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There is a need for permanent mechanisms of conflict resolution (CR), ie mechanisms that can decide who is the winner & who is the loser, & distribute sanctions, punishments & rewards among the parties & terminate a conflict. 12 mechanisms of this kind are discussed: mechanisms where both parties participate (regulated warfare, fights, duels, legal duels, verbal duels, debates, mediation/arbitration, court processes & voting). They function sometimes as mechanisms of direct CR: the winner also wins in the underlying conflict & the loser loses both places. Thus, ordeals were used to distribute property. But the mechanisms were also often used in a more indirect or independent way: they focused the attention of the parties to a conflict on something new, they functioned as a safety-valve, & they brought some kind of compensation to the loser. 15 conditions seem important for the instit'ization of a CR mechanism. It is pointed out that these conditions are probably complementary in the sense that if some of them are satisfied, the others are less necessary; the mechanism will be more firmly rooted the more conditions are satisfied. Some consequences of this principle are pointed out. Finally, the possibility of instit'ized CR in the field of internat'l conflict is discussed, & a mechanism based on a combination of world-wide TV debates between spokesmen of the parties to the conflict, voting by the whole world pop, & a set of well-known rules of internat'l behavior is analyzed. The propositions are illustrated by means of scattered reports on the various mechanisms, with a concentration on ordeals, legal duels & common-sense knowledge of court processes. IPSA.

There is no framework for conflict analysis currently in existence: generalization across disciplinary lines has been slow to develop, propositions have not been systematically linked, res has not always been guided by hyp's of acceptable power & significance, & no body of case materials based on comparative types, unifying concepts & general hyp's has been developed. In an attempt to arrive at more precise conceptualization, 50 propositions culled from the literature are presented & analyzed. The following 8 properties of conflict systems are outlined as the basis for hyp's re the sources, conditions, functions, context, & type of conflict: (1) conflict requires at least 2 parties or 2 analytically distinct units, (2) conflict arises from `positions scarcity' &'resource scarcity,' (3) conflictful behaviors are those designed to destroy, injure, thwart, or otherwise control another party or otner parties, & a conflict relationship is one in which the parties can gain only at each other's expense, (4) conflict requires interaction among parties in which actions & counteractions are mutually opposed, (5) conflict relations always involve attempts to gain control of scarce resources & positions or to influence behavior in certain directions; hence a conflict relationship always involves the attempt to acquire or exercise power or the actual acquisition or exercise of power, (6) conflict relations constitute a fundamental soc-interaction process having important consequences, (7) a conflict process or relation represents a temporary tendency toward disjunction in the interaction flow between parties, & (8) conflict relations do not represent a breakdown in regulated conduct but rather a shift in the governing norms & expectations. I. Taviss.

A discussion of pacifism 'to clarify some theoretical problems in sociol as well as in pacifist ideologies & to point out some hyp's_that might not only be validated theoretically or ideologically but also possibly be tested empirically.' Conflict is defined as value disagreement, which must be distinguished from cognitive disagreement. There is a distinction between instrumental & expressive behavior in conflict situations. The former has the function of contributing to conflict resolution, while the latter serves the function of tension release from the latent intensity. The problem becomes: 'how can the expressive needs be taken care of in a conflict with minimal instrumental costs?' The following expressive equivalents of violence are seen: (1) aggression may be directed against more abstract entities, eg, soc structures, rather than against the individual antagonist, (2) 'some expressive outlet will be gained from the mere feeling of offering resistance of putting up a fight,' & (3) 'it may be that the kind of non-violent behavior indicated is not only compatible with, but directly an expression of, some deeper, latent urges that we do not know.' A structural-functional analysis of conflict-relevant behavior is undertaken. The following 3 techniques for the prevention of manifest conflicts are discussed: creation of a network of primary relations between groups, creation of mutual interdependencies, & creation of authority in a supersystem. Gandhi's methods of preventing the aggravation of conflicts are noted: sticking to the initial aim, showing confidence in the adversary, understanding the opponent's point of view, & fighting the antagonism, not the antagonist. 5 aspects of non-violent actions instrumental to accepted solutions are considered: conflict resolution as soc control, systematic norm infraction, emptying of statuses, suffering, & conflict behavior as anticipatory conflict resolution. Some res topics relevant to the nrohlems discussed are suneested. I. Taviss.

A brief review of previous studies containing quantative analyses of legislative voting behavior is followed by the author's own analysis which emphasizes the importance of a valid methodology. It is found that Rice-type indices are incapable of being evaluated by any fixed objective criterion & are defective as measures of cohesion & conflict. The probability-based measures, on the other hand, provide a feasible means that is both valid & objective of evaluating & comparing cohesion & conflict within legislative bodies. These 2 indices were applied to 98 roll-call votes in the sessions of both houses of the Kan legislature in 1959. The analysis produced no evidence that an Ur or Ru bloc of legislators existed in either house. There was no continuous antipathy between the 2 groups that reflected itself over a broad range of issues. Only rarely did Ur vs Ru antagonism come into play. Although party was a relatively important factor, at least in the House of Representatives, the data do not suggest that party considerations were very often a factor in the total voting pattern of the legislature. Modified Author's Summary.

