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THE TWO VALUABLE COLLECTIVE VOLUMES1 UNDER REVIEW HAVE MUCH IN COMMON. THEY ASSEMBLE PREVIOUSLY UNPUBLISHED STUDIES; MOST OF THESE ARE SHORT MONOGRAPHS, BASED ON EXTENSIVE RESEARCH PROJECTS, AND CONSTITUTING SOPHISTICATED CONTRIBUTIONS TO SPECIALIST DEBATE; AND THEY RANGE OVER AN IMPRESSIVE VARIETY OF LOCALES. POLITICAL CLIENTELISM, PATRONAGE AND DEVELOPMENT OPENS WITH THE THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS OF ONE EDITOR (LEMARCHAND) AND TERMINATES WITH THOSE OF THE OTHER (EISENSTADT, WRITING TOGETHER WITH LUIS RONIGER, WHO ALSO PROVIDES A MOST USEFUL BIBLIOGRPHY OF OVER 500 ENTRIES). IN BETWEEN, IT CONTAINS ESSAYS EXPLORING CLIENTELISTIC POLITICS IN ITALY: (BY MARIO CACIAGLI AND FRANK BELLONI, AND BY JUDITH CHUBB); FRANCE (JEAN-FRANCOIS MEDARD); POLAND (JACEK TARKOWSKY); MEXICO (SUSAN KAUFMAN PURCELL); PERU (LAURA GUASTI); AND TURKEY (ERGUN OZBUDUN). THE VOLUME EDITED BY CLAPHAM ALSO OPENS WITH THE EDITOR'S OWN 'THEORETICAL' REFLECTIONS (I USE QUOTATION MARKS BECAUSE ACCORDING TO CLAPHAM HIMSELF THE PHENOMENON OF CLIENTELISM DOES NOT PROPERLY WARRANT A THEORY OF ITS OWN-AS IF THEORIES NECESSARILY HAD TO DEAL DEI MASSIMISISTEMI). THE ESSAYS THAT FOLLOW CONSIDER THE USSR (R. H. BAKER); BRAZIL (PAUL COMMACK); LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE (CLAPHAM HIMSELF); SOUTH VIETNAM UNDER DIEM (DENNIS DUNCANSON); THAILAND (JEREMY KEMP); IRELAND (MICHAEL HIGGINS); TROPICAL AFRICA (JEAN-FRANCOIS MEDARD-THE ONLY AUTHOR TO APPEAR IN BOTH COLLECTIONS); AND THE US (MARIE-FRANCE TOINET AND IAN GLENN). THE AUPY: 1983

In the previous issue of this journal (ROAPE 84), the author argued that international anticorruption efforts created conflicts between aid donors & African debtor governments because they attacked the ability of local interests to control & appropriate state resources. The control of corruption is an essential element in the legitimization of liberal democracy & in the promotion of global markets. However, it also threatens the local accumulation of wealth & property (dependent as it is on access to the state) in postcolonial Africa. This article explores another dimension of this problem, namely the way in which clientelist forms of political mobilization have promoted corruption & intensified crisis. Clientelism has been a key mechanism through which political interests have built the electoral support necessary to ensure access to the state's resources. In turn, it has shaped a politics of factional competition over power & resources, a politics obsessed with the division of the political spoils. The article argues that this process is not unique to Africa. What is different, however, is that factional conflict & its attendant corruption have had such devastating consequences. This reflects the particular forms that clientelism has taken on the continent. There is a need, it concludes, to find ways to shift African politics towards issues of social justice & government performance & away from a concern with a division of the state's resources. 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

The organizational training method designed by Cladomir Santos de Morais, which has been successfully applied in Honduras, Costa Rica, Portugal, Botswana, South Africa, & other countries may be useful for undercutting the clientelism so prevalent in many Latin American countries. Clientelism interferes with the ability of certain nations to function as postindustrial states, because these states require greater citizen empowerment & participation. Morais's method however, emphasizes autonomy & therefore results in individual & group empowerment, making it an effective strategy for breaking clientelism's power. Issues of action vs rhetoric, & the process of mass organized training in autonomy are explored. 16 References. D. Weibel

"In Latin America and beyond, societies are deeply unequal, the poor are marginalized, and states face continuous fiscal shortages and real or potential political instability. In this context, democracy functions imperfectly. It intermeshes with clientelism, with the incongruous result that clientelism not only erodes, but also accompanies and supplements democratic processes. Armed with evidence of these complex interactions, this book improves understandings of how and why clientelism endures and why state policy is often ineffective. Political scientists and sociologists, the contributors employ ethnography, targeted interviews, case studies, within-case and regional comparison, thick descriptions, and process tracing. They write from political economy and institutionalist as well as principal-centered and agent-centered perspectives"--

Introduction : the art of raccomandazione -- The ethnographic setting -- Patronage/clientelism : some theoretical considerations -- Towards a poetics of patronage -- Raccomandazione, tangente and mafia : an "amoral" family of genres -- Raccomandazione, class relations and the southern question -- Employing the 'little shove' : raccomandazione and work -- "We're not Uganda, but almost" : raccomandazione and southern identity -- Conclusion : raccomandazione and the bourgeois-liberal world order -- Epilogue : what happened when they read what I wrote : Mediterranean clientelism and corruption revisited

Discusses democratic consolidation and extension of substansive social, political, and civil rights to citizens, which is often undermined by clientelist social relations; theoretical and strategic issues and case studies; 5 articles. Contents: Theoretical and strategic issues: organizational empowerment versus clientelism, by Miguel Sobrado Chaves; Clientelism and citizenship: the limits of democratic reform in Sucre, Colombia, by Cristina Escobar; Levels of empowerment: marketers and microenterprise-lending NGOs in Apopa and Nejapa, El Salvador, by Serena Cosgrove; Changing patrons, from politician to drug don: clientelism in downtown Kingston, Jamaica, by Amanda Sives; Democracy, decentralization, and clientelism: new relationships and old practices, by María Pilar García-Guadilla.

It appears that elections increase chances for a smooth transition to democracy only in competitive authoritarian regimes where political instability already exists. This essay explores the process the author calls 'competitive clientelism' whereby elections supply ruling elites in authoritarian regimes opportunities to compete over limited sets of state resources that they then distribute to local elites a structure that reduces demand for any change to democracy. Adapted from the source document.