción de un discurso identitario y estratégico en clave defensiva frente a la impronta fascista de los gobiernos y regímenes de turno de la primera parte de la década de 1930. ; A few months after its founding, it was a concern for the Communist Party of Chile to establish fascism in their country. Communist antifascism was a discourse that was built early and that correlated national and international factors. In this article, we explain the historical development of this process and its impact on the political practice of the party from its foundation to the inflection of "class vs. class" politics in 1934. We argue that the construction of communist antifascism was divided into two phases. The first was marked by the similarities and correspondences that certain actors and situations had with European fascism, which generated a wide range of receptions around the relationship between violence, fascism and capitalism, which finally allowed them to identify fascist methods in Chile. Thus, the second phase was devoted to the construction of an identity and strategic discourse in a ...

In 1959 the triumph of the Cuban Revolution undoubtedly marked a watershed for the history of Latin America and also for the International Communist Movement. The particularities of the process led by Fidel Castro would also inspire new reflections on the characteristics of the Revolution in our continent, and not only in it, and the ways to achieve it. In this sense, the debate about the revolutionary "way" came to occupy a preponderant place in the agendas of the revolutionary parties. The objective of this paper is to reconstruct the reception of the Revolution led by Fidel Castro in the PC of Chile taking under account the communist militant subectivity and the articulation with local political parties.

The Chilean Communist Party [PCCh] was a pragmatic, manipulating party that sustained the pacific way until the very last minute, which rejected the armed path as a politic option and perfectly mastered the rules of the political game. But at the same time, it has always a disciplined party, with a rigid hierarchy and loyal to the URSS. The PCCh "wasn't a party like the others", in the sense that he must face constant internal pressure among a social dimension and a theological dimension. This work relates to a contradictory actor in the political scene, which didn't stand as a simple satellite of Moscow orders. In fact, their political action was determined by a democratic habitus which behavior results of a deep understanding of the rules played on the political arena, and the social structures learned through the party's experience. The construction and further consolidation of this habitus, and the confrontation of the democratic principles when the party reached the Presidency of the Nation [as a member of the Popular Unity Alliance], showed us how these democratic habits grew inside the PCCh et how this democratic habitus was built by the successive PCCh leaders, at different times and scenarios, because the PCCh's practices were closely aligned with the democratic principles. In that way, and holding this particular political know-how which differenced them from the rest of the Latin American communist parties, the PCCh contributed to sustain a practice-based system and the representations of the democratic Chilean regime, reaching a privileged place in the Chilean political order. ; Le Parti communiste chilien était un parti pragmatique, manipulateur, qui a soutenu la voie pacifique jusqu'au bout, a rejeté la voie armée comme moyen de lutte politique et a maîtrisé à la perfection les règles du jeu politique. Mais, dans le même temps, il a été un parti discipliné, hiérarchisé, fidèle aux directives de l'URSS. Le PCCh n'était pas un parti « comme les autres », car il devait faire face aux tensions ...

The Chilean Communist Party [PCCh] was a pragmatic, manipulating party that sustained the pacific way until the very last minute, which rejected the armed path as a politic option and perfectly mastered the rules of the political game. But at the same time, it has always a disciplined party, with a rigid hierarchy and loyal to the URSS. The PCCh "wasn't a party like the others", in the sense that he must face constant internal pressure among a social dimension and a theological dimension. This work relates to a contradictory actor in the political scene, which didn't stand as a simple satellite of Moscow orders. In fact, their political action was determined by a democratic habitus which behavior results of a deep understanding of the rules played on the political arena, and the social structures learned through the party's experience. The construction and further consolidation of this habitus, and the confrontation of the democratic principles when the party reached the Presidency of the Nation [as a member of the Popular Unity Alliance], showed us how these democratic habits grew inside the PCCh et how this democratic habitus was built by the successive PCCh leaders, at different times and scenarios, because the PCCh's practices were closely aligned with the democratic principles. In that way, and holding this particular political know-how which differenced them from the rest of the Latin American communist parties, the PCCh contributed to sustain a practice-based system and the representations of the democratic Chilean regime, reaching a privileged place in the Chilean political order. ; Le Parti communiste chilien était un parti pragmatique, manipulateur, qui a soutenu la voie pacifique jusqu'au bout, a rejeté la voie armée comme moyen de lutte politique et a maîtrisé à la perfection les règles du jeu politique. Mais, dans le même temps, il a été un parti discipliné, hiérarchisé, fidèle aux directives de l'URSS. Le PCCh n'était pas un parti « comme les autres », car il devait faire face aux tensions constantes existant au sein de la pratique et du discours entre les dimensions sociétale, qui se construisait à partir et dans la configuration politique et sociale chilienne, et téléologique, issue de l'appartenance au monde communiste. Notre travail a rendu compte d'un PCCh contradictoire, multiple qui n'a pas été un satellite de Moscou. Au contraire, son action politique a été déterminée par un habitus démocratique, où ensemble de modes et de comportements acquis qui résultent de l'internalisation de l'ensemble des règles du système politique liées au régime démocratique, et des structures sociales objectives à travers l'expérience du Parti. À partir de la construction et de la consolidation de cet habitus démocratique ainsi que de la confrontation des principes démocratiques à la pratique du PCCh lorsqu'il gagne la Présidence de la république au sein de l'alliance de l'Unité populaire, on a observé que cet habitus démocratique a été construit et consolidé par les choix des dirigeants du Parti en époques et configurations distinctes, ce qui a déterminé que la pratique du PCCh ait été en accord avec les principes démocratiques du régime. Ainsi, créditeur d'un savoir-faire politique particulier qui l'a différencié des autres partis communistes d'Amérique latine, le PCCh a contribué à maintenir en vigueur le système des pratiques et les représentations du régime démocratique chilien et a réussi à occuper une place privilégiée au sein de l'ordre politique chilien.