While game theory has been useful in the strategy of pure conflict, it has not performed well re 'games' in which mutual dependence is part of the logical structure & demands some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation. Thus the scope of game theory must be enlarged, with the zero-sum game taken to be a limiting case rather than a point of departure. Such an extension is proposed along 2 lines: (1) identification of the perceptual & suggestive element in the formation of mutually consistent expectations, & (2) identification of some of the basic 'moves' that may occur in actual games of strategy & the structural elements that the moves depend on. The following problems are analyzed: mutual perception & suggestive behavior, enforcement, communication, & strategic moves; & coordination of expectations in the 'pure'-bargaining game. It is concluded that in the methodology appropriate to a study of bargaining games: (a) the mathematical structure of the payoff function should not be permitted to dominate the analysis, (b) there is a danger in too much abstractness; the character of the game is changed when there is a drastic alteration in the amount of contextual detail that it contains or when such complicating factors as the players' uncertainties about each other's value systems are eliminated, & (c) some essential part of the study of mixed-motive games is necessarily empirical. I. Taviss.

"We hope this book is at least a mediocre attempt toward introducing an idea that will change the meaning of social and personality conflicts as radically as did Freud when he reported an hysterical symptom is effected by a motive and not a neutral mechanism or an inherently weak neurology. The symptom, said Freud, is related to a dynamic psychology, a purpose. This discovery has not been, and probably never will be, refuted. The question still remained, however. What is this purpose? With, and since Freud, attempts were made to answer this question in terms of forces that are distinctly genetic and individualistic in nature. That is, what should have been an antiquated form of atomism was taken for granted. Our solution is radically different. Our basic premise is that the current group life is the ultimate, that any tendency must be traced to this totality. The symptom is both anticipated and nourished by the total group setting. When we look at a neurotic, for example, we do not ask what is wrong with that person, what are his weaknesses? Rather, we ask, what are the nature of those group forces which, when they meet at the point represented by our subject, effect what is called a neurosis? We ask, why are there conditions that at times make it necessary for the individual to live a neurotic role in order that he may do the in inevitable, adjust to and contribute toward the group life? In a sense, then, in perspective, the purpose behind the symptom is the purpose behind all behavior, the need to preserve the whole, the need to contribute toward the dynamic cohesiveness that dominates all life. If the symptom has purpose, then it also has social utility"--Preface. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

Are domestic soc conditions related to the incidence of internat'l aggression? One way of approaching this question is to look at the justifications for war; however, a study of the verbal rationale for war does not lead very far sci'ly, since the same argument is equally useful for peace or war. A 2nd appraoch, called the `prerequisites' approach, attempts to isolate societal factors which predispose states to engage in war. A review of empirical findings in this 2nd area reveals the following: democratic pol'al systems have less foreign conflict than authoritarian pol'al systems; totalitarian countries fall in between. Rich countries have more foreign conflict than most of the econ'ly developing nations of the world. High unemployment & high Ur pop density, 2 indicators of domestic stress, are associated with high levels of foreign conflict. 3 out of 4 types of nonconformist behavior are related positively to war propensities. Domestic soc conflict behavior is directly with foreign conflict, esp when the conflict is expressed anomically; passive deviance, alcoholism death-rates & suicides are also high among countries which most frequently engage in war. But homicide is related inversely to war. Nearly all of the factors which r positively with foreign conflict are, in turn, related to Ur'ization. The exception is the type of pol'al system, since nondemocracies are found mostly in Ru countries. In very few cases, nevertheless, does the magnitude of the r exceed 30. IPSA.

