Suchergebnisse

Der Beitrag untersucht die Interaktion zwischen Gewerkschaften, die Löhne aushandeln, und Politikern, die die Höhe der Arbeitslosenversicherungsbeiträge und des Arbeitslosengeldes bestimmen. Wenn Politiker sich nicht für eine zukünftige Politik verpflichten, werden Beiträge und Leistungen im Verhältnis übermässig hoch. Das Ergebnis ist geringe Beschäftigung und niedrige Produktion. Die Wahl eines Politikers, der konservativer ist als der Durchschnittswähler mag zwar das Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem lösen, auf der anderen Seite könnte die Lohnflexibilisierung zu einer Abschwächung des Glaubwürdigkeitsproblems führen. Durch den Schleier der Ignoranz betrachtet, zeigt sich das Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem möglicherweise als ein Segen und nicht als Fluch. (ICCÜbers)

A political leader's temptation to deny costly debts to past supporters is a central moral-hazard problem in politics. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to probe the consequences of this moral-hazard problem for leaders who compete to establish political regimes. In contests for power, absolute leaders who are not subject to third-party judgments can credibly recruit only limited support. A leader can do better by organizing supporters into a court which could cause his downfall. In global negotiation-proof equilibria, leaders cannot recruit any supporters without such constitutional checks. Egalitarian norms make recruiting costlier in oligarchies, which become weaker than monarchies. The ruler's power and limitations on entry of new leaders are derived from focal-point effects in games with multiple equilibria. The relationships of trust between leaders and their supporters are personal constitutions which underlie all other political constitutions.

Abstract
This essay raises the question whether citizens in the digital age can learn from how credibility is treated in international negotiations. Negotiators face problems both in attempting to send credible signals and in making credibility assessments of received signals. Several studies, starting with Schelling's seminal analysis of commitments, indicate that credible signals are those that are somehow costly to the sender. Contributions to our understanding of how recipients make credibility assessments include Jervis's distinction between signals (with no inherent credibility) and indices (believed to be untainted by deception). The most general conclusion emerging from existing research is that there is no definitive, infallible solution to the problem of credibility, insofar as deception and misperception are intrinsic to all signaling systems. Today's unfortunate combination of limited awareness of credibility problems, on the one hand, and technological advances facilitating deception, on the other, calls for intensified education as well as multidisciplinary research.

Creating a new government agency presents some interesting
management challenges. The "Start‐up Problem" is how to
balance demands for credibility outside with the need to create internal
order. "Liability of Newness" whereby young organizations
will perish unless they quickly supply a credible product to external
expectations must be reduced. Explores some processes used by three new
Canadian agencies in solving the start‐up problem and identifies several
lessons that may help others.

AbstractWe provide empirical evidence of research practices that can undermine the credibility of empirical research in agricultural economics. We find that, in four popular journals, most studies are underpowered, a characteristic that, when coupled with publication bias, yields unreliable and exaggerated effect sizes. This problem is exacerbated by selective reporting of statistically significant results and multiple hypothesis testing without any adjustments to statistical inferences. Survey respondents self‐report engaging in practices that are consistent with these empirical findings. Addressing these problems in agricultural economics will require that editors, reviewers, and donors change the norms and incentives for authors.