This article investigates the links between the Communist International (Comintern) and the Communist Party of Chile from 1922 to 1941 based on the hypotheses set forth below. Between 1927 and 1935 the Communist Party of Chile suffered two major ruptures, both in the contents of its national policy and its relationship with the Communist International. The first break, between 1927 and 1933, marked the transition from extraordinary, political autonomy to practically total subjection to the different Comintern bodies which, through gross interference, attempted to convert the Communist Party of Chile into a simple executor of their decisions which were inspired by the politics of "class against class". The move to popular front policies in 1935 allowed the Chilean party greater margins of autonomy. Although the relationship with the Comintern would remain –essentially– in the terms established at the beginning of the decade, the successes of the Chilean party and the eclipse of the South American Bureau (BSA) of the Communist International, would allow the Communist Party of Chile room for action somewhat less restricted by the Comintern bodies. ; Este artículo indaga los vínculos entre la Internacional Comunista (Komintern) y el Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh) desde 1922 hasta 1941 a partir de las siguientes hipótesis. Entre 1927 y 1935 el PCCh sufrió dos rupturas mayores, tanto en los contenidos de su política nacional como en la relación con la Internacional. El primer quiebre, entre 1927 y 1933, significó el paso de una extraordinaria autonomía política a una sujeción prácticamente absoluta a los diferentes órganos komintereanos que, a través de una ruda intromisión trataron de convertirlo en un simple ejecutante de sus decisiones inspiradas por la política de "clase contra clase". El paso a la política frentepopulista en 1935 permitió al partido chileno mayores márgenes de autonomía frente a la Internacional Comunista. Aunque la relación con el Komintern se mantendría –en lo esencial– en los términos establecidos a comienzos de la década, los éxitos del partido chileno y el eclipse del Buró Sudamericano (BSA) de la Internacional, permitirían al PCCh un margen de acción algo menos asfixiante por parte de los organismos komintereanos. ; Este artigo explora as ligações entre a Internacional Comunista (Komintern) e o Partido Comunista do Chile (CCP) de 1922 a 1941, com base nas seguintes hipóteses. Entre 1927 e 1935, o PCC sofreu duas grandes rupturas, tanto no conteúdo de sua política nacional quanto em seu relacionamento com a Internacional. A primeira interrupção, entre 1927 e 1933, significou a passagem de uma extraordinária autonomia política para uma sujeição praticamente absoluta aos vários órgãos Komintern que, por interferência rude, tentaram transformá-la em um mero executor de suas decisões inspiradas pela política de "classe contra classe". A mudança para a política de frente popular em 1935 permitiu ao partido chileno uma maior autonomia em relação à Internacional Comunista. Embora o relacionamento com o Komintern permanecesse essencialmente nos termos estabelecidos no início da década, o sucesso do partido chileno e o eclipse do Escritório Sul-Americano (BSA) da Internacional permitiriam ao PCC uma margem de ação um pouco menos sufocante por parte dos órgãos do Komintern.