This paper develops a theory of how groups meet their members' demands. It is argued that the members of social units obtain satisfaction of their economic, cultural, and political needs through participation in social groups, including states or nations. It posits that changing environmental conditions may give rise to new needs or demands on the part of the members of groups. It argues that these new demands may be realizable either through self-reliant policies pursued in isolation or through relations with other political and social units. The theory is concerned particularly with national behaviors-be they individual or group, official or unofficial—which constitute the external responses of peoples comprising nation-states. The model essentially consists of the opposition of the two sets of factors. The direction of behavior of a group is schematized as the resultant balance between the strength of factors driving and/or attracting behavior inward and the strength of those factors pushing and/or pulling toward collaboration. The paper discusses factors influencing the choice in each of the two directions and predicts that the individual's and group's behaviors at any given time will be determined by the balance between these factors. The direction of behavior of the group is hypothesized to be conditioned upon such past history and current realities as the following: 1.1 and 1.2. The satisfactoriness or un-satisfactoriness of the group's experiences with its self-reliance versus its experiences with collaborative measures. 2.1 and 2.2. The degree to which the ideologies of the group's members are isolationist or collaborative. 3.1 and 3.2. The extent to which self-reliant means seem practical and advantageous versus the extent to which collaborative means seem feasible and advantageous. 3.3. The extent to which the group's task requires interdependence on other groups or allows the group to pursue its goal in isolation. 4.1. The degree to which the group's leadership perceives isolation or collaboration as supporting or destroying its elite positions. 4.2. The extent to which the members of the group think of collaborative relations as interfering with successful self-reliance. In addition to factors which give directionality to the behavior of groups, the model hypothesizes that there are auxiliary factors, which may facilitate or hinder the extent to which the group achieves isolation or collaboration, such as: 5.1. The extent to which the groups which interact have common and congruent, rather than contradictory and conflictful, elements in their cultural backgrounds and language-thought processes. After a discussion of the model's general characteristics and its inadequacies and limitations, brief illustrations are given of its use in the analysis of current policy issues in international affairs. For example, the theory indicates that regional collaboration, whether it is successful or unsuccessful, will tend to make universal collaboration less likely. On the issue of the number of functions which should be encompassed by a supra-group organization, the model predicts that single-purpose collaboration will tend to be extinguished, while multifunctionalism generates further collaboration.

In developing his revised `2-factor' or `2-step' approach to behavior, O. H. Mowrer has introduced fear & hope (& other related affects), as intervening or `mediating' variables between the environmental stimulus & the behavior of the S. 'Thus, where Behaviorism restricted itself to the simple, onestep S-R formula,' according to Mowrer, 'we are here confronted by the necessity of postulating, minimally, a 2-step, 2-stage formula: S-r: s-R, where S is the danger signal, r the response of fear which is conditioned to it, & where s is the fear, experienced as a drive, which elicits (after learning),response R.' In grossly oversimplified fashion the stimulus can be viewed as increasing or decreasing the level of a given affect which, in turn, shapes the organism's consequent behavior. If at all applicable to internat'l relations & the behavior of states, this basic hypothesis suggests that it is at least as important to study the intervening affect variables as it is to analyze the environmental stimuli, or the record of decisions reached & actions taken. Indeed, it is precisely in the affect phases of the interaction system between 2 or more states that one would expect to find the pulsing dynamics of internat'I behavior. Hostile states - trading reciprocally threatening or punishing stimuli - build explosive accumulations of affect which, by a kind of reaction process or 'Richardson process,' give rise to increasingly provocative decisions & actions. Modified AA.

The presentation of a theory of the manner in which groups meet their members' demands, maintaining that that behavior is determined by the balance between the factors driving &/or attracting behavior inward (isolation) & those pushing &/or pulling toward collaboration. A description of the kinds of demands that members may make upon their groups is followed by an investigation of the factors determining whether groups turn toward isolation or collaboration: past experience factors, ideological factors, perceptions of the short run, internal group factors & auxiliary factors. The model is then treated as an operating system & methods of producing change in the direction of group behavior are considered & the model is applied to nations. Limitations of the model are presented. Finally, the variables & relationships embodied in the model are employed in the analysis of 3 problems in the org of internat'l affairs: universal against regional org's, single-function against multi-function collaboration & institutions first against consensus first. I. Taviss.

It is argued that the fundamental problem of game theory is to determine what rational expectations intelligent players (P's) can consistently entertain about each other's behavior. In the case of the 2-person 0-sum game (& in some other special cases) it is sufficient to assume that the P's not only act rationally themselves by maximizing their expected utilities, but also expect each other to act rationally. These assumptions then imply that the P's will necessarily arrive at the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution of the game. But in the case of most other games, including bargaining games & more generally all cooperative games, we need more specific assumptions as to what rational expectations the P's can hold about each other's strategies. First, we need a symmetry postulate saying essentially that a rational P cannot expect a rational opponent to follow a less intelligent bargaining strategy than he himself would follow in his place, & in particular cannot expect his opponent to make concessions in situations where he himself would refuse such concessions. We also need a restriction-of-variables postulate, stating that a rational P cannot expect a rational opponent to let his behavior be governed by variables completely irrelevant for rational choice & for utility maximization. These postulates are defended against objections by Thomas C. Schilling. It is pointed out that any theory of bargaining behavior would have to use a symmetry postulate in some form, because it would have to assume the same basic rationality criteria (or the same basic psychol'al laws) for both P's. It is shown that the postulates proposed entail the Nash-Zeuthen solution for cooperative games. Schelling's attempt to build a theory of bargaining games (in which there is a partial conflict of interest between the 2 P's) on an assumed analogy with the theory of pure coordination games (in which there is a complete identity of interests between the 2 P's) is criticized. It is shown on various examples that a bargaining problem has a very diff logical structure from a coordination problem. Bargaining theories based on rationality postulates, like the Nash-Zeuthen theory, serve 3 main analytical purposes: (1) prediction & explanation of the actual outcome in bargaining situations, (2) conceptual clarification of the meaning of `rational behavior' in bargaining contexts, & (3) definition of a `bargaining equilibrium point', representing the outcome corresponding to the theoretical balance of power between the parties. For these purposes the Nash-Zeuthen theory has the great advantage of being based on a clear & specific concept of rational behavior & therefore yielding a unique determinate solution for each particular bargaining situation--a solution in very good agreement with our commonsense evaluation of the parties' relative bargaining power. AA.

The major deterrent against military attack by the USSR in the Amer conception is that of instant & massive retaliation (deterrence (D) is one of the principal elements in the current internat system contributing to the prevention of war). Whether military D so conceived is actually effective in preventing attack or war is analyzed on the basis of the findings of behavioral sci'ts. D as perceived by both the US & the USSR seeks to influence each other's behavior by threat of retaliatory punishment. Both nations thus ignore the empirical findings of psychol'ts about individuals & groups, namely. that outside threat tends to increase the cohesiveness of a group. Punishments, or threat of them, while they may tend to suppress behavior, serve little to change underlying motives & increase anxiety & hostility in those upon whom it is used; rewards may, however, change the direction of an organism's effort & motives. Behavior change therefore is accomplished much more effectively by a combination of reward & punishment than through the latter alone. In determining the effectiveness of D, it is necessary to know exactly what the aggressor expects to win. This can only be inferred from his history, his explicit ideology & his observable behavior. In launching a nuclear attack the aggressor must expect clearly to achieve gains signif'ly more than he can conservatively expect to lose by such an operation as compared to other alternatives available to him. Costs to the USSR might be increased by making it clear that not one or two entities, such as people or military equipment, could be hurt but rather a variety of entities, relations & even ideas of value to the decision-making elite. The probability that Russia would be successful, as perceived by the decision makers, might be decreased by increasing the invulnerability of one's retaliatory force, perhaps through having it mobile and widely dispersed. Other factors should also be taken into account in determining the effectiveness of D. There is evidence that those who have experienced disaster, for example, may make determined efforts to avoid experiencing it again. On a feeling level the threat of destruction ought, other things being equal, to be greater for the USSR than for the US. Furthermore, people with high aspirations prefer fairly moderate odds & will not take risks in situations where the stakes are big. Thus it is suggested that the tendency of communists to assume that history is on their side would lead them not to gamble and to take only small risks. If D is to be effective in influencing Soviet decision makers, it must not rely solely upon the threat of punishment. A D weapons system should be utilized to decrease the probability of success & to increase the likelihood of loss of one possible avenue of their movement, while at the same time deterring positively through increasing the payoff & the likelihood of success to them for every step in other directions. AA.

An exp'al investigation of the phenomena of trust, defining it as the expectation of an occurrence leading to behavior which is perceived to have greater negative motivational consequences if the expectation is not confirmed than positive motivational consequences if it is confirmed. A 2-person non-zero sum game was set up in which the gains or losses incurred by each person are a function of the choices made by one's partner as well as the choices made by one's self. The data from the S's involved not only the individual's choices but also what he thought the other person would choose & what he thought the other expected him to choose. 3 diff types of motivational orientation were established: cooperative, individualistic, & competitive. It was hyped that under a cooperative motivational orientation S's would be very likely to establish mutual trust; in the individualistic orientation S's would be unlikely to establish mutual trust if they had to make their choices without being aware of the other's choice; & under a competitive orientation, S's would be very unlikely to establish mutual trust & would be most likely to establish mutual suspicion. These hyp's were confirmed. A stable cooperative system was found to involve the following elements: expectation, intention, retaliation, & absolution. It is thus concluded that mutual trust is most likely to occur when people are positively oriented to each other's welfare. It may, however, occur even where there is no such orientation if the characteristics of the situation are such as to lead one to expect one's trust to be fulfilled. Some of these situational characteristics are: (1) the opportunity for each person to know what the other person will do before he commits himself irreversibly to a trusting choice, (2) the opportunity & ability to communicate fully a system for cooperation which defines mutual responsibilities & specifies a procedure for handling violations, (3) the power to influence the other person's outcome & therefore to reduce any incentive he may have to engage in untrustworthy behavior, & (4) the presence of a 3rd person whose relationship to the 2 players is such that each perceives that a loss to the other is detrimental to his own interests vis-a-vis the 3rd person. I. Taviss.