El presente artículo examina, en base a declaraciones oficiales y testimonios de sus líderes, los cambios en la línea política del Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh) durante el período inmediatamente posterior al golpe de Estado de 1973, hasta el llamado a la rebelión popular para derrocar a la dictadura. El interés de análisis respecto de esta etapa es dimensionar los alcances políticos que tendrá la relación entre los miembros del PCCh del "interior" y el "exterior"; la influencia del contexto internacional; el análisis político y teórico que harán en la Unión Soviética, así como en otros partidos comunistas pro soviéticos, de las razones de la derrota de la "vía chilena al socialismo", y analizar los factores que pudieron haber influido en los ochenta en el viraje político del PCCh. ; This article examines, based on official declarations and testimonies of its leaders, the changes in the political line of the Communist Party of Chile (C.ChP) during the period immediately following the 1973 coup d'état, until the call for popular rebellion to overthrow the dictatorship. The analytical interest in this stage is to measure the political scope of the relationship between the members of the CCP of the "interior" and the "exterior"; the influence of the international context; the political and theoretical analysis that they will make in the Soviet Union, as well as in other pro-Soviet communist parties, concerning to the defeat of the "Chilean way to socialism", and analyze the factors that could have influenced in the eighties in the political turn of the C.Ch.P. ; peerReviewed

RESUMENEn 1959 el triunfo de la Revolución Cubana marcó sin duda un parte aguas para la historia de América Latina y también para el Movimiento Comunista Internacional. Las particularidades del proceso liderado por Fidel Castro inspirarían además nuevas reflexiones sobre las características de la Revolución en nuestro continente, y no sólo en él, y las formas de alcanzarlo. El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo reconstruir la recepción de la Revolución liderada por Fidel Castro en el PC de Chile, teniendo en cuenta elementos para comprender la subjetividad de los militantes comunistas de aquellos años y la articulación con la tradición de los partidos políticos locales.ABSTRACTIn 1959 the triumph of the Cuban Revolution undoubtedly marked a watershed for the history of Latin America and also for the International Communist Movement. The particularities of the process led by Fidel Castro would also inspire new reflections on the characteristics of the Revolution in our continent, and not only in it, and the ways to achieve it. In this sense, the debate about the revolutionary "way" came to occupy a preponderant place in the agendas of the revolutionary parties. The objective of this paper is to reconstruct the reception of the Revolution led by Fidel Castro in the PC of Chile taking under account the communist militant subectivity and the articulation with local political parties.

En el Pleno de 1977, el PCCh estableció la tesis del Vacío Histórico en torno a lo militar, así como los lineamientos políticos para salir de él. Diversos fueros los afluentes militantes que comenzaron a llenar con reflexión y propuestas este vacío, la gran mayoría de ellos en el exilio. Este artículo, reconstruye y analiza la experiencia histórica y la trayectoria política de un contingente de militantes comunistas formados profesionalmente en las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Cuba a partir de 1975. Al respecto, sostenemos que el recorrido militante de este colectivo de comunistas, da cuenta de las complejas dinámicas partidarias internas, marcadas por la autocrítica inicial pos golpe de Estado y luego por las urgencias establecidas en función del término a la dictadura. De esta manera, el inicio del proceso de formación, la vida en las unidades militares, así como la producción política-teórica desarrollada por estos militantes en torno a la Política Militar del PCCh es un claro reflejo de las necesidades y vaivenes que experimentó el comunismo chileno en la década de los setenta, sobre todo en una temática esquiva dentro del debate partidario. ; From the "Historical Void" to the development of the military politics of the Communist party in Chile. Itinerary and political production of Chilean communist officers in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, 1975-1980. In the assembly of the central committee of 1977, the PCCh established the thesis of a Historical void on the military matter, and also the political guidelines to come out of it.Diverse were the militant tributaries that started to fill this void with forethought and propositions, most of them from the exile. This article rebuilds and analyzes the historical experience and political trajectory of a contingent of communist militants that were professionally educated in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba since of 1975. Thereupon, we stand that the militant trajectory of this communist group, gave an account of the complex dynamics inside the party, highlighted by the initial auto critique post-coup, following the emergency instituted in function of the ending of the dictatorship. Thus, the beginning of the education process, the daily life in the military units, as well as the political-theoretical production regarding the military politics of the PCCh developed by these militants, are a clear reflect of the needs and the ups and downs that the Chilean communism experimented in the 70s decade, specially about an evasive subject inside the debate of the party.

In the Great Depression, numerous American writers and intellectuals were attracted to the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA). This chapter provides an institutional analysis of that political-literary experience, arguing that it is best understood through a prism of structure.

Ricardo Fonseca's funeral was not only the posthumous tribute to who had been General Secretary of the Chilean Communist Party. In the context of the political proscription that affected the communists, the organization of the funerals, in mid-1949, became an effective political tool that sought to influence that complex scenario, demonstrating the strength that could still be deployed and reinforcing its own party identity, affected by its virtual marginalization of political life. This was expressed in the thorough preparation of the funeral, the monumental character that adopted the ritual and the impact it had on other political actors. ; El funeral de Ricardo Fonseca no fue solo el homenaje póstumo a quien había sido secretario general del Partido Comunista de Chile. En el contexto de la proscripción política que afectaba a los comunistas, la organización de las exequias, a mediados de 1949, se transformó en una efectiva herramienta política que buscó influir en ese complejo escenario, demostrando la fuerza que todavía podía desplegar y reforzando la propia identidad partidaria, afectada por su virtual marginación de la vida política. Esto se expresó en la minuciosa preparación de las exequias, el carácter monumental que adoptó la ritualidad y el impacto que produjo en otros actores políticos.

This paper presents the results and conclusions of the study of the relationship between the ideas that were elaborated from PC of Chile with respect to the indigenous peoples, especially Mapuche. Through a hemographic review, it identifies and analyzes the discourses established by the PC; with the purpose of verifying the hypothesis regarding the elaboration of different inclusive speeches to understand the existence and political participation of the different indigenous peoples, from 1912 to 1973. ; El presente artículo expone los resultados y conclusiones del estudio de la relación entre las concepciones que se elaboraron desde PC de Chile respecto a los pueblos indígenas, en especial, el mapuche. A través de una revisión hemerográfica, identifica y analiza cuales fueron los discursos establecidos por el PC; con el propósito de constatar la hipótesis respecto la elaboración de distintos discursos inclusivos para comprender la existencia y participación política de los diferentes pueblos indígenas, desde 1912 hasta 1973.

El artículo trata sobre los cambios en el imaginario político internacionalista del Partido Comunista chileno, tras el derrumbe de la Unión de República Socialista Soviética y el inicio de la "transición" a la democracia en su país. Se sostiene que después de una profunda crisis interna y de sus referentes, el PCCh reformuló su política internacionalista, enfatizando su perspectiva latinoamericanista. Si bien esta venía desarrollándose desde antes, en particular durante los años de la Dictadura de Pinochet, la mantención de Cuba como un Estado socialista le permitió reafirmar la vigencia de su proyecto histórico y concretar nuevas formas de solidaridad con otros pueblos del continente. Ello allanó la posibilidad de que los comunistas chilenos recibieran con entusiasmo otros procesos anticapitalistas de la región, tal como fue la rebelión zapatista en México. Aunque nunca plantearon copiarla mecánicamente, los más importantes dirigentes comunistas tuvieron simpatía y atracción del proceso encabezado por el EZLN, pues les dio algunas claves de sentido para enmarcar a escala continental las movilizaciones que impulsaban en Chile contra las políticas neoliberales. Esto se argumenta en base a periódicos, revistas, documentos partidarios y bibliografía relacionada al tema. ; The article its about the changes in the Chilean Communist Party´s imaginary political internationalist, after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and the beginning of the "transition" to democracy in his country. It is argued that after a deep internal crisis and its referents, the Chilean Communist Party reformulated its internationalist policy, emphasizing its Latin American perspective. Although it had been developed before, particularly during the Pinochet dictatorship, Cuba's maintenance as a socialist state allowed it to reaffirm the validity of its historic project and to establish new forms of solidarity with other peoples of the continent. This paved the way for the chilean communists to enthusiastically welcome other ...

This item is part of the Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements (PRISM) digital collection, a collaborative initiative between Florida Atlantic University and University of Central Florida in the Publication of Archival, Library & Museum Materials (PALMM).

Where the people saw in the February 7, 1986 snap presidential election a chance to deliver a crippling blow on the Marcos regime, a memorandum by the Executive Committee of the Party Central Committee (EC-CC) saw it merely as "a noisy and empty political battle" among factions of the ruling class. When the aroused and militant people moved spontaneously but resolutely to oust the hated regime last February 22-25, the Party and its forces were on the sidelines, unable to lead or influence the hundreds or thousands of people who moved with amazing speed and decisiveness to overthrow the regime. This was because of the Party's official policy enunciated by the EC-CC to launch an active and vigorous boycott campaign vis-a-vis the election, a policy that was based--as the events showed--on the incorrect reading of the political situation. An assessment conducted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee characterized the boycott policy as a major political blunder.

This item is part of the Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements (PRISM) digital collection, a collaborative initiative between Florida Atlantic University and University of Central Florida in the Publication of Archival, Library & Museum Materials (PALMM).